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The Addison C. Harris Lecture  
Building the Federal Judiciary (Literally and Legally): The 
Monuments of Chief Justices Taft, Warren, and Rehnquist† 
JUDITH RESNIK* 
ABSTRACT 
The “federal courts” took on their now familiar contours over the course of the 
twentieth century. Three chief justices—William Howard Taft, Earl Warren, and 
William Rehnquist—played pivotal roles in shaping the institutional, 
jurisprudential, and physical premises. Taft is well known for promoting a building 
to house the U.S. Supreme Court and for launching the administrative 
infrastructure that came to govern the federal courts. Earl Warren’s name has 
become the shorthand for a jurisprudential shift from state toward federal 
authority; the Warren Court offered an expansive understanding of the role federal 
courts could play in enabling access for a host of new claimants seeking an array 
of rights.  
William Rehnquist is identified with limiting both rights and access in favor of 
state court and of executive authority. He has been less well appreciated for his 
role in changing the institutional capacity of the federal courts. During the 
Rehnquist era, the budget of the federal courts doubled as staff and facilities 
expanded, in part by way of the largest federal building program since the New 
Deal.  
Over the course of the twentieth century and under the leadership of all three 
chief justices, the judiciary gained an increasingly robust corporate persona. 
Judges shifted their sights from “court quarters” to custom-designed courthouses 
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Resnik. This Lecture built on and is related to the book Representing Justice: Inventions, 
Controversies, and Rights in City-States and Democratic Courtrooms (2011), co-authored 
with Dennis Curtis. Thanks are due to Dean Lauren Robel, Dawn Johnsen, and Charlie 
Geyh, whose hospitality prompted this Lecture, as well as an earlier conference, 
Congressional Power in the Shadow of the Rehnquist Court: Strategies for the Future. My 
Article from that earlier conference can be found at Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: 
The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223 (2003).  
  I owe a great debt to remarkable research assistants. Special thanks to Allison Tait, 
Jason Glick, Ruth Anne French-Hodson, and to Brian Holbrook, Ester Murdukhayeva, and 
Charles Tyler, to undergraduates Katherine Haas, Rose Malloy, and Dale Lund, to recently 
graduated students Adam Grogg and Elliot Morrison, and to Marin Levy who did intensive 
and thoughtful historical research into the many documents related to federal building 
projects. 
  I should add that I have been a participant in some activities about which I write. In 
addition to being an occasional litigator in the federal courts, I have testified before both 
Congress and committees of the Judicial Conference on issues related to topics addressed 
here. See, e.g., Courtroom Use: Access to Justice, Effective Judicial Administration, and 
Courtroom Security: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010) [hereinafter 2010 Courtroom Use: Access to 
Justice] (statement of Judith Resnik). 
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and, during Chief Justice Rehnquist’s tenure, obtained billions of dollars to fund 
new construction. The Administrative Office of the United States Courts came into 
close contact with two other federal bureaucracies—the General Services 
Administration and the National Endowment for the Humanities—and developed a 
program of construction that made massive federal courthouses signature buildings 
of the federal government.  
Changes of the last decades, however, interrupt the narrative of federal judicial 
growth spiraling ever upward. Flattening rates of filings, vanishing trials, and 
limitations imposed both by Congress and the Supreme Court on federal court 
authority make fragile both the monumental aspirations for federal adjudication 
and the continuing investment of resources in federal judges and in their courts. 
The cultural capital of the federal courts overshadows that of state and 
administrative adjudication, but, as federal jurisprudence continues to constrict 
access, the state courts—with jurists pressing for “Civil Gideon”—are advancing 
the very agendas that the Warren Court once made “federal” imperatives. 
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I. TRANSFORMING THE JURISDICTIONAL AND JURISPRUDENTIAL LANDSCAPE 
In 1850, the federal government owned about fifty buildings. None were labeled 
courthouses. Today, several hundred federal courthouses dot the landscape of the 
United States. Their existence marks both the transformation of the federal 
government and the commitment of all three branches to the importance of 
adjudication in this polity.  
These many solid (and often stone) structures give an impression of longevity 
that masks their complex origins and relatively short history, just as the Ionic 
columns of the U.S. Supreme Court (figure 1) suggest a building style far removed 
from that in vogue in 1935 when its doors opened. The grandeur of that building 
forecast the role that the Court it sheltered has come to play in American life.  
 
 
Figure 1: United States Supreme Court, Washington, D.C. Architect: Cass Gilbert, 1935.  
 
Archival image from 1935 reproduced courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration.
 
At the time, the structures for the lower courts, like their ambitions, were much 
more modest. Through the 1960s, federal judges were focused on obtaining what 
their reports called “court quarters,”1 rather than on securing financing for the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED 
STATES 18 (Mar. 1961); REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF SENIOR CIRCUIT JUDGES 18 (Sept. 
1945); see infra note 203 and accompanying text. 
  The Judicial Conference and its predecessor, the Conference of Senior Circuit 
Judges, produced reports either yearly or biannually. These reports were first published (in 
1924) by a law review, then in the Annual Reports of the Attorney General, and 
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architecturally important buildings that have since come to mark their housing 
stock. In the 1980s, however, when contemplating the rise in filings, the judiciary’s 
leadership sought relief for what it termed a “housing crisis” and argued for more 
and better spaces for its expanding workforce and workload.2  
By then, “the federal courts” had become a vivid part of legal and popular 
culture. The pervasive assumption was that an unending spiral of growth in the 
federal caseload needed to be matched by larger footprints for its buildings. That 
belief was grounded in the century’s history. From 1901 to 2001, as shown in the 
chart entitled Article III Authorized Judgeships: District, Circuit, and Supreme 
Courts, 1901, 1950, 2001 (figure 2), authorized judgeships grew from about 100 to 
more than 800 life-tenured positions.  
 
Figure 2: Article III Authorized Judgeships: District, Circuit, and Supreme Courts, 1901, 
1950, 2001.  
 
Copyright © 2007 Judith Resnik. 
                                                                                                                 
subsequently as independent documents that, after 1939, were sometimes bound with the 
Annual Reports of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, which came into 
being in 1939. The titles of the Conference reports vary somewhat; in some years the report 
is denoted the “Annual Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United 
States,” and in other years, the “Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the 
United States.” Further, the name of the Conference changed from the Conference of Senior 
Circuit Judges to the Judicial Conference of the United States. For brevity, I will refer to 
each Judicial Conference report by the title JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, the relevant 
page, and the month and year of publication. 
 2. See DIR. OF THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT 66 (1989); 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 82–83 (Sept. 1989). Because these Administrative Office 
reports are also annual publications and also have some name variation, I will cite each as 
AO ANN. REP., followed by the relevant pages and year of publication.  
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As detailed in the next chart, Civil and Criminal Filings in United States District 
Courts: 1901, 1950, 2001 (figure 3),3 caseloads followed a similar upward slope, as 
they climbed from the 1901 figure of under 30,000 civil and criminal cases to more 
than 300,000 in 2001. 
 
Figure 3: Civil and Criminal Filings in United States District Courts: 1901, 1950, 2001.  
 
Copyright © 2008 Judith Resnik. 
 
Thus, in 1995, the first “Long Range Plan” produced by the judiciary’s 
policy-making body, the Judicial Conference of the United States, was preoccupied 
with how to handle the presumably ever-spiraling upward demands.4 That report 
predicted that by 2010, civil and criminal filings would exceed 600,000.5  
During the last several years, however, filings have leveled off. In 2010 (as in 
1995), some 325,000 to 350,000 civil and criminal cases were begun yearly, 
outstripped as they have been in the past by bankruptcy petitions that, by 2010, 
numbered almost 1.5 million. The decade-plus trend is captured by comparing two 
charts. Figure 4, Federal Court Filings, 1950–2010, sketches the last sixty years,  
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 3. These data are derived from caseload statistics compiled by the Office of Judges 
Program, Statistics Division, Administrative Office of the United States Courts. Federal 
Judicial Caseload Statistics, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/Federal 
JudicialCaseloadStatistics.aspx.  
 4. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL 
COURTS (1995) [hereinafter LONG RANGE PLAN], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
uscourts/FederalCourts/Publications/FederalCourtsLongRangePlan.pdf (republished at 166 
F.R.D. 49 (1996)). The Judicial Conference there made more than ninety recommendations 
to Congress. For additional discussion, see infra notes 511–16 and accompanying text.  
 5. LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 15 tbl.3.  
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and figure 5, Federal Court Filings, 1995–2010, provides a snapshot of the more 
recent time period.6 To translate the data into percentage increases, civil and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 6. Comparisons between the projected filings and cases filed were made when the AO 
reviewed the implementation of the judiciary’s future planning. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE 
U.S. COURTS, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS: 
STATUS REPORT I–18 (2008). The data in figures 4 and 5 come from various AO volumes, 
including AO ANN. REP. 138 tbl.C-1 (1950); id. at 165 tbl.D-1 (criminal data); AO ANN. 
REP. 217 tbl.13 (1980) (civil data); id. at 269 tbl.40 (criminal data); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
REPORT 4 (Mar. 1986) (both civil and criminal data); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS: MARCH 31, 1995, at 33 tbl.C-1 (1995) (civil data); 
id. at 57 tbl.D-1 (criminal data); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL 
CASELOAD STATISTICS: MARCH 31, 2000, at 34 tbl.C-1 (2000) (civil data); id. at 58 tbl.D-1 
(criminal data); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD 
STATISTICS: MARCH 31, 2005, at 39 tbl.C-1 (2005) (civil data); id. at 63 tbl.D-1 (criminal 
data); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS: 
MARCH 31, 2010, at 43 tbl.C-1 (2010) (civil data); id. at 68 tbl.D-1 (criminal data). Slight 
variations on the numbers reported can be identified by comparing these numbers with those 
found at Federal Court Management Statistics (2011), U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/FederalCourtManagementStatistics.aspx, and at ADMIN. 
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES: MULTI-YEAR STATISTICAL 
COMPILATIONS ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY’S CASELOAD THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 2008 
(2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/ 
2008/alljudicialfactsfigures.pdf.  
  Focusing on the years between 2001 and 2009, civil and criminal filings averaged 
328,404. Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics.aspx (follow “Federal Judicial Caseload 
Statistics” for any year; then follow “Judicial Caseload Indicators” hyperlink). The high was 
349,076 filings in 2005, and the low was 312,738 filings in 2006. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE 
U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS: MARCH 31, 2006, at 6 (2006) 
[hereinafter FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS (2006)], available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2006/front/ma
r06indicators.pdf; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD 
STATISTICS: MARCH 31, 2005, at 6 (2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2005/front/mar05toc.pdf. The average 
for bankruptcy filings over the same period was 1,362,728; the year-to-year figures were 
more volatile. Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics.aspx (follow “Federal Judicial Caseload 
Statistics” for any year; then follow “Judicial Caseload Indicators” hyperlink). The high was 
1,794,795 bankruptcy filings in 2006, a reporting period which included the five months 
between the time when President Bush signed the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23, and the time when the  
law went into effect. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS (2006), supra, at 6. The low 
was 695,575 bankruptcy filings in 2007. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS: MARCH 31, 2007, at 6 (2007), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2007/front/ 
IndicatorsMar07.pdf. 
  Filings in criminal cases increased in 2010 to an “all-time high” of 78,000. Judiciary 
Makes Appeal for Fiscal 2011 Funding, THIRD BRANCH, Nov. 2010, at 2, 3. Bankruptcy 
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criminal case filings grew about 10% from 1950 to 1965, about 95% from 1965 to 
1980, about 50% in the interval from 1980 to 1995, and, since then, the growth has 
slackened off—to under 25% from 1995 to 2010.7 Further, while civil filings 
represented the major source of growth during the big spurt years of the 1960s to 
the 1980s, criminal filings constitute the primary basis for the more recent 
increases.8  
 
                                                                                                                 
filings also increased—a “staggering 63 percent since June 2008.” Id.  
 7. To be specific, from 1950 to 1965, filings in federal courts increased by 
9.39% (23.9% increase in civil filings, and 11.63% decrease in criminal filings). From 1965 
to 1980, total filings increased by 95.73% (149.4% increase in civil filings, and 13.24% 
decrease in criminal filings). From 1980 to 1995, they increased by 48.39% (47.13% 
increase in civil filings, and 55.78% increase in criminal filings). And from 1995 to 2010, 
they increased by 22.57% (13.68% increase in civil filings, and 71.55% increase in criminal 
filings). See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2010 FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD 
STATISTICS tbl.F-2 (2010) [hereinafter FED. WORKLOAD STATS. (2010)]; ADMIN. OFFICE OF 
THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 135 tbl.C-1, 195 tbl.D-
1 (1995); AO ANN. REP. 370 tbl.C-1, 415 tbl.D-1 (1980); AO ANN. REP. 174 tbl.C-1, 213 tbl. 
D-1 (1965); AO ANN. REP. 138 tbl.C-1, 165 tbl.D-1 (1950). 
 8. See FED. WORKLOAD STATS. (2010), supra note 7; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS (1995); AO ANN. REP. (1980); 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 46 (Sept. 1965); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 3–5 (Sept. 
1950). As noted, civil filings rose about 14%, while criminal filings grew about 72%. The 
map of bankruptcy filings is somewhat more complex because of the changing contours of 
the bankruptcy statute that has varied eligibility rules and created new judicial officers—
bankruptcy judges. From 1950 to 1965, bankruptcy filings grew 440%, from 33,392 to 
180,323. From 1965 to 1980, bankruptcy filings increased about 162%, reaching 472,400. In 
the following two fifteen-year periods, from 1980 to 1995 and from 1995 to 2010, filings 
increased 82% and 83%, respectively. As of 2010, filings were 1,572,597.  
  By way of context, state court filings rose about 39% from the 1980s to the 1990s; 
rose about 9% from the 1990s to 2000; and, in the interval from 2000–2008, rose more than 
35%. See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: AN 
ANALYSIS OF 2008 STATE COURT CASELOADS 45 tbl.1 (2010) [hereinafter STATE CT. 
CASELOAD STATS. (2008)]; NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD 
STATISTICS, 2001, at 138 tbl.7 (2001) [hereinafter STATE CT. CASELOAD STATS. (2001)]; 
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1990, 
at 108 tbl.7 (1992) [hereinafter STATE CT. CASELOAD STATS. (1990)]; NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE 
COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1980, at 55 tbl.13 (1984) 
[hereinafter STATE CT. CASELOAD STATS. (1980)]. The numbers include domestic cases, and 
in the most recent interval, criminal filings rose at twice the rate of civil filings. 
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Figure 4: Federal Court Filings, 1950–2010.  
 
Copyright © 2010 Judith Resnik. Source: Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.  
 
 
Figure 5: Federal Court Filings, 1995–2010.  
 
Copyright © 2010 Judith Resnik. Source: Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. 
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Various explanations can be proffered for this relative flattening, such as shifts 
in doctrine and statutes that have narrowed access to the federal courts, the expense 
of lawyers, and the elaboration of alternative dispute resolution methods, as well as 
a host of other variables that range from the role played by regulatory oversight and 
availability of insurance to the ups and downs of the economy. Yet the slower rise 
in the demand curve interrupts a narrative of ever-expanding federal court activity.  
Moreover, during the last fifteen years when the increase in filing rates slowed, 
a key investor in the federal courts—the U.S. Congress—has imposed new limits 
on the judiciary’s statutory authority.9 Further, even as the judiciary has been 
relatively successful in maintaining its budgetary allotments,10 members of 
Congress have questioned the need for new courtrooms and proposed cutting back 
construction funds.11 Congress has also been reluctant to add judgeships requested 
                                                                                                                 
 
 9. See, e.g., Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 
2600, 2636 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006)), invalidated in part by 
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 356, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-
644 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), Pub. 
L. No. 104-134, § 804, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-073 (1996) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 
1915 (2006)). 
 10. Support for operating budgets in both fiscal year 2009 and in fiscal year 2010 was 
96% and 98% of the amount sought, respectively. See Update: Fiscal Year 2009 and 2010 
Budgets, THIRD BRANCH, Apr. 2009, at 4, 4; Judiciary Makes Case for Fiscal Year 2009 
Funding, U.S. COURTS (Mar. 12, 2008), http://www.uscourts.gov/News/NewsView/08-03-
12/Judiciary_Makes_Case_for_Fiscal_Year_2009_Funding.aspx; Judiciary To Get $6.9 
Billion in FY 2010 Appropriations, U.S. COURTS (Dec. 15, 2009), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/News/NewsView/09-12-
15/Judiciary_To_Get_6_9_Billion_In_FY_2010_Appropriations.aspx. The 2011 
appropriations of $6.91 billion was 94% of what the federal judiciary had requested. See 
Federal Judiciary Funded to End of Fiscal Year, THIRD BRANCH, Apr. 2011, at 1, 1; 
Expanding Caseload Fuels Judiciary Request for Resources in 2011, U.S. COURTS (Mar. 18, 
2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/News/NewsView/10-03-18/Expanding_Caseload_Fuels_ 
Judiciary_Request_for_Resources_in_2011.aspx. Further, the $6.91 billion for 2011 was 
“about 1 percent above a FY 2010 hard freeze.” Federal Judiciary Funded to End of Fiscal 
Year, supra, at 1. Included was $82 million for new construction and $280 million for repairs 
and renovation. Id. at 3. For fiscal year 2012, the judiciary sought $7.3 billion in 
appropriations, an increase of $299 million over the 2011 budget. Judiciary Warns of Impact 
of Deep Cuts in 2012, THIRD BRANCH, Apr. 2011, at 1, 2. Included were salaries, staff, 
defender services, court security, and rent for space. Id. 
 11. See, e.g., Eliminating Waste and Managing Space in Federal Courthouses: GAO 
Recommendations on Courthouse Construction, Courtroom Sharing, and Enforcing 
Congressionally Authorized Limits on Size and Cost: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Econ. Dev., Pub. Bldgs., and Emergency Mgmt. of the H. Comm. on Transp. and 
Infrastructure, 111th Cong. (2010) [hereinafter 2010 Eliminating Waste and Managing 
Space in Fed. Courthouses]; Courtroom Use: Access to Justice, Effective Judicial 
Administration, and Courtroom Security: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and 
Competition Policy of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010) [hereinafter 2010 
Courtroom Use: Access to Justice].  
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and has refused to provide salaries for judges to keep pace with inflation. The fiscal 
constraints of 2011 impose additional pressures for cutbacks.12 
In this Harris Lecture, I reflect on the edifice known as the federal courts, whose 
shape and import have changed radically over the past century. The federal courts 
loom large even as state systems receive the vast bulk of filings and address a wider 
array of legal questions. State courts receive almost 100 million cases, including 
traffic filings.13 State Trial Court Filings, 1976–2008 (figure 6) reflects that 
volume, as does Comparing the Volume of Filings: State and Federal Courts, 2001 
(figure 7),14 which offers a one-year snapshot to put the federal civil, criminal, and 
bankruptcy filings in the context of the state court workload.  
 
 
Figure 6: State Trial Court Filings, 1976–2008.  
 
Copyright © 2010 Judith Resnik. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 12. See, e.g., Hard Choices and Difficult Issues: The Judiciary Considers Its Financial 
Future, THIRD BRANCH, Oct. 2011, at 1. 
 13. STATE CT. CASELOAD STATS. (2008), supra note 8, at 45 tbl.1, 54 tbl.3. 
 14. Thanks are owed to Ruth Anne French-Hodson and Jason Glick for obtaining and 
mapping the data and to David Rottman and the National Center for State Courts for 
providing information and direction. As figure 6, which looks at a time frame beginning in 
1976, reflects, state court data collection does not offer the ability to have national figures on 
filings throughout the twentieth century, and the obvious caveats apply to the materials 
thereafter—that collection and county vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
2012] BUILDING THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 833 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Comparing the Volume of Filings: State and Federal Courts, 2001.  
 
Copyright © 2011 Judith Resnik. 
 
Yet the federal courts, with their relatively modest caseloads, dominate legal law 
and culture. As I will detail below, federal courthouses, like the hundreds of 
statutes on federal court jurisdiction, are twentieth-century artifacts of interactions 
among the judiciary’s leadership, the legislative and administrative branches, and 
the private sector. Thus, my discussion underscores the degree of interbranch 
agreement and of coventuring that the edifice of the federal courts reflects.15 Three 
chief justices of the twentieth century—William Howard Taft, Earl Warren, and 
William Rehnquist—were pivotal in transforming the landscape (literal and 
figurative) of the federal courts. During their tenures, new doctrines, jurisdictional 
provisions, infrastructures, procedural practices, and physical spaces reshaped the 
federal courts.16  
Chief Justice Taft, who had served as the country’s president, has long been 
appreciated within the legal academy for his administrative vision—memorialized 
                                                                                                                 
 
 15. In contrast, scholarship is often focused on the conflicts among the branches. See, 
e.g., CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE: THE STRUGGLE FOR 
CONTROL OF AMERICA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM (2006). 
 16. Several studies of the office of the Chief Justice address its holders—often with a 
focus on the role in relationship to the other justices and the decisions rendered by the Court. 
See generally Joel K. Goldstein, Leading the Court: Studies in Influence as Chief Justice, 40 
STETSON L. REV. 717 (2011). 
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in his restructuring of the Supreme Court’s docket, his orchestrating of the creation 
of a conference of judges (with the chief justice as its head) as a policy voice for 
the branch, and his insistent promotion of a building for the Court.17 Further, while 
attentive to state governance and deeply committed to the protection of property 
rights, the Taft Court’s jurisprudence accelerated the twentieth century’s tilt toward 
national control, as the Court took upon itself the important role of adjusting the 
distribution of power between state and federal governments.18  
Earl Warren is the chief justice associated with the expansion of access to the 
federal courts and with the elaboration of individual rights through (inter alia) 
Brown v. Board of Education19 (ordering school desegregation), Gideon v. 
Wainwright20 (requiring the provision of counsel for state felony defendants), and 
Fay v. Noia21 (permitting federal habeas corpus review of state court judgments).22 
These pillars of the Warren Court’s jurisprudence obliged states and their courts to 
enforce federal access and equality norms—thus constraining state power and 
putting what in the 1970s came to be called “federalism” concerns second to 
federal commitments to individual rights protection.23 
                                                                                                                 
 
 17. See generally Robert C. Post, Mr. Taft Becomes Chief Justice, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 
761 (2008) [hereinafter Post, Mr. Taft]; Kenneth W. Starr, William Howard Taft: The Chief 
Justice as Judicial Architect, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 963 (1992). The “conventional image” of 
Taft is “a stubborn defender of the status quo, champion of property rights, apologist for 
privilege, [and] inveterate critic of social democracy.” ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, WILLIAM 
HOWARD TAFT: CHIEF JUSTICE 13 (1964). Mason linked the “dualism” of Taft as court 
reformer and as conservative to Taft’s view that courts could be instrumental in staving off 
criticism of the social order. Were courts more efficient, they could meet “legitimate 
demands for evenhanded justice” as they also could protect private property and “help 
disarm its most dangerous enemies—socialists, communists, and progressives.” Id. at 13–14. 
Taft’s interest in judicial reform prompted him to decline appointment to be an associate 
justice, for he wanted to preside as the Court’s chief. Id. at 17. 
 18. See Robert Post, Federalism in the Taft Court Era: Can It Be “Revived”?, 51 DUKE 
L.J. 1513 (2002) [hereinafter Post, Federalism in the Taft Court Era]. Mason also focused on 
the ways in which Taft’s reading of the Commerce Clause provided the foundations for 
federal regulatory authority to later decades. MASON, supra note 17, at 16.  
 19. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 20. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 21. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). 
 22. This list is far from complete. See generally EARL WARREN AND THE WARREN 
COURT: THE LEGACY IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN LAW (Harry N. Schreiber ed., 2007); David 
A. Strauss, The Common Law Genius of the Warren Court, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 845 
(2007). William Brennan is recognized as central (“Warren’s intellectual chief-of-staff”) to 
contributions associated with Warren. Dennis J. Hutchinson, Hail to the Chief: Earl Warren 
and the Supreme Court, 81 MICH. L. REV. 922, 928–29 (1983). Some of Warren’s critics 
disagree with an assessment of his impact. See, e.g., Philip B. Kurland, Earl Warren, The 
“Warren Court,” and the Warren Myths, 67 MICH. L. REV. 353 (1968). Kurland argues that 
“no evidence” supported Warren’s influence beyond the vote “conferred upon him,” and that 
rather than making the Court, the Court “formed him.” Id. at 354. 
 23. The term “federalism” did not enter the discourse in federal court decisions until 
1939, and was then used to describe a political system rather than a justification for 
constitutional interpretation until the 1970s. See, e.g., Hale v. Bimco Trading, Inc., 306 U.S. 
375, 378 (1939). A central example of the shift to federalism serving as a rationale for 
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William Rehnquist, likewise understood as a powerful chief justice, is credited 
with smoothly running the Supreme Court.24 Rehnquist’s jurisprudence, favoring 
state court authority and private ordering, turned the Court away from many of the 
Warren-era precedents.25 Rehnquist Court decisions, “deregulating the states,”26 
limited federal remedial authority.27 William Rehnquist is thus recognized, in the 
words of Linda Greenhouse, as the “Architect of [the] Conservative Court”;28 under 
his leadership, the Court reduced the jurisdictional footprint of the federal courts. 
That shift could be understood either to have properly reinstalled an earlier vision 
of limited authority or to undermine what Norman Spaulding has termed the 
“countermonuments” of the post–Civil War Reconstruction amendments that 
insisted on national implementation of equality norms.29  
Rehnquist was not only a doctrinal “architect” but also an institution builder 
who, working with Ralph Mecham, the Director of the Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts (AO),30 and the group of judges selected for its Executive 
                                                                                                                 
ceding authority to states is Justice Black’s reliance on the phrase “Our Federalism” that, 
when coupled with equity concerns, required federal courts not to enjoin state court criminal 
proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). 
See generally Judith Resnik, What’s Federalism For?, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 269 
(Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009); Judith Resnik, Federalism(s), Feminism, 
Families, and the Constitution, in WOMEN AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: HISTORY, 
INTERPRETATION, AND PRACTICE 127 (Sybil A. Schwarzenbach & Patricia Smith eds., 2003). 
 24. Rehnquist was said to assign opinions evenhandedly and to ensure that all were filed 
before a term ended. See, e.g., Craig M. Bradley, Introduction to THE REHNQUIST LEGACY 1, 
1–5 (Craig Bradley ed., 2006). Discussion of Rehnquist’s role in dealing with the entire 
judiciary comes from Russell R. Wheeler, Chief Justice Rehnquist as Third Branch Leader, 
89 JUDICATURE 116 (2005). 
 25. See Frank B. Cross, Thomas A. Smith & Antonio Tomarchio, Warren Court 
Precedents in the Rehnquist Court, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 3, 16 (2007). 
 26. See R. Shep Melnick, Deregulating the States: The Political Jurisprudence of the 
Rehnquist Court, in INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC LAW 69, 69–95 (Tom Ginsburg & Robert A. 
Kagan eds., 2005); Erwin Chemerinsky, Assessing Chief Justice William Rehnquist, 154 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1331 (2006); Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to 
Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 
1097, 1153–55 (2006). An overview of the television coverage of the Rehnquist years is 
provided in Jennifer Segal Diascro, The Legacy of Chief Justice Rehnquist: A View from the 
Small Screen, 92 JUDICATURE 106 (2008). 
 27. See Norman W. Spaulding, Constitution as Countermonument: Federalism, 
Reconstruction, and the Problem of Collective Memory, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1992 (2003). 
Rehnquist also presided over the cutback in the number of decisions issued each year. See 
David M. O’Brien, A Diminished Plenary Docket: A Legacy of the Rehnquist Court, 89 
JUDICATURE 134 (2005). During the Burger era, the Court dealt with some 175 cases a year; 
by Rehnquist’s era’s end, the number was down to under 80. Id. at 134. O’Brien reported 
that the Warren Court decided about 4.5% of the filings, or 110 cases per term, whereas the 
Burger Court decided 2–3%, and the Rehnquist Court decided under 1% of the filings, which 
grew to about 9400 cases. Id. at 135. 
 28. Linda Greenhouse, Court in Transition: Remembering Rehnquist: William H. 
Rehnquist, Architect of Conservative Court, Dies at Age 80, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2005, at 
A16. 
 29. Spaulding, supra note 27, at 2000–26.  
 30. Mecham, the sixth person to serve as the Director of the AO, was appointed in 1985, 
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Committee, succeeded in gaining significant budgetary allocations. In 1971, the 
federal judiciary received $145 million; by 2005, its budget was $5.7 billion,31 
rising from under one-tenth to two-tenths of one percent of the federal budget, as 
during the Rehnquist era staff positions more than doubled from 15,000 to 
32,000.32 Further, the Rehnquist Administration obtained what one newspaper 
called the “largest public-buildings construction campaign since the New Deal: a 
10-year, $10 billion effort to build more than 50 new Federal courthouses and 
significantly alter or add to more than 60 others.”33 The federal judiciary thereby 
had the “fastest growth in square footage” of building of any sector under the aegis 
of the General Services Administration (GSA).34 Between 1996 and 2006, the 
space dedicated to the courts doubled.35 While the “bailouts” and “stimulus” 
packages of the last few years may make those numbers seem smaller, the sums 
devoted specifically to federal courts outstripped those provided to other federal 
agencies under the GSA.36  
                                                                                                                 
under the tenure of Chief Justice Warren Burger and by a committee on which Associate 
Justices Byron White and William Rehnquist served. THE HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: SIXTY YEARS OF SERVICE TO THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 
115 (Cathy A. McCarthy & Tara Treacy eds., 2000) [hereinafter HISTORY OF THE AO]. 
Mecham had been an experienced lobbyist, working as “a Washington representative for the 
Atlantic Richfield Company” before being appointed to direct the AO. John W. Winkle III, 
Interbranch Politics: The Administrative Office of U.S. Courts as Liaison, 24 JUST. SYS. J. 
43, 46 (2003). 
 31. Wheeler, supra note 24, at 120. 
 32. Id.  
 33. Randy Gragg, Monuments to a Crime-Fearing Age, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 28, 
1995, at 36, 36. The amount of funds spent and the number of projects have been tallied 
differently depending on the time spans. For example, during the decade between 1996 to 
2006, the judiciary gained “46 new courthouses or annexes at a cost of $3.4 billion,” with 
more then underway. The Future of the Federal Courthouse Construction Program: Results 
of a Government Accountability Office Study on the Judiciary’s Rental Obligations: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Econ. Dev., Pub. Bldgs. and Emergency Mgmt. of the H. Comm. on 
Transp. and Infrastructure, 109th Cong. 1 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 Future of the Federal 
Courthouse Construction Program Hearings] (statement of Rep. Bill Shuster, Chairman, 
Subcomm. on Econ. Dev., Pub. Bldgs. and Emergency Mgmt.). From 1985 to 1999, fifty-
two court projects “totaling $3.5 billion” were reported completed—producing a courthouse-
building program that was the “largest in U.S. history,” and listed among the “major 
accomplishments” of the AO. HISTORY OF THE AO, supra note 30, at 113. As of 2005, the 
Government Accountability Office described the actual outlays, between 1993 and 2005, to 
be $4.5 billion for seventy-eight courthouse projects. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
GAO-05-673, COURTHOUSE CONSTRUCTION: INFORMATION ON PROJECT COST AND SIZE 
CHANGES WOULD HELP TO ENHANCE OVERSIGHT 1 (2005). 
 34. 2006 Future of the Federal Courthouse Construction Program Hearings, supra note 
33, at 269 (statement of David L. Winstead, Comm’r Pub. Bldgs. Serv., U.S. Gen. Servs. 
Admin.).  
 35. Id.  
 36. The GSA oversees about 40% of the federal work space and has various limits on its 
charter; for example, unless requested to provide services, it does not have statutory 
authority over the Senate or the House of Representatives, the Central Intelligence Agency, 
the Department of Defense, the U.S. Postal Office, or the Federal Bureau of Prisons. See 40 
U.S.C. § 113(d)–(e) (2006). 
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Institutional analyses of the courts tend to explore the interactions between 
Congress and the judiciary, the effect of doctrines on behavior, and the role played 
by political affiliations and world views in court decision making.37 Attention is 
paid to judicial preference formation, economic demands for law, and the 
incentives that foster investment in judicial authority from other branches of 
government. My discussion enlarges the focus to include the corporate output of 
the judiciary as well as its adjudicative decisions. 
Here, I probe how the federal courts came to capture political, cultural, and 
economic capital and, despite their relatively small volume of cases, became the 
dominant image of “the courts” in twentieth-century national discourse. I begin 
with a brief review of nineteenth-century federal activities, serving as a reminder of 
how small the federal judiciary once was. Thereafter, I trace the twentieth-century 
growth in federal adjudicatory authority, interrelated with federal building 
programs through which the national government turned itself into one of the major 
real estate owners and managers in the world and by which Congress chose 
repeatedly to invest in making federal courthouses architecturally significant 
symbols.  
Understanding the interaction of jurisdiction, architecture, and ideas about 
judicial power entails excavating the work of three agencies that are themselves 
creatures of the twentieth century: the Judicial Conference of the United States, 
which gained its own Administrative Office in 1939 and elaborated its structure in 
1948 and in 1957; the GSA, brought into being in 1949; and the National 
Endowment for the Arts (NEA), chartered in the 1960s. These entities cooperated 
and competed for dollars and authority as they accorded the private sector roles in 
shaping government buildings. After sketching how the federal judiciary under 
Chief Justice Rehnquist obtained both funds and control over the design of its 
buildings, I explore the puzzle of how these aspects of his work (Bill Rehnquist, the 
Builder-of-Federal-Judicial-Girth, if you will) fits with a more familiar narration of 
Rehnquist-the-Reluctant, famous for constraining the deployment of federal 
judicial authority.  
This structural account aims not to provide untold insider stories of which jurist 
persuaded which member of Congress to support a particular court project, nor to 
detail administrative styles of chief justices as their biographers might. Rather, I am 
interested in probing the interactions between doctrines and infrastructures, 
between interpretations of judicial role and the constitutive practices and places of 
judges, and between ideas of federal adjudication and their materialization—
produced and reflected in the differences in the institutions that William Howard 
Taft, Earl Warren, and William Rehnquist inhabited.38 Further, I hope not only to 
inscribe an understanding of the political and cultural impact of their achievements 
                                                                                                                 
 
 37. See generally Tom Ginsburg & Robert A. Kagan, Institutionalist Approaches to 
Courts as Political Actors, in INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC LAW: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES 1, 
1–16 (Tom Ginsburg & Robert A. Kagan eds., 2005). 
 38. This socio-legal account has parallels in work on other court systems. See, e.g., 
Antoine Vauchez, Keeping the Dream Alive: The European Court of Justice and the 
Transnational Fabric of Integrationist Jurisprudence, EUR. POL. SCI. REV. (forthcoming 
2012), available at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&pdftype= 
1&fid=8306567&jid=EPR&volumeId=-1&issueId=-1&aid=8306565. 
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but also to open questions about the durability of their diverse aspirations for “the 
federal courts” and to consider the role state courts are coming to play (in some 
respects ironically) as heirs to Earl Warren’s legacy. 
II. FROM THE 1830S TO THE 1930S; FROM MARINE HOSPITALS AND CUSTOM HOUSES 
TO A SKYSCRAPER FEDERAL COURTHOUSE IN NEW YORK AND THE SUPREME COURT 
BUILDING IN WASHINGTON  
As the title of this Lecture suggests, central to the narrative of the building of the 
federal courts is William Howard Taft, who served from 1909 to 1913 as president 
before, in 1921, becoming the chief justice of the United States.39 Many people 
identify Taft with one particular building, that of the 1935 Supreme Court, which 
opened a few years after his death.   
What may be less familiar is that this was the Supreme Court’s very first 
building. During the nineteenth century, both Congress and the Executive had 
dedicated spaces, but it was not until the twentieth century that the Supreme Court 
got “a room of its own” (pace Virginia Woolf). As historians have detailed, the 
justices first camped in a market hall in New York City.40 Upon going to 
Philadelphia in the 1790s, the justices sat inside its City Hall and borrowed the 
courtroom of that state’s Supreme Court.41 When the justices moved to 
Washington, they used a committee room inside the Capitol before taking up 
residence, in 1810, in the remodeled former chambers of the Senate.42 
Just as the Supreme Court borrowed and shared quarters before 1935, so did 
lower federal courts during much of their first 150 years. In the eighteenth century, 
when justices still rode circuit, they joined district judges holding court in local 
hotels, homes, or state buildings43 whose availability depended on “cooperation” 
from those separate governments.44 (The federal system was similarly dependent on 
                                                                                                                 
 
 39. Post, Mr. Taft, supra note 17, at 761–62. Taft retired as Chief Justice on February 3, 
1930 and died five weeks later. 2 HENRY F. PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM 
HOWARD TAFT: A BIOGRAPHY 1078–79 (1939). 
 40. Katherine Fischer Taylor, First Appearances: The Material Setting and Culture of 
the Early Supreme Court, in THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 
357, 357, 373–76 (Christopher Tomlins ed., 2005). 
 41. Robert P. Reeder, The First Homes of the Supreme Court of the United States, 76 
PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 543, 551–53 (1936). The justices “first assembled on February 1, 
1790 in the Merchants Exchange Building” in New York City, which was then the country’s 
capital. The Court as an Institution, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S. (2011), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/institution.pdf. 
 42. Taylor, supra note 40, at 357. In 1860, the Court moved up one level, as the Senate 
again gave over cast-off space. Id.; see also ROBERT SHNAYERSON, THE ILLUSTRATED 
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 86–88 (1986). 
 43. When the Circuit Court for the District first convened, it likely worked in the “room 
in the Capitol assigned to the Supreme Court.” JEFFREY BRANDON MORRIS, CALMLY TO 
POISE THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF THE COURTS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
CIRCUIT 7, 10 (2001). In the 1820s, the District got its own City Hall, which also housed 
courts, the register of wills, and other municipal offices. Id. at 29. 
 44. PETER GRAHAM FISH, FEDERAL JUSTICE IN THE MID-ATLANTIC SOUTH: UNITED 
STATES COURTS FROM MARYLAND TO THE CAROLINAS, 1789–1835, at 32 (2002). 
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local jailers from whom it rented space, sometimes on an as-needed, weekly 
basis.45)  
The physical environment reflected that the federal judiciary was then small in 
terms of jurisdiction, staff, and rule making. Ambivalence had surrounded the 
creation of a national judicial force and, to cushion the potential abrasion, federal 
courts not only used local buildings but also local litigation practices. Before the 
1930s, for example, the federal district court in Virginia largely conformed its rules 
of practice to those of state courts, just as the federal court in New Jersey relied on 
New Jersey rules.46  
A. Constituting the Federal Building Authority 
A lack of buildings specifically for federal judges ought not to be equated with 
the absence of federal government construction, undertaken by virtue of a power 
conferred by the Constitution. Article I, Section 8 authorizes Congress “[t]o 
establish Post Offices and post Roads,” as well as to create a capital city and to 
acquire land for both civilian and military purposes (“the Erection of Forts, 
Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings”).47 In the early part 
of the eighteenth century, the business of building fell under the auspices of the 
Treasury Department and Customs Services that, like the federal judiciary, were 
statutory creations of the 1789 Congress.48 Initially, Congress authorized projects 
building by building.49  
                                                                                                                 
 
 45. Id. at 237–38. Rental space was also used for court marshals. For example, an 1853 
act authorized funding and provided a budget, that “the marshall shall not incur an expense 
of more than twenty dollars in any one year for furniture, or fifty dollars for rent of building” 
without getting prior authorization from the Secretary of the Interior. Act of Feb. 26, 1853, 
ch. 80, § 2, 10 Stat. 161, 165. 
 46. Initially, federal conformity to state practice was “static,” in that federal courts had 
to follow the practices of states as of 1789 even when states no longer did so in their own 
courts. This static conformity was replaced after the Civil War with a dynamic conformity, 
permitting federal courts to follow the rule changes for common law cases that occurred in 
each of the states in which they sat. See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling 
Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1037–39 (1982). The caveat is that, as of 1822, federal 
courts sitting in equity began to share common rules, although how similar their practices 
were is more difficult to ascertain. See Kristin A. Collins, “A Considerable Surgical 
Operation”: Article III, Equity, and Judge-Made Law in the Federal Courts, 60 DUKE L.J. 
249, 273 (2010). 
 47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7, 17, 18. A few opinions have engaged with these 
provisions. See, e.g., Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885), discussed in 
GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS, CHARLES F. WILKINSON, JOHN D. LESHY & ROBERT L. 
FISCHMAN, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 147–52 (6th ed. 2007). 
 48. The history of federal construction comes from several sources, including LOIS 
CRAIG, THE FEDERAL PRESENCE: ARCHITECTURE, POLITICS, AND SYMBOLS IN UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT BUILDING (1978); ANTOINETTE J. LEE, ARCHITECTS TO THE NATION: THE RISE 
AND DECLINE OF THE SUPERVISING ARCHITECT’S OFFICE 14–29 (2000); BATES LOWRY, 
BUILDING A NATIONAL IMAGE: ARCHITECTURAL DRAWINGS FOR THE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, 
1789–1912 (1985) (published in conjunction with an exhibition of the same title); DARRELL 
HEVENOR SMITH, THE OFFICE OF THE SUPERVISING ARCHITECT OF THE TREASURY: ITS 
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The first federal structures outside of Washington were supported by a 1789 
congressional fund for marine hospitals to take care of “men, who, by their 
labor . . . in peace and war, contribute so largely to the wealth and power of the 
nation.”50 (This legislation serves as a reminder that contemporary national health 
care legislation has roots in federally financed programs from the eighteenth 
century.51) The other major group of federal buildings were for the Customs Office, 
where transactions related to taxing imports took place. 
The importance of customs officers can be seen from the buildings dedicated to 
them, which were among the largest federal structures of their time.52 Customs 
officials not only collected duties on imported goods but also “served as the eyes 
and ears of the federal government at the local level.”53 Their portfolio included 
reporting on conditions of roads and of local industries, as well as serving as agents 
for marine hospital funds, superintendents of lighthouses, and overseers of new 
building construction.54  
As revenues grew and the nation gained a modicum of stability, ambitions for 
more important edifices followed. Like their European predecessors, the leaders of 
the new country were self-conscious about their image. Many thought that the 
virtues of the United States were best expressed through somber classicism 
acknowledging the country’s debt to “the ancient Greek republic.”55  
By the 1830s, a specially designated federal employee, Robert Mills, “served 
more or less officially” in a position he called “architect of the public buildings.”56 
Mills admired Greek symmetry, as Thomas Jefferson had famously deployed in a 
courthouse he designed in Virginia. Mills was committed to making Jefferson’s 
ideal of classical architecture the “national style”; when “the full temple form was 
not used, at least the great colonnade was.”57 Mills was also a source of some 
                                                                                                                 
HISTORY, ACTIVITIES, AND ORGANIZATION 3 (1923). The Craig volume was part of a project 
of the NEA, which supported the volume’s publication. As discussed infra notes 218–20, the 
NEA decided to review “the government’s attempts to house its services and activities” 
because of the view that federal buildings in the 1970s were architecturally dreary. Nancy 
Hanks, Foreword to CRAIG, supra, at vii (Hanks served as the chairman of the NEA from 
1969 to 1977).  
 49. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 13, 1807, ch. 14, § 5, 2 Stat. 418, 419. Congress there 
authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to find a “convenient site, belonging to the United 
States, in the city of New Orleans, a good and sufficient house, to serve as an office and 
place of deposit for the collector of the customs” and appropriated $20,000 for the building. 
Id.  
 50. See LEE, supra note 48, at 28 (quoting William M. Meredith, Secretary of the 
Treasury, describing, in 1849, the rationale for the Act of July 16, 1798, ch. 77, 1 Stat. 605). 
That act was repealed in 1884. See Act of June 26, 1884, ch. 121, § 15, 23 Stat. 53, 57. 
 51. See THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS 
OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 2–3, 7–11 (1992). 
 52. CRAIG, supra note 48, at 63, 202–03. Smaller facilities were also enlarged, such as 
the Custom House in Boston and in New York. LOWRY, supra note 48, at 48–50, 48 fig.44, 
49 fig.45. 
 53. LEE, supra note 48, at 14.  
 54. Id. at 14–29. 
 55. LOWRY, supra note 48, at 38. 
 56. CRAIG, supra note 48, at 56. 
 57. Id. at 50. Craig also noted that the “closer” to Washington, the more federal 
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centralization of standards, such as requiring that buildings be made with materials 
more fireproof than not.58  
By the middle of the nineteenth century, the federal government owned eighteen 
marine hospitals and twenty-three custom houses, with fifteen more structures 
underway.59 Congress used these buildings to support what Lois Craig has called a 
“federal presence,”60 as the construction was a sign of a flourishing nation,61 
engaged in various regulatory activities.62 The buildings around the country joined 
those dedicated in Washington, D.C. for the legislative and executive branches as 
exemplars of the federal government.63 
B. “Furnishings” for the Federal Judiciary After the Civil War 
The word “courthouse” was hardly mentioned in the congressional records 
authorizing buildings in the pre–Civil War era. Some federal legislation for custom 
houses made reference to payments for furnishings for judges64—thus revealing 
that a courtroom and chambers were to be tucked somewhere inside. In addition, 
Congress occasionally provided expressly for building courts and jails in its 
territories.65  
                                                                                                                 
structures “spoke in the classical tongue,” while “frontier customhouses were utilitarian 
structures.” Id. at 51. 
 58. Id. at 56; LEE, supra note 48, at 35. See generally FED. JUDICIAL CTR., CONSTRUCTING 
JUSTICE: THE ARCHITECTURE OF FEDERAL COURTHOUSES 1 [hereinafter CONSTRUCTING JUSTICE] 
(on file with the author) (a description of the historical photographs exhibited at the Federal 
Judicial Center). 
 59. LOWRY, supra note 48, at 52; SMITH, supra note 48, at 3. In 1841, Congress insisted 
on some regularization of the decisions to buy land. In order to have the legal authority to 
purchase and build government structures, Congress imposed the requirement that the 
Attorney General provide opinions on the “validity of the title.” Id.  
 60. CRAIG, supra note 48.  
 61. LEE, supra note 48, at 29–35; see also LOWRY, supra note 48. 
 62. While the nationalization story of the post–Civil War period dominates, national 
administrative capabilities existed prior to the Civil War, of which the Customs Office was 
one example; others included the regulatory systems for patents, land claims, and 
steamboats. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Administration and “The Democracy”: Administrative 
Law from Jackson to Lincoln, 1829–1861, 117 YALE L.J. 1568, 1633–43 (2008). Inspection 
and regulation of steamboats was the federal government’s “first major health and safety 
regulatory program.” Id. at 1581. Between 1830 and 1860, the population of the United 
States doubled, and federal expenditures more than quadrupled during those same thirty 
years. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF 
THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, at 1104 (1975). 
 63. LEE, supra note 48, at 29–35.  
 64. For example, when Act of Mar. 3, 1851, ch. 32, 9 Stat. 598, 609 (1851), 
appropriated money for a custom house in Savannah, Georgia, it noted that funds were to be 
used for “furniture and fixtures for the accommodation of the officers of the revenue, as also 
for the post-office, and United States courts.” See also ERWIN C. SURRENCY, HISTORY OF THE 
FEDERAL COURTS 82 (2d ed. 2002). 
 65. Illustrative is the designation, in 1832, by Congress of acreage in Little Rock for the 
“erection of a courthouse and jail” for the Territory of Arkansas. Act of June 15, 1832, ch. 
79, 4 Stat. 531, 531 (1832). Provisions were also made in 1839 for funds for a courthouse in 
Alexandria, Virginia. OFFICE OF COMM’R OF PUB. BLDGS., EXPENDITURE—PUBLIC 
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The meager references were appropriate when considered against the backdrop 
of the size of the federal courts of that era. In 1850, some thirty-seven federal trial 
judges were dispatched to the forty-five district courts in the states,66 including two 
to California, which gained statehood that year.67  
In 1852, the Treasury Department created a unit called the Office of Supervising 
Architect and centralized decision making about federal buildings. Soon thereafter, 
government records called specifically for courthouse construction.68 Chartering 
the Supervising Architect was both evidence of the development of federal 
bureaucracy and (as Max Weber has taught us) an example of how once in place, a 
bureaucracy generates agendas for its own growth.69 One measure of the 
Supervising Architect’s impact comes from an 1875 congressional provision that 
no funds be spent on public buildings without approval from the Secretary of the 
Treasury, “after drawings and specifications together with detailed estimates of the 
cost thereof, shall have been made by the Supervising Architect.”70 
The violence and dislocation occasioned by the Civil War halted many national 
initiatives, building included. But winning the Civil War sparked interest in 
imposing and in showing federal authority. Thus, two creatures of the first 
                                                                                                                 
BUILDINGS, H.R. DOC. NO. 26–32 (1839).  
 66. One judge presided in each of the following states: Alabama, Arkansas, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North 
Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and Wisconsin. 
California, Florida, Louisiana, New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia each had two 
judgeships. This count does not include federal judges in the territorial courts, including 
those in the District of Columbia. See Chronological History of Authorized Judgeships in the 
U.S. District Courts, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/judgesandjudgeships/ 
authorizedjudgeships/chronologicalhistoryofauthorizedjudgeshipsindex.aspx [hereinafter 
Chronological History of Authorized Judgeships in the U.S. District Courts]. 
 67. Act of Sept. 28, 1850, ch. 86, § 2, 9 Stat. 521, 521. A reorganization reduced the 
number to one in 1866 but returned it to two in 1886. See Act of Aug. 5, 1886, ch. 928, § 1, 
24 Stat. 308, 308; Act of July 27, 1866, ch. 280, § 1, 14 Stat. 300, 300. As noted above, five 
other states (Florida, Louisiana, New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia) also had two 
judgeships allotted. Chronological History of Authorized Judgeships in the U.S. District 
Courts, supra note 66. 
 68. For example, in 1855, the Secretary of Interior and postmaster general called for 
“sites for court houses and post offices” in Philadelphia, New York, and Boston. S. EXEC. 
DOC. NO. 33–30 (1855). 
 69. Prior to the Office’s creation, federal officials who worked on federal building had 
various titles, including “Architect of the Department” and “Supervising Architect.” LEE, 
supra note 48, at 41. No statutory authority supported the Secretary of Treasury when he 
first created the Office of Supervising Architect, but legislation in the 1860s and thereafter 
made mention of the job. SMITH, supra note 48, at 6–7. For example, Act of Mar. 14, 1864, 
ch. 30, § 6, 13 Stat. 22, 27, provided for “one superintending architect, one assistant 
architect,” several clerks, and a messenger.  
  The first to hold the position, Ammi B. Young, served from 1852 until 1862 as the 
“chief designer of all federal buildings” that fell within the Treasury Department’s control. 
LEE, supra note 48, at 47. Young, credited with designing some seventy buildings, also made 
ironwork the preferred material to provide fireproofing and permanency. LEE, supra note 48, 
at 59–60; CONSTRUCTING JUSTICE, supra note 58, at 1–2. 
 70. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 130, 18 Stat. 371, 395; see also SMITH, supra note 48, at 7–8. 
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Congress of 1789—the lower federal courts and the Treasury Department—came 
into closer contact as Congress repeatedly turned to the federal courts as 
instruments of federal norm enforcement.71 In 1867, Congress gave federal courts 
authority to hear habeas corpus petitions from individuals held in state custody.72 In 
1871, Congress authorized federal courts to hear cases alleging deprivations of civil 
rights,73 and in 1875, Congress gave the federal courts what has come to be known 
as “general federal question jurisdiction” to hear claims (if the amount in 
controversy sufficed) alleging violation of rights arising under federal law.74  
To implement such new provisions as well as to enforce federal criminal law, 
better organization of federally employed lawyers was needed. In 1870, Congress 
created the Department of Justice to add resources to and a measure of control over 
the dispersed system that had long existed by virtue of individual presidential 
                                                                                                                 
 
 71. See generally Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance 
Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875–1891, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 511, 513 
(2002) (explaining how “nonjudicial actors . . . empowered the institution of the federal 
judiciary” (emphasis in the original)). In his view, the result was a judiciary committed to 
economic nationalism that expressed and extended the views of the reigning political party. Id. at 
521–22. Alison LaCroix has argued that the focus on courts was continuous with earlier 
conceptions that identified judicial power and federal court jurisdiction as essential to the 
nation—as evidenced by the briefly lived Act of 1801 that did create federal question 
jurisdiction. See Alison L. LaCroix, The New Wheel in the Federal Machine: From Sovereignty 
to Jurisdiction in the Early Republic, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 345–50, 387–94. The task of 
administering courts fell in 1849 to the newly created Department of the Interior, charged with 
management of public lands and parks as well as the fiscal responsibility for the federal court 
system. History of the Federal Judiciary: Judicial Administration and Organization, FED. JUD. 
CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/admin_09.html.  
 72. Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–
2254 (2006)). 
 73. See Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(2006)). 
 74. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (1875) (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 (2006)). As noted above, LaCroix underscored that the 1801 Judiciary Act gave 
circuit courts jurisdiction of “all cases in law and equity, arising . . . [under] the Constitution 
. . . [and t]he laws of the United States . . . and [t]reaties made, or which shall be made under 
their authority.” LaCroix, supra note 71, at 372 (quoting the Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, § 
11, 2 Stat. 89). Because the bill was so quickly repealed and the 1875 legislation has 
endured, the post–Civil War enactment is credited as the beginning of general federal 
question jurisdiction. Congress has also thought it appropriate, when viewing the courts as 
unreliable in carrying out its will, to divest jurisdiction. A well-known example is the case of 
Ex Parte McCardle, in which William McCardle, the editor of the Vicksburg Times, was 
detained in the 1860s by the occupying military authorities. They objected to his anti-
Reconstruction editorials, and he in turn argued that the Military Reconstruction Act was 
unconstitutional. While his case was pending before the U.S. Supreme Court, Congress 
withdrew the jurisdictional provision that had provided a route to the Court, and the justices 
concluded that Congress had the power to do so. See Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 
(1869); Daniel J. Meltzer, The Story of Ex parte McCardle: The Power of Congress to Limit 
the Supreme Court’s Appellate Jurisdiction, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 57 (Vicki C. 
Jackson & Judith Resnik eds., 2010). 
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appointments of United States Attorneys for each of the federal districts.75 The 
1870 legislation also centralized most of the court-related work in the Justice 
Department, which took over the Interior Secretary’s “supervisory powers . . . over 
the accounts of the district attorneys, marshals, clerks, and other officers of the 
courts of the United States.”76  
To gain efficacy in requesting funds for the courts from Congress, the Justice 
Department began compiling information about the federal courts. Beginning in 
1871, the attorney general provided annual reports to Congress. The Justice 
Department reported that, in 1876, almost 29,000 cases were pending on the 
docket; in 1900, the reports indicated that pending cases had risen to about 
55,000.77 Pending cases do not equate with filings; in the beginning of the twentieth 
century, just under 30,000 new civil and criminal cases were commenced.78  
                                                                                                                 
 
 75. Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, 16 Stat. 162. The First Judiciary Act had created the 
Office of Attorney General, to be held by a person “learned in the law,” to prosecute suits for 
the United States and to provide advice on legal questions to the Executive branch. Judiciary 
Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92–93. While Congress thus invented an office not 
mentioned in the Constitution, Congress did not provide either staff for the attorney general 
or authority over government lawyers, then called “district attorneys” (and now called 
United States Attorneys) who had the power to represent the United States in the lower 
federal courts. ANTONIO VASAIO, JUSTICE MGMT. DIV., THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE BUILDING: 1934–1984, at 2 (1984); Susan Low Bloch, The 
Early Role of the Attorney General in Our Constitutional Scheme: In the Beginning There 
Was Pragmatism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 561, 566–70. As Bloch noted, the 1789 Act did not 
expressly grant authority to the president to appoint these lawyers, but the president took it 
upon himself to do so, arguably relying on the authority to appoint officers under Article II, 
§ 2. Likewise, there was no explicit provision in the Act for a confirmation process but it 
was “assumed” that the Senate would provide “advice and consent.” Id. at 568 n.24. Today, 
statutes provide for presidential nomination and senatorial confirmation. 28 U.S.C. § 503 
(2006) (establishing the Office of the Attorney General); id. § 541 (establishing the position 
of United States Attorneys). Both before and after the creation of the Department of Justice 
in 1870, attorneys general worked in various spaces, such as in offices at the Treasury 
Department. VASAIO, supra, at 4. The Department of Justice did not get a building of its own 
until 1934. Id. at 16–17. 
 76. § 15, 16 Stat. at 164. Congress also gave the Justice Department authority over 
commissions. 
 77. David S. Clark, Adjudication to Administration: A Statistical Analysis of Federal 
District Courts in the Twentieth Century, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 65, 98 tbl.4 (1981). Clark also 
detailed the change in the mix of cases, as the proportions of criminal and civil cases varied 
over time, as did the ratio of civil filings by private parties to those brought by the 
government. Id. at 88–148. 
 78. Data on the number of filed cases in 1901 are extrapolated from data on pending and 
terminated cases. The 1901 data are drawn from a two-volume empirical study by the 
American Law Institute (ALI). See 1 AM. LAW INST., A STUDY OF THE BUSINESS OF THE 
FEDERAL COURTS 107 (1934) (data on criminal cases); 2 AM. LAW INST., A STUDY OF THE 
BUSINESS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 111 (1934) (data on civil cases). The ALI statistics 
comport with those in the 1900 and 1901 Reports of the Attorney General during the era 
when the Department of Justice was charged with administration of the federal courts. See 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES FOR 
THE YEAR 1900, at 66 ex. A (1900); DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY-
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The number of judges increased along with the docket. While several federal 
districts continued to have a single judge, between 1857 and 1886, thirteen states 
gained a second authorized federal trial judgeship.79 All told, by 1886, the federal 
judicial workforce consisted of sixty-four judges—a tiny part of the expanding 
federal civilian workforce. In 1861, some 37,000 individuals were employed; by 
1891, almost 160,000 were on the federal payroll.80  
Another technique to make material new federal authority was construction. 
Recall that, by the 1850s, the federal government owned about fifty buildings. 
“Between 1866 and 1897 . . . the federal government built nearly three hundred 
new buildings throughout the Union.”81 Spaces inside (and sometimes whole 
buildings) went to courts, used by Congress to make meaningful the North’s 
victory over the South. Appropriations for buildings rewarded loyal congressmen 
by giving them “federal presents” (as one commentator put it) for local 
constituents.82 “For example, Memphis received a courthouse even though no 
federal courts were held there.”83  
In the early 1900s, Congress “opened the floodgates . . . by inventing . . . the 
‘omnibus’ public building bill, which replaced for the most part the previous 
practice of enacting individual bills for each building.”84 In the 1902 Act alone, 
                                                                                                                 
GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE YEAR 1901, at 64 ex. A (1901). The numbers for 
civil and criminal filings for 1901 were derived by subtracting the number of cases pending 
at the end of 1900 from the sum of the cases terminated in and pending at the end of 1901. 
That method yielded 16,734 criminal cases (the same number reported by Clark, supra note 
77, at 103 tbl.6) and 11,971 civil cases (or 1302 fewer civil cases than Clark had reported, 
id.). 
 79. Alabama got its second district judge in 1886. See Act of Aug. 2, 1886, ch. 842, 24 
Stat. 213. In 1871, Arkansas was given a second judge. See Act of Mar. 8, 1871, ch. 106, § 
5, 16 Stat. 471, 472. Other states that received second judgeships include California (1886); 
Georgia (1882); Iowa (1882); Louisiana (1881, returning it to two judgeships); Michigan 
(1863); Missouri (1857); North Carolina (1872); Tennessee (1878); Texas (1857); Virginia 
(1871, returning to a two-judgeship provision); and Wisconsin (1870). The District of 
Columbia also received a second judgeship, in 1870. Illinois and Ohio received a second 
judgeship in 1855, and New York received a third in 1865. See Chronological History of 
Authorized Judgeships in the U.S. District Courts, supra note 66. 
 80. CRAIG, supra note 48, at 163. She traced the federal employment workforce from an 
1816 baseline of 4847 employees to the 1911 group of 395,905 employees. Id.  
 81. LOWRY, supra note 48, at 58. 
 82. THOMAS J. SCHLERETH, VICTORIAN AMERICA: TRANSFORMATIONS IN EVERYDAY LIFE, 
1876–1915, at 76 (Richard Balkin ed., 1991). 
 83. CRAIG, supra note 48, at 163. 
 84. LOWRY, supra note 48, at 80. Some prior bills had authorized that buildings be 
constructed in several different locations. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 4, 1854, ch. 242, § 2, 10 
Stat. 546, 571 (1854) (providing for a “custom-house, post-office, and United States courts” 
in various cities). Another omnibus construction bill, providing $45 million in funds, was 
enacted in 1913. See Act of Mar. 4, 1913, Pub. L. No. 62-427, 37 Stat. 739. A third such bill, 
the Public Buildings Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-281, 44 Stat. 630, authorized construction 
of several kinds of federal buildings: “courthouses, postoffices, immigration stations, 
customhouses, marine hospitals, quarantine stations, and other public buildings.” § 1, 44 
Stat. at 630. While that list of buildings was similar to those found in bills from the late 
nineteenth century, the order in which they were listed had changed; the 1926 legislation put 
courthouses at the front. 
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Congress authorized more than 150 new buildings. That “wholesale authorization” 
gave every member of Congress “the possibility of providing his district with a 
federal building, regardless of need.”85 Surveys to assess needs in advance of 
appropriations were not authorized until 1926.86 
The new judgeship lines created jobs that the president, with senatorial input and 
approval, could award.87 Further, the statutory requirement that appointees reside in 
the districts in which they worked mitigated the perception of control from 
Washington.88 Given these pork-barrel opportunities, coupled with local hopes that 
courthouses were draws for commercial development, towns and cities vied to be 
the sites for federal construction.89 Thus, the growth in federal power through 
federal jurisdictional statutes and federal judgeships produced and justified interest 
in new funding for more buildings.90  
C. Professionalizing Architects Seeking Public Patronage 
Localities were not the only ones lobbying for funds. “Private architects 
insistently sought a piece of the public action.”91 Within a decade of the creation of 
the Office of Supervising Architect, architects aimed for federal patronage while 
avoiding government control. In 1867, the American Institute of Architects (AIA), 
which (despite its name) had functioned more as a local New York society,92 
became national in scope and in ambition. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 85. LOWRY, supra note 48, at 80. As for the style of the buildings, many designs 
adopted the Beaux-Arts style popularized by the Chicago Exposition of 1893. See id. at 81–
82; CRAIG, supra note 48, at 203, 210–15. Some concerns about pork barrel funding led to 
cutbacks in 1911 in the workforce of the Office of Supervising Architect and to a hiatus 
between 1913 and 1926 in omnibus funding bills. CRAIG, supra note 48, at 239–40. 
 86. CRAIG, supra note 48, at 163. 
 87. Congress continued to create new judgeships thereafter. One count was that there 
were 1.3 federal judges per million people at the beginning of the twentieth century and 2.2 
judges per million in 1980. See Clark, supra note 77, at 69–71 tbl.1. 
 88. See 28 U.S.C. § 134 (2006). This provision has been a requirement since the 
Judiciary Act of 1789. 
 89. CONSTRUCTING JUSTICE, supra note 58, at 2. 
 90. As compared to the availability of state court facilities, federal courts were sparse 
and often at great distance, imposing costs on some litigants that made federal jurisdiction an 
attractive draw for others. See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: 
FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870–1958, at 244 (1992). 
 91. CRAIG, supra note 48, at 149. 
 92. LEE, supra note 48, at 100. See generally MARY N. WOODS, FROM CRAFT TO 
PROFESSION: THE PRACTICE OF ARCHITECTURE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 28–36 
(1999). As Woods explained, the term “architect” derives from a Greek term meaning 
“master carpenter” and was once used in reference to various craftspersons. The term did not 
denote a person with special design authority until the Renaissance in Italy. Id. at 5. In early 
America, the term included various people working on design. The specification of the 
reference to particular kinds of designers came through the work of organizations like the 
AIA, which called for training and credentials as qualifications to use the appellation 
architect. Id. at 6–8. Woods cited Louisa Tuthill as one of the first—in 1848—to call on 
“young men to become professional architects,” and hence to have both a “lucrative and 
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One objective was helping private architects obtain government contracts.93 To 
do so entailed changing laws limiting design to public-sector employees. Accusing 
the Office of Supervising Architect of producing repetitive buildings (with an 
“apparent sameness . . . even [if] picturesque”),94 private architects argued that their 
more inventive proposals should be funded. Those criticisms, coupled with 
complaints of corruption and waste by the Office of Supervising Architect,95 helped 
to produce the Tarsney Act of 1893, permitting the federal government to employ 
independent architects selected through competitions.96 But the statute used 
discretionary terms, and government officials were not eager to implement it.97 For 
some time, the legal victory for private contractors was more on paper than in 
practice.  
                                                                                                                 
honorable profession.” Id. at 8. 
 93. See, e.g., Public Architects Committee, AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, 
http://network.aia.org/publicarchitectscommittee/home/; Notes from a Public Architect 
Consultant, AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, http://www.aia.org/practicing/groups/kc/ 
AIAB088893?dvid=&recspec=AIAB088893. The AIA, founded in 1857, had its 
counterparts in the Royal Institute of British Architects (begun in 1834) and the French 
Société Centrale des Architectes (founded in 1840). By the 1870s, the AIA promoted 
professional education and helped to develop architectural programs in various universities. 
See History of the American Institute of Architects, AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, 
http://www.aia.org/about/history/AIAB028819. The AIA lobbied in the last decades of the 
nineteenth century to confine the Treasury’s architect’s role to “supervising” rather than 
designing federal construction. The argument made was that the requisite “artistic and 
administrative” talents were not to be found in the same person and that government design 
plans were inferior to those of private architects. LEE, supra note 48, at 183–84. 
 94. LEE, supra note 48, at 163. The similarity may, for some, have been seen as 
desirable. “[N]ew federal buildings were consistently well received in America’s Peorias,” 
where they symbolized “membership in the Union.” CRAIG, supra note 48, at 163. 
 95. CRAIG, supra note 48, at 156. The first supervising architect, Ammi B. Young, 
discussed infra note 129, “was dismissed amid charges of extravagance and waste.” Id. 
Another, Alfred Mullett, was “subjected to no less than five investigations,” and according to 
one review, while he was not corrupt, his subordinates were. Id. 
 96. LEE, supra note 48, at 166–67; LOWRY, supra note 48, at 77; CONSTRUCTING JUSTICE, 
supra note 58, at 2. Woods credited the success of the Chicago World’s Fair with making 
plain what “professional architects could accomplish.” WOODS, supra note 92, at 42.  
 97. The statute provided that the Treasury Secretary had the “discretion to obtain plans, 
drawings, and specifications for the erection of public buildings . . . by competition among 
architects under such conditions as he may prescribe,” provided that “not less than five 
architects” be invited for competitions and that the work be done under the “general 
supervision” of the Office of Supervising Architect. Act of Feb. 20, 1893, ch. 146, 27 Stat. 
468, 468–69. The act was first used for a custom house in Norfolk, Virginia. LEE, supra note 
48, at 201. Members of the Cleveland administration were slow to implement its provisions. 
LEE, supra note 48, at 167–76. In some instances, Congress intervened directly by 
stipulating procedures when appropriating funds for construction; for example, a bill funding 
a Chicago post office required that the Secretary of the Treasury “hire a Chicago architect to 
prepare designs for the building.” LEE, supra note 48, at 176. When Lyman Gage, who had 
been on the board of directors for the Chicago World’s Fair, became Secretary of the 
Treasury, commissions went to private architects such as Cass Gilbert. WOODS, supra note 
92, at 42–43. But the legislation was not mandatory, and “[d]uring the fifteen years of the 
Tarsney Act (1897 to 1912), only thirty-one buildings were designed according to its 
provisions.” LEE, supra note 48, at 208. 
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In 1912, over the objections of the AIA but in the wake of accusations that 
competition awards were biased in the AIA’s favor at the expense of taxpayers, the 
Tarsney Act was repealed.98 In its stead, Congress delegated to its Public Buildings 
Commission the tasks of recommending processes for decision making on the 
construction of federal structures.99 The result was that new commissions went to 
architects both in the public employ and the private sector. 
The rate of building during the pre–World War I era was impressive. By 1912, 
1126 federally funded buildings were underway, amounting to a “new building 
every fourth day in the year.”100 By the 1920s, enough architects were government 
based to create their own Association of Federal Architects for civil service 
personnel involved in construction.101 One way to provide a summary is by way of 
figure 8, Federal Judges, Jurisdiction, Caseloads, Lawyers, and Buildings: 1850s-
1930s, which offers highlights of the various institutional shifts enumerated during 
those years. 
 
Figure 8: Federal Judges, Jurisdiction, Caseloads, and Buildings, 1850s–1930s. 
 
Copyright © 2010 Judith Resnik. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 98. CRAIG, supra note 48, at 203. Smith also reported on the conflicts between private 
architect and public supervisors when the Tarsney Act was in use. SMITH, supra note 48, at 
28–29. 
 99. Public Buildings Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 62-432, 37 Stat. 866. Congress asked for 
information about appropriate standards, sizes, and costs. Id. 
 100. CRAIG, supra note 48, at 213 (quoting the Secretary of the Treasury in 1916). 
 101. Id. at 298. The group began publication of its magazine, The Federal Architect, in 
1930. Id. The publication and the association “faded away” in 1947. See id.  
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Reviewing those decades entails attending to the institutional players then of 
relevance. Inside the executive branch, the two agencies of central relevance were 
the Justice Department, accounting for and provisioning the federal courts, and the 
Office of Supervising Architect within the Treasury, directing building. Two 
private organizations of note, the already-mentioned AIA and the American Bar 
Association (ABA), were regular participants. Founded in 1878, the ABA gave 
voice to the overlapping interests of the bench and the bar.102 With professional 
growth and nationalization of the bar came lobbying. Lawyers sought resources—
improved salaries, staff, and spaces—for federal judges,103 as lawyers also 
influenced the architecture of courtrooms, in which a “bar” came to separate the 
special space for professionals (judges, clerks, and lawyers) from the general 
public.104 Congress in turn doled out funds, both piecemeal and wholesale for 
buildings. 
What should be apparent to readers in the twenty-first century is what I have not 
mentioned on this list—the corporate voice of the federal judiciary. Individual 
judges, linked to politicians, would likely have had sway over funding for specific 
districts, but the judiciary had little institutional infrastructure to provide a steady 
presence of its own in Congress. Instead, through the Attorney General, the ABA, 
and individual connections, federal judges were able to convince the political 
branches to support their work. A sampling from photographs in the National 
Archives provides visual testimony to the resulting success.  
The United States Court House and Post Office (figure 9), opening in Des 
Moines, Iowa in 1871, reflects the burgeoning jurisdiction of the federal courts in 
the post–Civil War decades. Designed by Alfred B. Mullett (described as the “best 
known of the fifteen men who served as supervising architect of the Treasury 
                                                                                                                 
 
 102. The ABA was founded in 1878 in Saratoga Springs, New York. See RICHARD L. 
ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 45 (1989). The ALI was founded in 1923. John P. Frank, The 
American Law Institute, 1923–1998, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 615, 615 (1997). See 
generally Robert W. Gordon, The American Legal Profession, 1870–2000, in 3 THE 
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 73 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins 
eds., 2008). 
 103. See, e.g., Edward A. Sumner, J. M. Dickinson, Chapin Brown, Charles E. Shepard 
& John W. Griggs, Report of the Committee on Compensation to Federal Judiciary, in 
REPORT OF THE THIRTY-SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION HELD 
AT MONTREAL, CANADA 620, 620–21 (1913). 
 104. MARTHA J. MCNAMARA, FROM TAVERN TO COURTHOUSE: ARCHITECTURE AND 
RITUAL IN AMERICAN LAW, 1658–1860, at 55–56 (2004); Michael Kammen, Temples of 
Justice: The Iconography of Judgment and American Culture, in ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIARY: ESSAYS ON THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789, at 248, 249 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992). 
McNamara argued that the proliferation of courts was driven not by the needs of the state but 
by lawyers who used their monopoly power to generate law-specific buildings (courthouses 
and jails) that marked the distinction between their profession and other municipal functions. 
MCNAMARA, supra, at 1–3. Linda Mulcahy traced the increasingly hierarchical structuring 
of courthouses as lawyers, judges, and architects separated public and professional arenas. 
See LINDA MULCAHY, LEGAL ARCHITECTURE: JUSTICE, DUE PROCESS, AND THE PLACE OF LAW 
(2011); Linda Mulcahy, Architects of Justice: The Politics of Courtroom Design, 16 SOC. & 
LEGAL STUD. 383 (2007). 
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Department”105), the structure was enlarged in the 1880s. By 1902, requests were 
being made for more space, and in 1913, Congress allocated funds to do so in its 
Public Buildings Act.106  
 
 
Figure 9: United States Court House and Post Office, Des Moines, Iowa. Supervising
Architect: Alfred B. Mullett. 1871; enlarged 1890, demolished 1968.
 
Image reproduced courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 105. LEE, supra note 48, at 73. Mullett designed the State, War, and Navy Building in 
Washington, D.C. and had “near total control over public building design” during much of 
his service. Id. “He is best known for his six immense, richly decorated Second Empire 
edifices,” combining customhouses, courthouses, and post offices. CRAIG, supra note 48, at 
155; see also History of the Federal Judiciary, Historic Federal Courthouses, FED. JUD. 
CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/history/courthouses.nsf [hereinafter History of the Federal 
Judiciary, Historic Federal Courthouses] (depicting the Des Moines, Iowa U.S. Courthouse 
and Post Office in 1871).  
 106. Public Buildings Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 62-432, 37 Stat. 866. The Public 
Buildings Act of 1913 allocated $350,000 for the second building’s construction; the 1871 
structure was demolished in 1968. U.S. Courthouse, Des Moines, IA, U.S. GEN. SERVICES 
ADMIN., http://www.gsa.gov/portal/ext/html/site/hb/category/25431/actionParameter/explore 
ByBuilding/buildingId/444# [hereinafter U.S. Courthouse, Des Moines, IA].  
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The result, shown in figure 10, was a new Classical Revival style building that 
opened in 1929 and remains (as renovated and enlarged in 1995)107 in use by the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. The name chosen in 
1929—the U.S. Court House—denoted the growing importance of adjudication, as 
the building could have had a name denoting that it housed various government 
services including a post office and offices for administrators from the Departments 
of Agriculture and Commerce.108 
 
 
Figure 10: United States Court House, Des Moines, Iowa. Supervising Architect: James A.
Wetmore. 1929.
 
Image reproduced courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 107. U.S. Courthouse, Des Moines, IA, supra note 106. 
 108. The 1929 building joined several other “monumental public buildings” along the 
riverfront and their style and placement reflected the “city beautiful movement” efforts to 
create important civic spaces. Id. 
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An example from the South is the 1908 federal building in Biloxi, Mississippi 
that was given the name Post Office, Court House, and Custom House. See figure 
11. James Knox Taylor, who held the position of Supervising Architect from 1897 
until 1912, is credited with the three-story building, whose design has much in 
common with his other structures, “nearly all . . . classical or colonial revival.”109 
The Biloxi building was one of many that sparked complaints of “pork-barreling,” 
in that new federal construction outpaced the growth in that city’s population and 
need for services.110 The limited demand may explain why the 1908 arched and 
columned building remained in use until 1959, when a new U.S. Post Office and 
Court House was built and the 1908 building became Biloxi’s City Hall.111 
 
 
Figure 11: United States Post Office, Court House, and Custom House, Biloxi, Mississippi.
Supervising Architect: James Knox Taylor. 1908.
 
Image reproduced courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 109. LEE, supra note 48, at 209. 
 110. See LOWRY, supra note 48, at 80. Construction of the building was delayed by 
hurricanes, supply failures, and “incompetent contractors.” CITY OF BILOXI, THE EARLY 
YEARS, available at http://biloxi.ms.us/pdf/centennialdisplay.pdf (an information sheet 
created to accompany a display celebrating the centennial of this building in June 2008). 
When the building finally opened in 1908, its dedication was enhanced by “new electric 
trolleys” that brought people around the city. Id.  
 111. See id. In 1978, the building was listed on the National Register of Historic Places, 
which identified it as one of the best documented in the state. Id. In 2003, the court moved to 
Gulfport where the Judge Dan M. Russell, Jr. Federal Building & U.S. Courthouse opened. 
Its “abundance of natural light” was described as fostering “a sense of openness between the 
public building and the surrounding community.” Mike Cummings, “Isn’t This a 
Spectacular View?”—Federal Courthouse Bathed in Light Sense of Openness Exists 
Between New Building, Community, SUN HERALD (Biloxi, MS), Nov. 13, 2003, at A1. The 
damage from Hurricane Katrina required the closure of the courthouse for many months.  
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Westward expansion was accompanied by courthouse construction. In 1892, an 
imposing three-story federal building, catalogued by Denver’s library as a post 
office and by the National Archives database as the U.S. Court House and Post 
Office, opened. See figure 12. Designed by Mifflin E. Bell and Will. A. Freret, both 
of whom served as supervising architects, the building was crowned with a tower at 
its top and appointed with columns.112  
 
 
Figure 12: United States Post Office at 16th (Sixteenth) and Arapahoe Streets, Denver, 
Colorado. Supervising Architects: Mifflin E. Bell and Will. A. Freret. 1892.
 
Image reproduced courtesy of the Denver Public Library, Western History Collection. Photographer: Wm. Henry Jackson, WH-1573. 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 112. Both architects are credited as designers of the building; Mifflin E. Bell was 
supervising architect from 1883 to 1887, and Will A. Freret served briefly, from 1887 to 
1889. See LEE, supra note 48, at 135–47. 
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Yet, by 1900, it was considered “outdated,”113 and shortly thereafter Congress 
authorized a new building.114 As the Senate hearings recorded, supporters argued 
that Denver was the “largest city between the Missouri River and the Pacific coast. 
It [was] therefore the capital, as it were, of a vast empire.”115 The Tarsney Act had 
                                                                                                                 
 
 113. Byron White U.S. Courthouse, Denver, CO, U.S. GEN. SERVICES ADMIN., 
http://www.gsa.gov/portal/ext/html/site/hb/category/25431/actionParameter/exploreByBuildi
ng/buildingId/927 [hereinafter Byron White U.S. Courthouse, Denver, CO]. My thanks to the 
Hon. John Kane, who enabled me to tour the courthouse, and to the Tenth Circuit 
Executive’s Office and its staff for providing additional materials on the history of the 
building. See also THE FEDERAL COURTS OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT: A HISTORY (James K. 
Logan ed., 1992). According to a 1906 report from the Senate’s Committee on Public 
Buildings and Grounds, although the first building for a post office and courthouse was 
authorized under the Act of May 8, 1882, ch. 127, 22 Stat. 61, it was not completed until 
1893. S. REP. NO. 59-1433, at 1 (1906). In the interim, the report explained, the: 
[C]ity had grown to such an extent that the building was not nearly large 
enough to accommodate the Federal business. From the beginning it was found 
impossible to find space in the building for all the Government offices located 
in Denver, and to-day many of the Federal officials in the city are housed 
outside the Government building, rendering necessary the payment of a very 
large rent account every month. . . . 
It is estimated that when the original bill was passed, in 1882, Denver had a 
population of less than 40,000. By 1890 the number had increased to 106,000, 
and to over 133,000 in 1900, and there had been a corresponding growth in the 
population of the State of Colorado and the entire Rocky Mountain region 
contiguous to that city. The result was an expansion of business far in excess of 
the calculations of the designers of the original building and the failure of the 
structure from the beginning to meet the demands upon it. 
The growth of the . . . country has continued since the occupancy of the 
present building, in 1893, until now it is conservatively calculated that the city 
has a population of 175,000.  
The consequence is that there is a crowding together in public offices of 
officials, employees, and papers that should not be permitted, with a consequent 
congestion of business that is appalling.  
Id. at 1–2. The report noted that the federal treasury was “taxed to the extent of $14,375 a 
year for the rent of public buildings,” and that the 1893 building houses “[t]he post-office, 
the Railway-Mail Service, the internal-revenue service, the Federal courts, the United States 
marshal, the clerks of the Federal courts, and the Weather Bureau Service.” Id. at 2. 
 114. Byron White U.S. Courthouse, Denver, CO, supra note 113; see also TENTH CIRCUIT 
HISTORICAL SOC’Y, BYRON WHITE UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE [hereinafter TENTH CIRCUIT 
DENVER COURTHOUSE BROCHURE], available at 
http://www.10thcircuithistory.org/pdfs/courthouse/Byron_White_Courthouse_Brochure_200
9.pdf. Congress authorized the construction of the building in 1903 but did not allocate funds 
until 1908. The firm of Tracy, Swartwout, & Litchfield won the commission, and the marble 
for the building came from the Yule Marble Quarry in Colorado.  
 115. S. REP. NO. 59-1433, at 3. The Senate report also cited complaints of a federal judge 
that the building’s other uses interfered with the court. “The post-office draws a crowd at all 
hours of the day, and it is the favorite point for newsboys and venders, whose cries 
constantly disturb the sessions of court.” Id. at 5. Tenth Circuit archival materials also 
described the role played by the Denver Chamber of Commerce and the state’s congressional 
delegation in securing funds for a building to be in the tradition of monumental structures 
2012] BUILDING THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 855 
 
by then shifted more work to the private sector and, after funds were appropriated 
in 1909, Supervising Architect James Knox Taylor picked a private firm for the 
design. Completed in 1916 and called the Denver United States Post Office and 
Courthouse (figure 13), the building is four stories high and occupies a city block. 
 
 
Figure 13: United States Post Office and Courthouse, Denver, Colorado. Architects: Tracy,
Swartwout & Litchfield. 1916; renamed in 1994 the Byron R. White United States 
Courthouse. 
 
Image reproduced courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration. 
 
The size, scale, and elegance of the Neo-Classical architecture, a style common 
to federal buildings of its era, made the 1916 building a major landmark of the 
federal government. The structure features a three-story portico that is formed by 
sixteen symmetrical Ionic columns decorated with eagles at their tops. The classical 
theme celebrating federal power continues in the street-side inscriptions, invoking 
Cicero (“The law causes wrong or injury to no one”—“Lex Nemini Iniquum, 
Nemini Injuriam Facit”) and the Magna Carta (“To no one shall we deny justice, 
nor shall we discriminate in its application”—“Nulli Negabimus, Nulli Differemus, 
Justitiam”).116 
                                                                                                                 
such as the Lincoln Memorial.  
 116. Byron White U.S. Courthouse, Denver, CO, supra note 113. The texts, selected by 
architect Evarts Tracy, were placed on the friezes. Cicero’s quote faces the Eighteenth Street 
side while the Magna Carta excerpt sits on the Nineteenth Street side. Inscriptions also 
appear on benches on the northeast and southwest sides of the building. Reflecting the 
building’s initial use as a post office as well as a court, the front façade has inscriptions of 
the names of the cities to Denver’s East and West to “indicate the flow of mail across the 
country.” Memorandum from Gen. Servs. Admin. (Mar. 23, 2007) (on file with author). 
Thanks are due to Nicholas Salazar for the Latin translations. The building remains in use. 
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Further north, a Post Office and Courthouse in Missoula, Montana (figure 14), 
completed in 1913, shows (again) the imprint of Supervising Architect James Knox 
Taylor and the success of local politicians who brought a federal building to the 
city, incorporated only thirty years earlier.117 The town’s newspaper called the 
“classically inspired” three-story building in a Renaissance Revival style an 
“ornament to the city.”118 It was indeed a highly ornamented building, with arched 
entrances and two-story attached columns (pilasters) crowned with ornate 
Corinthian capitals.119 
James Knox Taylor is also credited with the U.S. Post Office and Customs 
House of 1913 in San Diego, California (figure 15). The building sheltered the 
district court as well as the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the 
Weather Bureau. Taylor designed a Spanish Colonial Revival building of stucco-
brick masonry, adorned by ten, two-story columns and crowned by a red tile roof, 
that he explained as appropriate for the state’s history as well as the “climate and 
the desires of the people.”120  
 
                                                                                                                 
While dedicated (with the exception of one courtroom) for several decades entirely to the 
U.S. Postal Service, in 1994 the facility was renovated and renamed in honor of Supreme 
Court Justice Byron R. White, the first person from Colorado to serve on the Court. The 
courthouse, which houses four appellate and one trial courtroom, is the headquarters for the 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which includes the states of Colorado, Kansas, New 
Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming, and holding sittings in Denver, Wichita, and 
Oklahoma City. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 41, 48 (2006). The building’s namesake, Byron White, 
was appointed by President John Kennedy to the Supreme Court and served from 1962 until 
1993, and died in 2002. Some of White’s memorabilia are displayed on the first floor. The 
building’s renovation and conversion cost about $30 million or “$115 per square foot” 
resulting in a building valued at $200 million, which is about $760 per square foot. See Press 
Release, U.S. Gen. Servs. Admin., GSA’s Byron White Courthouse Wins Presidential 
Design Award (Oct. 30, 1997), available at http:www.gsa.gov/portal/content/100400. The 
district court has its own building that opened in 2002—the Alfred A. Arraj U.S. 
Courthouse, a ten-story, 325,000 square foot structure consisting of a pavilion and a tower 
that provides space for fifteen courtrooms. See U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., ALFRED A. ARRAJ 
U.S. COURTHOUSE: A MODEL OF SUSTAINABILITY, available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/ 
fy05osti/38655.pdf. 
 117. Federal Building, U.S. Post Office and Courthouse, Missoula, MT, U.S. GEN. 
SERVICES ADMIN., http://www.gsa.gov/portal/ext/html/site/hb/category/25431/action 
Parameter/exploreByBuilding/buildingId/598.  
 118. Id. (citing the newspaper The Daily Missoulan); see also History of the Federal 
Judiciary, Historic Federal Courthouses, supra note 105.  
 119. Federal Building, U.S. Post Office and Courthouse, Missoula, MT, supra note 117. 
The building has been expanded several times as it has since provided housing for the 
Northern Region of the U.S. Forest Service. A second federal court, opened in 1996, was 
named the Russell E. Smith Courthouse in honor of a local district judge who served there 
from 1966 until his death in 1990. The older building is no longer used as a court.  
 120. Jacob Weinberger U.S. Courthouse, San Diego, CA, U.S. GEN. SERVICES ADMIN., 
http://www.gsa.gov/portal/ext/html/site/hb/category/25431/actionParameter/exploreByBuildi
ng/buildingId/338 (describing the Jacob Weinberger U.S. Courthouse, in San Diego, 
California). 
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Figure 14: Federal Building, United States Post Office and Courthouse, Missoula, Montana.
Supervising Architect: James Knox Taylor. 1913.
 
Image reproduced courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration. 
 
 
Figure 15: United States Post Office and Customs House, San Diego, California.
Supervising Architect: James Knox Taylor. 1913; renamed in 1986 the Jacob Weinberger
United States Courthouse; renovated 1994.
 
Image reproduced courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration. 
 
In the same year at the opposite side of the country, another major federal Post 
Office and Courthouse opened in the federal territory of Puerto Rico. See figure 16. 
One can see its massive structure reinforcing the federal power exercised over that 
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“unincorporated territory” that today remains in a complex relationship with the 
United States.121 The building’s size contrasted with the federal outpost in the far 
north, where a federal encampment (figure 17) was established for the Alaska 
federal court in 1914. That building’s modest dimensions contrasted with the 
300,000 square miles over which the court had jurisdiction.122  
 
Figure 16: United States Post Office and Courthouse, San Juan, Puerto Rico. Supervising 
Architect: James Knox Taylor. 1914; enlarged 1938–1940; renamed in 1999 the José V. 
Toledo Federal Building and United States Courthouse.
 
Image reproduced courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 121. See EFRÉN RIVERA RAMOS, THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY: THE JUDICIAL 
AND SOCIAL LEGACY OF AMERICAN COLONIALISM IN PUERTO RICO 81 (2001). 
 122. See MELODY WEBB, THE LAST FRONTIER 198 (1985). Congress first created the 
district—with a single tribunal—in the Alaska Organic Act of 1884. Ch. 53, § 3, 23 Stat. 24, 
24; see also CLAUS-M. NASKE, A HISTORY OF THE ALASKA FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT 
SYSTEM, 1884–1959, AND THE CREATION OF THE STATE COURT SYSTEM, ch. 1 at 1 (1985). In 
1884 President Chester Arthur appointed the first district judge, Ward McAllister Jr., along 
with four commissioners who were to function as “probate judge, justice of the peace, land 
office registrar, notary public, and much more.” Id. at ch. 2 at 5. They were based in Sitka, 
Alaska. In 1900, revisions created a district court with three divisions, each with a district 
judge who was to be resident in the district, to hold office for four years, to receive an annual 
salary of $5000 a year, and to work under rules of civil procedure provided in that statute. 
Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 786, §§ 4–10, 31 Stat. 321, 322–26; see also NASKE, supra, at app. 
(Judges, District of Alaska). My thanks to Dana Fabe of the Alaska Supreme Court for help 
in locating these references. 
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Figure 17: United States Courthouse and Jail and adjacent Bank of Alaska, Fairbanks,
Alaska. Circa 1914; demolished 1932.
 
Image reproduced courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration. 
 
I began this Lecture with a photograph of the U.S. Supreme Court building, 
designed by Cass Gilbert and opened in 1935. An appropriate bookend for this 
section is another Cass Gilbert structure, also opened in the mid-1930s. The 
building, known to many as “Foley Square” and housing the Southern District of 
New York and the Second Circuit, was the first federal courthouse skyscraper. See 
figure 18. The building’s 590-foot rise by way of a “version of Saint Mark’s 
campanile” in Venice123 is emblematic of the nationwide growth in judgeships and 
caseloads. By the time this building opened, federal court filings were at about 
150,000 cases, a fivefold increase over the numbers in the 1870s.124  
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 123. Gail Fenske, Cass Gilbert’s Skyscrapers in New York: The Twentieth-Century City 
and the Urban Picturesque, in INVENTING THE SKYLINE: THE ARCHITECTURE OF CASS 
GILBERT 229, 275 (Margaret Heilbrun ed., 2000). Gilbert’s tower echoed one added in 1915 
by Peabody and Stearns to Boston’s U.S. Custom House, which was built in 1847 and 
designed by Ammi B. Young. See ROBERT CAMPBELL & PETER WANDERWARKER, 
CITYSCAPES OF BOSTON: AN AMERICAN CITY THROUGH TIME 50–51 (1992). 
 124. Clark, supra note 77, at 98 tbl.4, 114 tbl.10. The original Gilbert structure for the 
Southern District had sixteen courtrooms. An expanded space, renamed in 2001 the 
Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse in honor of Justice Marshall (who had sat as an 
appellate judge in that courthouse) contains thirty-five. Thurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse, 
New York, NY, U.S. GEN. SERVICES ADMIN., http://www.gsa.gov/portal/ext/html/site/hb/ 
category/25431/actionParameter/exploreByBuilding/buildingId/868. But by the 1990s, these 
provisions were seen as inadequate. Thus, the Southern District was given a second nearby 
building, the Daniel P. Moynihan Courthouse, sometimes called “Pearl Street” in reference 
to its address but named in honor of New York’s Senator Moynihan, who was a major 
proponent of improving the quality of federal buildings. See infra notes 206–16.  
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Figure 18: United States Courthouse, New York City, New York. Architect: Cass Gilbert,
1936; renamed in 2001 the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse.
 
Image reproduced courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration. 
D. Courthouses in Context  
When these examples of federal buildings constructed between the 1870s and 
the 1930s are set against the backdrop of the pre–Civil War construction efforts, 
several propositions become clear. First, in terms of national government priorities, 
courthouses were not part of the first wave of federal construction, nor central to 
the second; marine hospitals, custom houses, and post offices were. Only during the 
latter part of the eighteenth century were the words “court house” placed on the 
portals of important national government buildings.  
Second, in terms of aesthetics, buildings ranged from Romanesque fortresses to 
Greek temples, from various versions of Classical Renaissance to Gothic 
knockoffs, as the men who held the position of Supervising Architect “scrambled 
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their historical allusions.”125 As one commentator put it, the “panoply of federal 
buildings stretching across the nation” shared only the “common bond . . . that they 
all owed their parentage to a single office in Washington.”126  
The chronology and architectural exuberance undergirds a third point, about the 
change in the kind of services and buildings provided by the national government. 
Judicial functions were once rarely announced on the front door, but the Customs 
Office was,127 even if that name is now relegated to history as that office’s function 
has been eclipsed by the national taxing authority. Further, as illustrated by the 
sequence of buildings in Des Moines, Iowa and in Denver, Colorado, many of what 
had been large-scale and impressive buildings in the nineteenth century were, 
within relatively short order, seen as obsolete. A few were lost to fires, and some 
were torn down or recycled for other uses as politicians succeeded in getting 
resources for replacements or expansions.128 Moreover, the growth in national 
services both promoted multifunction buildings and then explained their eclipse. 
For example, postal and court services outgrew their allotted spaces and spun off 
into separate facilities, purpose-built and purpose-named.  
Fourth, the development of federal housing stock intersects with the 
professionalization of lawyers and architects and, later, of judges. These specialized 
service providers helped to shape government entities that in turn needed their 
expertise. Further, these professions were active participants in conflicts about the 
respective roles of the public and private sectors in controlling federal building 
designs. In-house government services expanded during the second half of the 
nineteenth century. In the 1850s, the Office of Supervising Architect consisted of 
about ten people in Washington, D.C. (two architects, “one clerk, six draftsmen, 
and one bookkeeper-draftsman”); by 1913, the Office employed about 350 people, 
250 in Washington and another 100 in the field.129 The growth spurt from ten to 
350 is a fortyfold increase in personnel from the 1850s to 1913.130  
Yet, even as the number of federal employees involved in building projects rose, 
their control over design declined over time. In the first few decades after the 
1850s, when the Office of Supervising Architect came into being, federal 
employees were in charge of design. Thereafter, AIA efforts succeeded in shifting 
                                                                                                                 
 
 125. CRAIG, supra note 48, at 195. 
 126. LOWRY, supra note 48, at 58. Washington maintained enormous control. See id. at 
59. Craig provided examples, such as a congressional building committee committed to 
“twelfth-century Normandy for the style” for new federal institutions, with results like the 
“medieval castle of the Smithsonian,” completed in 1855. CRAIG, supra note 48, at 91. 
 127. Examples of such exceptions during this era include the courthouse and post office 
built in 1857–1858 in Windsor, Vermont, and courthouses provided for the territories. See 
CRAIG, supra note 48, at 105. Craig noted that the Vermont building cost more than $70,000 
and the population of the town, when it was constructed, numbered about 2000. Id. 
 128. Lee mapped changing architectural trends, both in public and private design. For 
example, while Robert Mills and Alfred Mullet had often relied on classical revival 
buildings, after the 1870s, taste turned toward Gothic and then Romanesque styles. LEE, 
supra note 48, at 68, 111. 
 129. CRAIG, supra note 48, at 99. 
 130. In the forty-year interval between 1853 and 1892, the building stock of the Office of 
Supervising Architect increased “seventeen-fold.” Id. at 148. 
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significant responsibilities to the private sector. Today, courthouse design is 
outsourced and (as I will argue below), so increasingly are court services.  
III. HOUSING THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: THE SHIFT FROM “COURT QUARTERS” OF 
THE 1920S TO COURTHOUSE DESIGN IN THE 1980S 
Before turning to late twentieth-century developments, a richer account of the 
earlier part of the century is needed. As the Gilbert skyscraper for the Southern 
District of New York makes plain, by the 1930s, courthouses were moving to the 
fore as monumental statements of government authority. The federal judiciary was 
rising in prominence, and credit for the infrastructure that helped to generate that 
visibility goes first to William Howard Taft, who not only pressed for a building for 
the Supreme Court but who also laid the groundwork for the bureaucratic form of 
today’s federal courts. 
A. From “Paddling One’s Own Canoe” to Collective Action  
In 1922, soon after William Howard Taft became Chief Justice Taft, he 
complained in a speech to the ABA about the isolation of federal judges, each left 
“to paddle his own canoe.”131 Taft’s metaphor made the point that no institutional 
mechanisms enabled federal judges to function as a collective body.  
Scattered around the United States, trial judges used the diverse procedures of 
the states which they served; a federal judge of the 1920s working in Connecticut 
relied on different rules of court than did a federal judge in New York, Texas, or 
California. Dispersed federal judges had relatively little in common. Unlike today, 
they did not have “Iqbal” and “Rule 12” as shared cultural references.132 Moreover, 
when judges wanted a clerk, a typewriter, or a travel stipend, they asked the 
Department of Justice. Further, as the names of buildings shown above suggest, 
trial-level judges often shared quarters with other federal agencies.  
William Howard Taft sought to change the structural relations among federal 
judges, just as he aspired to put the Supreme Court in control of its own docket.133 
                                                                                                                 
 
 131. William Howard Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Ct., Possible and Needed 
Reforms in Administration of Justice in Federal Courts, Address Before Annual Meeting of 
the American Bar Association (Aug. 10, 1922) [hereinafter Taft, 1922 Needed Reforms], in 8 
A.B.A. J. 601, 602 (1922). Taft was nominated and confirmed as Chief Justice on the 30th of 
June, 1921. DAVID H. BURTON, TAFT, HOLMES, AND THE 1920S COURT 113 (1998). Burton 
saw Taft as a “conservative Progressive” whose interventions worked great changes in the 
federal judicial structure. See id. at 80. 
 132. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), joined Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544 (2007), to interpret Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as permitting a 
case to be dismissed if a complaint failed to meet a “plausibility standard” in its allegations 
of fact and law. See generally Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of Modern 
American Procedure, 93 JUDICATURE 109 (2009); Kevin M. Clermont, Three Myths About 
Twombly-Iqbal, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1337 (2010).  
 133. See Judiciary Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-415, 43 Stat. 936. For a history of the 
shift to the discretion Taft achieved by way of certiorari, see Edward A. Hartnett, 
Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 1643 (2000). 
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As his biographer, Alpheus Thomas Mason, wrote in the 1960s: “No other Chief 
Justice, before or since, worked so hard at lobbying.”134 (That judgment needs to be 
qualified now because the administrative apparatus, spawned by virtue of Taft’s 
efforts, augments the lobbying resources of the Office of the Chief Justice and of 
the judiciary more generally.) Succeeding on many fronts, Taft transformed the 
function of the Supreme Court, which lost its character as an ordinary appellate 
court and gained a new charter—to decide matters it deemed to be of national 
import, thereby making them so.135 In addition, Taft sought to increase the number 
of lower federal judges and to gather them under his wing so as to become the chief 
administrator of the federal judiciary as well as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. 
In 1922, Taft persuaded Congress to create twenty-four new lower court judgeships 
which, given the 126 judgeships that had been authorized as of 1914,136 grew the 
workforce by more than 20 percent.  
Taft also obtained congressional authorization to convene what was then called 
the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges, chartered to meet once a year in 
Washington to advise the chief justice on “the needs of [each] circuit and as to any 
matters in respect of which the administration of justice in the courts of the United 
States may be improved.”137 Taft—and every chief justice that has succeeded 
him—chaired the Judicial Conference, which has evolved into the corporate policy-
making voice for the federal judiciary.138 
To garner the power to create shared federal rules, Taft worked with lawyers 
aiming to nationalize their profession. Just as architects had created the AIA in the 
1850s and moved it to a national level in the 1860s, attorneys too were shaping 
professional organizations aimed at national markets. As noted, the ABA was 
founded in 1878,139 and its annual conventions became occasions for agenda 
                                                                                                                 
 
 134. MASON, supra note 17, at 15. Mason also recounted that the membership of the 
Judiciary Committee included several Senators whom Taft identified as his opponents, 
committed to progressive reforms that Taft opposed. Id. at 95–100, 121–37. 
 135. See Starr, supra note 17, at 967–69. 
 136. See Henry P. Chandler, Some Major Advances in the Federal Judicial System 1922–
1947, 31 F.R.D. 307, 322 (1963); Authorized Judgeships, U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/JudgesJudgeshi
ps/docs/allauth.pdf. What Taft did not gain was the power to assign judges as he wanted. See 
MASON, supra note 17, at 100–02. 
 137. See Act of Sept. 14, 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-298, § 2, 42 Stat. 837, 838 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2006)). Taft thus enshrined the “executive principle”—that the 
judiciary should be in charge of its own “business.” See MASON, supra note 17, at 107. In 
1937, Congress amended the 1922 Act to include participation by the chief judge of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in the Conference of Senior 
Circuit Judges. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, § 331, 62 Stat. 869, 902 (codified 
at 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2006)).  
 138. See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2006). See generally Judith Resnik & Lane Dilg, Responding 
to a Democratic Deficit: Limiting the Powers and the Term of the Chief Justice of the United 
States, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1575 (2006). 
 139. See supra note 102. At that founding, some 100 lawyers from twenty-one states 
gathered in Saratoga Springs, New York. History, AM. BAR ASS’N, www.americanbar.org/ 
utility/about_the_aba/history.html. 
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settings, such as seeking to respond to what Roscoe Pound famously labeled 
“popular dissatisfaction” with the courts.140  
In the first decade of the twentieth century, the ABA championed several 
projects, including new legislation to give federal judges the power to promulgate 
nationwide rules of procedure. Strong populist opposition prevented enactment 
until 1934, when Congress passed the Rules Enabling Act, giving the Supreme 
Court the power to set forth such rules.141 In 1938, the Court issued its first set—the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The 1938 Rules reflected concerns that the means of getting to justice were 
overly cumbersome, intricate, technical, and too reliant on the English system’s 
juridical categorization of causes of action.142 To lower barriers to entry, the 
reformers crafted a trans-substantive set of procedures that provided the same 
governing regime regardless of the kind of lawsuit (contract, tort, patent, federal 
statutory right) or of the form of relief (damages or injunctions). Further, liberal 
rules of pleading and joinder permitted different kinds of claims and various parties 
to be brought together in a single lawsuit, thereby widening the parameters of 
lawsuits. In addition to relaxing the risk of procedural errors, the Federal Rules 
reshaped the course of lawsuits by adding a system of information exchange 
(“discovery”) among parties in advance of trial143 as well as an occasion (called a 
“pre-trial”) for lawyers and judges to meet in advance informally to plan for trial.144  
Rulemakers aspired both to change how lawyers brought cases to courts and 
how federal judges saw their role. But more than rules are needed to change 
behavior. By the 1940s, the infrastructure that Taft launched—the Conference of 
Senior Circuit Judges—had elaborated its own subcommittees and programs to 
implement new ideas. Energetic and evangelistic judges, committed to revamping 
                                                                                                                 
 
 140. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of 
Justice, 40 AM. L. REV. 729 (1906); see also Barry Friedman, Popular Dissatisfaction with 
the Administration of Justice: A Retrospective (and a Look Ahead), 82 IND. L.J. 1193 (2007). 
Friedman argued that the distress came from distance between the “felt necessities of the 
time” (to quote Pound) and the law’s lack of responsiveness, as segments of the population 
were “systematically entrenched loser[s].” Id. at 1210–11.  
 141. See Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–2074 (2006)). Its legislative history and the role played by 
Taft are explored in Stephen B. Burbank’s classic essay, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 
supra note 46. The 1938 Rules made the major decision to create a unified procedural 
system for law and equity. In 1822, the Court had prescribed thirty-three equity rules for 
lower courts, and revised those rules in 1842 with a set of ninety-two. See 42 U.S. (1 How.) 
xxxix, xxxix–lxx (1842); 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) v, v–xiii (1822). Neither set was as 
comprehensive as the Equity Rules of 1912, 226 U.S. 627, and those in turn were superseded 
by the more comprehensive provisions promulgated in 1938. The influence of equity 
practice on the 1938 Rules is charted in Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common 
Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 
909, 975–82 (1987). 
 142. See J. A. JOLOWICZ, ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 24–54 (2000). 
 143. See generally Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical 
Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691 (1998). 
 144. The history of these developments is detailed in Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 
96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982) [hereainfter Resnik, Managerial Judges]. 
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the attitudes and practices of their peers, championed their vision of judging, 
preached it, and demonstrated it. By the 1960s, they convinced their colleagues to 
create a “school for judges”145 to teach new means of being judges—both in terms 
of daily practices and in their institutional persona vis-à-vis other branches of 
government. 
B. Ministering to the Federal Courts: The Administrative Office and the Federal 
Judicial Center  
Through the 1930s, the judiciary relied on the Department of Justice for 
services.146 Under the leadership of a succession of chief justices (from Taft to 
Charles Evans Hughes, Harlan Fiske Stone, Fred Vinson, and Earl Warren), 147 the 
Conference of Senior Circuit Judges proposed ways for judges to gain more control 
over those ministering to the judiciary.148 In 1939, Congress responded by 
authorizing the judiciary to bring its management in-house through the creation of 
its own administrative office.149 
Initially working with a staff of about forty, the AO took over tasks from the 
Department of Justice as well as from district court clerks around the country. The 
AO expanded the data collected and submitted proposed budgets to Congress. The 
AO also oversaw the operations run by clerks and probation officers and dealt with 
                                                                                                                 
 
 145. See Warren E. Burger, School for Judges, 33 F.R.D. 139 (1964). 
 146. Until 1891, “the only salaried officers of the federal judiciary” were its judges, and 
all nonjudge staff members were paid on a fee-for-service basis. HISTORY OF THE AO, supra 
note 30, at 3. 
 147. Taft died in 1930 and was replaced by Charles Evans Hughes, who served as the 
chief justice until his retirement in 1941. Timeline of the Justices, SUPREME COURT HIST. 
SOC’Y, http://www.supremecourthistory.org/history-of-the-court/. He was replaced by 
Harlan Fiske Stone, who died unexpectedly in 1946. Id. Frederick Vinson became chief 
justice until his death in 1953, and Earl Warren was appointed thereafter. Id. 
 148. HISTORY OF THE AO, supra note 30, at 1–4. How to do so was a subject of debate. 
Many jurists were critical of the Department of Justice, but not all were enthusiastic about a 
new administrative center in Washington, and some judges urged that clerks of courts be 
given budgetary authority rather than centralizing the process. During the late 1920s and 
1930s, the proponents of a central agency gained sway and went to Congress with a bill to 
create the AO, with its director appointed by the chief justice. See id. at 4–15. The first 
director was Henry Chandler, who had been a president of the Chicago Bar Association and 
who worked with Associate Director Elmore Whitehurst for many years. See generally 
Chandler, supra note 136. 
 149. See Act of Aug. 7, 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-299, § 302, § 304(2), 53 Stat. 1223, 1223 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 601–612 (2006)). The political configuration that 
resulted in its enactment is explored in Peter Graham Fish, Crises, Politics, and Federal 
Judicial Reform: The Administrative Office Act of 1939, 32 J. POLITICS 599 (1970). Fish 
argues that struggles over status, including the failed effort in 1937 to expand (or “pack”) the 
Supreme Court, prompted the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges to want to shore up 
internal judicial administrative capacities. Additional discussion comes from the HISTORY OF 
THE AO, supra note 30, at 11–16. See generally MITCHEL A. SOLLENBERGER, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RS 21847, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS: HISTORY, 
OPERATIONS, AND CURRENT ISSUES (2004).  
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issues ranging from office supplies to caseloads.150 In addition, the AO monitored 
congressional legislation related to the judiciary. Over time, the AO has become the 
judiciary’s liaison to Congress. The AO both responds to requests for the 
judiciary’s views on pending legislation and at other times works with judges to 
draft proposed legislation.151  
A general recodification in 1948 of the federal statutes related to the jurisdiction 
of the federal courts produced a new name for the Conference of Senior Circuit 
Judges, which became (and remains) the Judicial Conference of the United States. 
Initially composed exclusively of appellate judges, the Judicial Conference focused 
on the “business” of the courts as it made policy for the courts. By statute (then as 
now), each of the chief judges of the circuits are members of the Judicial 
Conference of the United States.152 In the 1950s, Chief Justice Earl Warren opened 
access to the Judicial Conference for district court judges by persuading the 
appellate group to include representative district judges, with one elected from each 
circuit.153  
In 1967, Warren also helped shape an agreement to enable the judiciary’s 
bureaucratic apparatus to expand by virtue of a newly chartered congressional 
entity—the Federal Judicial Center (FJC)—charged with education and research for 
the federal courts.154 That mission is reflected in several of the courthouse 
photographs reproduced above, and many more can be found on the FJC’s website 
display, Historic Federal Courthouses.155 The FJC runs what is informally called 
“baby judge school” to orient new judges. The FJC also convenes specialized 
educational programs and, at the behest of committees of the Judicial Conference, 
does targeted research.  
When Congress first authorized the senior circuit judges to come to Washington 
in 1922, the legislature limited their allowance to ten dollars a day.156 When they 
                                                                                                                 
 
 150. The kind and nature of data collected have drawn concerns from the perspective of 
researchers seeking to understand various dimensions of the judiciary’s work. See Theodore 
Eisenberg & Margo Schlanger, The Reliability of the Administrative Office of the U.S. 
Courts Database: An Initial Empirical Analysis, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1455 (2003). 
 151. See Winkle, supra note 30. In 1976, the AO created its Office of Legislative 
Analysis, which was later renamed the Office of Legislative Affairs. Id. at 45.  
 152. See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2006). 
 153. Act of Aug. 28, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-202, 71 Stat. 476; see also H.R. REP. NO. 85-
172 (1957) (explaining that, given that “many of the recommendations of the Conference 
deal with judicial matters being handled daily in the district courts,” those judges should be 
included because they were a “valuable source of information” on the “problem of court 
congestion and delay in litigation”). In 1996, Congress amended the provision to create 
terms of not less than three nor more than five years and to permit senior as well as active 
judges to serve. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, § 601, 
110 Stat. 3847, 3857. 
 154. Act of Dec. 20, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-219, § 101, 81 Stat. 664, 664 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 620 (2006)). 
 155. See History of the Federal Judiciary, Historic Federal Courthouses, supra note 105; 
see also Constructing Justice: An Exhibit of Courthouse Photographs at the Federal Judicial 
Center, CT. HISTORIAN, Nov. 1995, at 1.  
 156. Act of Sept. 14, 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-298, § 2, 42 Stat. 837, 838–39. This 
micromanagement stemmed in part from concerns that the meetings were an excuse for trips 
2012] BUILDING THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 867 
 
had their annual meeting, the Justice Department provided staff support. In 
contrast, by the late 1980s, William Rehnquist presided over an administrative 
apparatus designed for and by the judiciary. The AO directly employed more than 
1100 employees providing central resources to the dispersed national judicial 
workforce of another 29,000, probation officers included.157 The FJC staff had 
some 130 members,158 and by 2010, Congress supported the work of both the AO 
and the FJC with more than $110 million annually.159  
As with the courts, the changing shape (and power) of the judiciary’s 
administrators can be seen in the physical spaces they used. When begun in 1939, 
the AO shared space in the then-new Supreme Court building.160 As staff grew to 
more than 100, employees were dispersed to various buildings in Washington.161 
When the FJC came into being in the late 1960s, its employees worked in The 
Dolley Madison House (figure 19), a Federal-style structure named for the wife of 
President James Madison and built in the 1820s by her brother-in-law.162  
                                                                                                                 
to Washington. See Norman J. Padelford, The Federal Judicial Conference, 26 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 482, 485 (1932).  
 157. Winkle, supra note 30, at 46. As of 2009, the Judicial Branch had more than 33,000 
employees. U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS: 
EMPLOYMENT AND TRENDS SEPTEMBER 2009 tbl.2 (2009), available at 
http://www.opm.gov/feddata/html/2009/September/table2.asp. The U.S. Supreme Court 
employed 483 people. Id. Included within “judicial branch” employees are not only staff for 
judges and clerks of courts but also probation officers. See Summary of Nonstandard Pay 
and Benefits by Type of Pay or Benefit, in U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., FEDERAL LAW 
ENFORCEMENT PAY AND BENEFITS: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS app.C (2004), available at 
http://www.opm.gov/oca/leo_report04/appendixc.asp. How the governance structure should 
be organized and whether additional senior staff (akin to a “chancellor”) would be 
appropriate are issues that have been debated over the later part of the twentieth century. See 
RUSSELL R. WHEELER & GORDON BERMANT, FEDERAL COURT GOVERNANCE (1994); Charles 
Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradigm Found: Redefining the Judiciary’s Imperiled Role 
in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165 (1996); Daniel J. Meador, Appellate Subject Matter 
Organization: The German Design from an American Perspective, 5 HASTINGS INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 27 (1981). 
 158. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ANNUAL REPORT 2010, at 4. 
 159. In fiscal year 2010, the FJC had a budget of about $27 million and devoted about 
75% of its budget to education. The AO received about $83 million. See Judiciary Receives 
5.7 Percent Increase in Appropriations for FY 2010, THIRD BRANCH, Feb. 2010, at 2. 
 160. HISTORY OF THE AO, supra note 30, at 22. 
 161. By 1942, the AO had a staff of 104 persons, up from 96 the year before. See AO 
ANN. REP. 3 (1942). Under the tenure of Acting Director William Ellis, most of the staff was 
moved from the Supreme Court to offices in a GSA building. Id. at 44. For background on 
the early years of the AO, see James M. Collier, Fiscal Housekeeping in the Federal Courts, 
1 W. POL. Q. 400, 401 (1948). Additional discussions of the administrative apparatus can be 
found in RUSSELL WHEELER, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., A NEW JUDGE’S INTRODUCTION TO 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION (2003) and RUSSELL R. WHEELER & CYNTHIA 
HARRISON, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., CREATING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM (2005). 
 162. The drawing of the Dolley Madison House, provided courtesy of the AO, and with 
the assistance of Steven Salzgiver and Bruce Ragsdale, details a building for which James 
Madison lent the money for construction. After financial reversals for its builder, who died, 
Dolley Madison inherited the house. Survey of Historic Sites and Buildings, Lafayette 
Square Historic District, NAT’L PARK SERVICE, http://www.nps.gov/history/history/ 
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Figure 19: The Dolley Madison House, Washington, D.C., 1820.
 
Image courtesy of the Adminstrative Office of the United States Courts. 
 
As staff and activities outstripped space, the judiciary sought larger facilities. In 
1981, the architect of the Capitol identified a site proximate to the Supreme Court 
and adjacent to Union Station—which had been designed in 1907 by Daniel 
Burnham to greet travelers coming to the nation’s capital.163 In 1984, the Judicial 
Conference formally sought authority to proceed164 and, in 1988, obtained 
permission from Congress to enter into a public-private partnership that produced 
the Thurgood Marshall Federal Judiciary Building (figure 20), which opened in 
1992.  
                                                                                                                 
online_books/presidents/site6.htm. The Cosmos Club bought the building in 1886, sold it in 
1940 to the federal government, and then leased and used it until 1952. During the 1950s and 
1960s, the building was used by other federal agencies before, in 1968, becoming the home 
of the Federal Judicial Center. See U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., THE DOLLEY MADISON HOUSE 
(undated brochure, on file with author). 
 163. When it opened, Union Station claimed to be the largest train station in the world 
and provided a dramatic gateway to the capital in the classic Beaux-Arts style. See History of 
Union Station, UNIONSTATIONDC.ORG, http://www.unionstationdc.com//info/infohistory.  
 164. A detailed account of the project is provided in GEORGE M. WHITE, FINAL REPORT 
OF THE ARCHITECT OF THE CAPITOL TO THE COMMISSION FOR THE JUDICIARY OFFICE 
BUILDING: THE DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE THURGOOD MARSHALL FEDERAL 
JUDICIARY BUILDING (1994). 
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Figure 20: Thurgood Marshall Federal Judiciary Building, Washington, D.C. Architects: 
Lee/Timchula Architects, 1992. 
 
Image courtesy of the Federal Judicial Center. 
 
AO Director L. Ralph Mecham celebrated the Marshall building for putting “a 
face on a branch of government that is spread out across the nation, and serves as a 
strong testament to the important work that is accomplished here.”165 The 
“monumental” structure, offering a million square feet, contrasts with the quaint 
Dolley Madison House as it also reflects the legislative sophistication and the 
administrative girth of the judiciary. The Marshall Building is also a testament to 
the decades that preceded its construction, during which the meaning of a “federal 
case” and the conception of the roles for the federal judiciary changed. 
C. Putting New Cases into the Federal Courts: The 1930s to the 1980s 
The 1935 Cass Gilbert skyscraper courthouse in New York City (figure 18) 
ascended stories beyond its predecessors. So too did caseloads and legal rights. Not 
only did filings increase, but the content of cases changed—driven by dynamic 
variables including the kinds of legal rights recognized, access to legal services, 
and government regulatory policies.166 In the wake of the Depression, many saw 
federal governance as a necessary and desirable response to political and economic 
                                                                                                                 
 
 165. Press Release, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal Judiciary Marks Building 
Milestone (Oct. 4, 2002). 
 166. Many social scientists have tried to model litigation, and others have studied the 
shifts in the dockets of both state and federal courts that point to a rise in cases involving 
government regulation (criminal cases included) and a homogenization across jurisdictions 
over time. For example, one study sampled cases filed in three federal appellate courts in 
different parts of the United States from 1895 through 1975. The researchers concluded that 
while once those courts’ dockets were “dominated by private economic disputes,” by the 
1970s, a large proportion of the caseload involved “government activity . . . essentially 
noneconomic in character. . . . Policies of the federal government and the problems 
associated with them now provide the basis for most federal appellate activity.” See 
Lawrence Baum, Sheldon Goldman & Austin Sarat, The Evolution of Litigation in the 
Federal Courts of Appeals, 1895–1975, 16 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 291, 306, 308 (1981–1982).  
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conditions. Expansion of federal jurisdiction was a mechanism by which to spread 
and enforce new national legal obligations. In the 1940s, the Civil Rights 
movement turned to the federal courts and, under the leadership of Earl Warren in 
the 1960s, judicial interpretations of the Constitution, statutes, and federal rules 
looked favorably upon court-based processes to enable racial equality and to 
enhance human dignity. Congress not only supported but also expanded this project 
as, time and again, it authorized government officials and private parties to bring 
lawsuits as a means of enforcing federal law.  
Earl Warren’s tenure marked a commitment to rights assertion spanning both the 
civil and criminal dockets. Brown v. Board of Education remains the landmark that 
continues to evoke both admiration and debate.167 Another major holding is Gideon 
v. Wainwright, giving new meaning to the procedural requirement of a “right to 
counsel”168 that had, for almost two hundred years, had little substantive import. In 
that 1963 decision, the Supreme Court required that indigent criminal felony 
defendants be provided with state-paid lawyers169 who, as subsequently elaborated, 
were also to be accorded the requisite resources, including experts, if necessary to 
mount a defense.170  
Warren’s leadership of the Judicial Conference resulted in renewed interest in 
the role that federal procedural rules could play in access to justice. In 1960, Chief 
Justice Warren appointed an ad hoc committee to review how the 1938 Civil Rules 
were functioning; Dean Acheson was the chair and Professor Benjamin Kaplan of 
Harvard Law School was the reporter.171 The group produced a major reworking of 
the class action rule that facilitated both the enforcement of civil rights injunctions 
and new capacities for consumers to band together to seek economic recoveries 
from manufacturers and sellers of goods.172  
Those rule-based changes were complemented by a statute, proposed by the 
Judicial Conference, authoring consolidation across federal district courts and 
producing now commonplace “multidistrict litigation,” or MDLs.173 Such 
                                                                                                                 
 
 167. See MARTHA MINOW, IN BROWN’S WAKE: LEGACIES OF AMERICA’S EDUCATIONAL 
LANDMARK (2010). 
 168. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 169. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 170. See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). 
 171. In 1935, the Supreme Court had appointed an Advisory Committee to draft rules. In 
1942, the Court appointed a standing Advisory Committee that was “discharged” in 1956. In 
1958, Congress authored the Judicial Conference to advise the Court on rule making. In 
1960, Chief Justice Warren appointed several committees for the study of bankruptcy, 
appellate, admiralty, and civil rules. Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure of the Judicial 
Conference of the U.S., Announcement of the Chief Justice of the U.S. (Apr. 4, 1960) (on 
file with the author).  
 172. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (1966) (later amended); see also Owen M. Fiss, The Political 
Theory of the Class Action, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 21 (1996); Judith Resnik, From 
“Cases” to “Litigation,” 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1991); Judith Resnik, Dennis E. 
Curtis & Deborah R. Hensler, Individuals Within the Aggregate: Relationships, 
Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296 (1996); David Marcus, Flawed but Noble: 
Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications for the Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 
657 (2011). 
 173. See Multidistrict Litigation Act, Pub. L. No. 90-296, 82 Stat. 109 (1968) (codified as 
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provisions reshaped the prospects of what litigation might accomplish, as did the 
growth in the number of lawyers, increasingly diverse in terms of their own 
demographic profiles, who both fueled and staffed the regulatory state and ferreted 
out forms of injury imposed on a diverse array of individuals.  
The idea that individuals ought to be empowered and equipped in the contest 
with the state migrated from the criminal side to civil litigation.174 In 1974, shortly 
after the tenure of Chief Justice Warren ended, Congress established the Legal 
Services Corporation that employed lawyers, paid by the government, to represent 
poor litigants in certain kinds of civil disputes.175 The Supreme Court also held that 
states could not impose access fees that served as a barrier to certain kinds of civil 
litigants.176 Further, a very small sliver of civil litigants—individuals faced with 
state efforts to establish or to terminate their status as parents—gained 
constitutional rights to state-subsidized evidence,177 state-paid transcripts, and, 
under certain, narrow conditions, to state-funded lawyers.178 
Aggregate processing itself became another vehicle for enhancing access to 
courts. Class actions generate subsidies for litigants by relying on economies of 
scale to induce lawyers to serve a wider set of claimants.179 Information 
technologies revealed patterns of problems experienced by large numbers of 
individuals—permitting the connection of incidents heretofore perceived as 
isolated or idiosyncratic events. Phrases like “the asbestos litigation” and “the 
tobacco litigation” capture the practice of court recognition of an enormous array of 
                                                                                                                 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006)). 
 174.  Just after Warren Burger assumed the chief justiceship, the Supreme Court 
borrowed Professor Charles Reich’s insight that statutory entitlements were forms of 
“property” to be protected from state deprivation by “due process of law.” The Court 
required that final decision making about government entitlements employ judicial modes of 
process to ensure fairness. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Charles A. Reich, 
The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). 
 175. See Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-355, 88 Stat. 378 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C § 2996 (2006)).  
 176. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). The limits of that holding were 
marked in United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973), and in Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 
656 (1973). For statutory provisions in the federal system for fee waivers, see 28 U.S.C. § 
1915 (2006), amended by Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 804, 110 
Stat. 1321, 1373 (1996). 
 177. Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981). 
 178. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (transcripts); Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. 
Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (counsel). Lassiter was limited in 2011 when the Supreme Court 
rejected requiring counsel for all civil contemnors facing detention. See Turner v. Rogers, 
131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011). Turner holds that the Due Process Clause “does not automatically 
require the provision of counsel at civil contempt proceedings” for an indigent facing 
incarceration of up to one year because of an unpaid child support order owed to a child’s 
custodian, who, the Court noted, was also likely to lack counsel. Id. at 2520. But in the 
absence of counsel, “substitute procedural safeguards” are required to ensure fair decision 
making. Id. at 2518.  
 179. See generally Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions 
Creating Subsidies and Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 
148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119 (2000); Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T 
v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78 (2011) 
[hereinafter Resnik, Fairness in Numbers]. 
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parties and of varying forms of injury prompting interrelated judgments. 
Proceedings with hundreds and thousands of individuals, some in search of 
institutional reform and some in search of money, became plausible, if not routine. 
While some of those claims arose from tort or contract, many new litigants entered 
the federal courts because Congress had welcomed them. The legislature embraced 
adjudication by authorizing litigants to bring—whether as individuals or as parts of 
aggregates—a widening array of lawsuits aimed at enforcing civil, environmental, 
consumers’, and workers’ rights.  
Adjudication’s flowering in the United States can be seen through the 
congressional creation of hundreds of new federal rights and the filing of more 
cases.180 As tracked at the outset in figure 3, the docket of the federal courts grew 
from under 30,000 civil and criminal filings in 1901 to more than 90,000 in 1950 
and almost 320,000 in 2001. And, as noted at the outset, filings increased about 
95% from 1965 to 1980, and about another 50% from 1980 to 1995. Moreover, the 
mix changed. In 1901, more criminal than civil cases were filed; by the 1950s, the 
civil docket had begun to surge; and, by 2001, the number of civil filings (roughly 
250,000) was more than four times that of the criminal filings.181 Rising caseloads 
produced calls for more judgeships; figure 2 provides a snapshot of a parallel 
growth in life-tenured judgeships over the twentieth century.182  
Thus, by the later part of the twentieth century and through the interactions of 
social movements, economic challenges, judges, lawyers, and politicians, Congress 
had vested in the federal judiciary a role that now may seem to be inherent in its 
charter. Independent judges were authorized to respond to claims under a myriad of 
statutes and understood themselves specially obligated to respond to constitutional 
arguments made by a diverse set of claimants. The expansion of jurisdictional 
authority was mirrored by an administrative expansion as Congress endowed the 
judiciary with new methods to provide for and to articulate its own interests. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 180. Between 1955 and 1960, roughly ninety thousand federal cases were filed each year, 
dividing roughly as two-thirds civil and one-third criminal. See Clark, supra note 77, at 131 
tbl.16. Twenty years later, filings had doubled, again with more civil than criminal cases. Id. 
at 143 tbl.20. By century’s end, the number of filings rose to about 300,000 civil and about 
60,000 criminal cases. 
 181. The filing data for 1950 and 2001 come from the AO, which, as noted, became the 
entity collecting statistics after its inception in 1939. The figures for 1901 are drawn from a 
two-volume empirical study by the ALI, as well as from Clark, supra note 77. See 1 
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, A STUDY OF THE BUSINESS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 107 (1934) 
(providing data on criminal cases); 2 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, A STUDY OF THE BUSINESS 
OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 111 (1934) (providing data on civil cases). See supra note 78 for 
the extrapolations used. How much time was devoted to the different kinds of cases is a 
discrete question, answered in administrative terms by a “weighted caseload” measure 
aiming to capture the distinctions between the many civil filings settled or withdrawn before 
a federal judge sees a case and the burdens of criminal defendants who must be heard before 
pleading guilty or being sentenced. The AO began to use “weighted case measures” in 1946 
and has several times refined those metrics. See Explanation of Selected Terms, U.S. 
COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/library/fcmstat/cmsexpl03.html. 
 182. See also Chronological History of Authorized Judgeships in the U.S. District 
Courts, supra note 66. 
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D. Space, Staff, and Air Conditioning 
From the inception of the judiciary’s leadership Conference in the 1920s, that 
group focused on resources. Acting as the corporate voice of the judiciary, the 
Judicial Conference repeatedly asked Congress—through the Department of 
Justice—to create new judgeships for those circuits or districts identified as 
particularly needy.183 The Conference also requested law books for chambers, 
reimbursements for expenses, and more staff.184 Each year the Proceedings of the 
Judicial Conference recorded the discussions and requests; beginning in the late 
1930s, the AO, which took up the record-keeping that had been done by the 
Department of Justice, expanded the data collected as it filed annual reports 
detailing the workload and activities of the courts.  
To my own surprise when reviewing these yearly compendia, the term “court 
house” was not used in the reported proceedings from the 1930s to the 1960s. 
Indeed, although the AO’s enabling statute outlined several tasks including the 
provision of “accommodations for the use of the courts” and for staff, that mandate 
was read narrowly. As Henry Chandler, the AO Director in 1941 explained, it was 
“well known” that the AO was not “equipped to construct or operate buildings”; 
instead it would “discharge its duty” by obtaining “suitable provision from the 
agencies.”185 
What were the relevant agencies then? Recall that Congress had, in 1852, 
located the Office of Supervising Architect in the Treasury Department. In the 
wake of the Depression, the federal government launched an ambitious plan (what 
today we might call a “stimulus package”) that included funds for buildings. As a 
consequence of these New Deal efforts, the Office of Supervising Architect had to 
work with the Public Buildings Administration of the Federal Works Agency as 
well as the Post Office Department, which had independent authority to obtain 
property.186 In 1939, the Office of Supervising Architect itself was folded into the 
Public Buildings Administration,187 and in 1949, the new umbrella for both became 
a new entity, the GSA,188 which continues to oversee federal land purchases, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 183. See, e.g., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT i (OCT. 1924); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
REPORT 5–6 (Oct. 1927); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 4–8 (Oct. 1931). 
 184. See, e.g., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT i–ii (Oct. 1924); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
REPORT 5–6 (Oct. 1927); AO ANN. REP. 15–18 (1941).  
 185. AO ANN. REP. 15–16 (1941).  
 186. Id. at 15–16; HISTORY OF THE AO, supra note 30, at 41. 
 187. See Reorganization Plan No. I of 1939, 53 Stat. 1423 (pursuant to Reorganization 
Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-19, 53 Stat. 561). In 1949, Congress enacted the Public 
Buildings Act, authorizing the site selection and construction of federal buildings. See Public 
Buildings Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-105, 63 Stat. 176 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 40 U.S.C.). 
 188. Created under President Harry Truman at the end of World War II, the GSA was 
supposed to centralize the procurement and superintendence of government property. 
Functions of other agencies were transferred to the GSA, which was run by an 
“Administrator ” appointed by the president. See Federal Property and Administrative 
Services Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-152, 63 Stat. 377 (codified in scattered sections of 40 
U.S.C., 41 U.S.C., and 50 U.S.C.). A monograph by the GSA described its 1949 mandate to 
have been “standardization, direct purchase, mass production, and fiscal savings.” U.S. GEN. 
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construction, and maintenance. Functioning as the “landlord” for other federal 
agencies, the GSA has at times been a coventurer with and at other times a critic of 
the federal judiciary.189 
During the 1940s and 1950s, the judiciary worked with its sibling agencies to 
improve its “quarters.” At points, federal judges also protested that the federal 
government’s building regime was insufficiently attentive to their specific needs. A 
case in point comes from the saga of how, in the 1950s, the federal courts obtained 
funds for air conditioning—a topic that may seem an odd object of attention. Yet, 
this issue became a focal point when the judiciary sought additional judgeship lines 
from Congress. Some members of the legislature responded by noting that 
abandoning the practice of closing courts in the summer could open up more days 
for work. The Judicial Conference, in turn, argued that “extreme heat” interfered 
with “the efficiency and output of the courts during the hot months of the year.”190  
                                                                                                                 
SERVS. ADMIN., GROWTH, EFFICIENCY AND MODERNISM: GSA BUILDINGS OF THE 1950S, 60S, 
AND 70S 29 (2003) [hereinafter GSA MODERNISM]. 
  A series of other acts added to GSA responsibilities, and the Public Building Act of 
1959 gave the GSA more direct control over federal construction. See Public Buildings Act 
of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-249, 73 Stat. 479 (codified at 40 U.S.C. §§ 581–590, 3301–3315 
(2006)). By the 1960s, the GSA was seen as an “iceberg”—in that its direct budget (then of 
about $600 million) was dwarfed by the vastly larger sums (then more than $2.5 billion) the 
GSA controlled through projects under its aegis. See Michael James Luciano, A Study of the 
Origin and Development of the General Services Administration as Related to Its Present 
Operational Role, Direction, and Influence 245 (1968) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New 
York University) (UMI Pub. No. AAT 6907976). 
 189. Other entities have complained about the GSA. Episodically, concerns from various 
sectors prompt legislative oversight and sometimes direction. For example, in the 1972 
amendments, Congress instructed that the GSA report its “determination and findings 
supporting” the negotiation of purchase contracts “in writing to the Committees on Public 
Works of the Senate and House of Representatives,” and that the “maximum number of 
qualified sources” be solicited for proposals. See Public Buildings Amendments of 1972, 
Pub. L. No. 92-313, 86 Stat. 216, 219 (codified as amended at 40 U.S.C. §§ 3301–3316 
(Supp. 2008)).  
  The 1972 amendments added to the existing reporting rules in the Public Buildings 
Act of 1959, which required annual reports on recent and continuing constructions and 
acquisitions as well as “building project surveys as may be requested by resolution” of 
House or Senate committees. Public Buildings Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-249, 73 Stat. 
479, 481. Further, the Public Buildings Act required that the GSA submit formal documents 
to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as well as congressional committees as part 
of the authorization process. See 40 U.S.C. § 3307 (2006); CLAY H. WELLBORN, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RS 22287, GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION PROSPECTUS THRESHOLDS 
FOR OWNED AND LEASED FEDERAL FACILITIES 2–3 (2008). For each construction or 
acquisition project above a certain cost threshold, GSA must submit a detailed prospectus to 
congressional committees. 40 U.S.C. § 3307 (2006). Congress allocates funds “only if the 
Committee on Environment and Public Works of the Senate and the Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of Representatives adopt resolutions 
approving the purpose for which the appropriation is made.” Id. The cost threshold 
triggering this process cost for new spaces in fiscal year 2009 was $2.66 million. WELLBORN, 
supra, at 4. 
 190. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 25 (Sept. 1952). Director Henry Chandler explained 
in 1954: “Court rooms are often so situated that it is necessary to keep the windows closed in 
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Technology offered a solution. Air conditioning could make keeping facilities 
open easier, and thereby demonstrate that even adding court days in the summer 
did not suffice, for demand continued to outstrip need. The Judicial Conference 
asked its landlord, the Public Buildings Service, to obtain money to air condition 
certain facilities. In 1952 and again in 1953, the Commissioner of the Public 
Buildings Services reported back that little prospect existed for funds.191 But after 
Earl Warren became the Judicial Conference chair, the Conference appointed its 
own “Committee on Air Conditioning,” which surveyed needs, went directly to 
Congress for funds, and succeeded in 1955 in obtaining a direct appropriation of 
$1.15 million.192  
That fact is reflected in a reading of the small print on figure 21, which is a 
drawing from the AO’s annual report of 1957.193 The graphic—the “Judicial 
Dollar”—used the heuristic of a circle representing 100 cents to detail allocations 
of budgeted funds. As the small print explained, staff salaries (probation included) 
accounted for 42% of the expenditures; jurors represented 12%; judges’ salaries 
constituted 23%; and 8% went to “travel, misc. and air conditioning,” which was 
then a new line item in the budget. Note that, aside from air conditioning, no 
mention is made of funds directed for the support of “court quarters.” 
 
                                                                                                                 
order to shut out city noises that would make it hard and next to impossible to hear the 
proceedings.” JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 63 (Sept. 1954). 
 191. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 25–26 (Sept. 1952); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 
16, 28 (Mar. 1953). 
 192. Letter from R.O. Jennings, Acting Commissioner of Public Buildings, to AO 
Director Henry Chandler (Sept. 12, 1952), in Judicial Conference Meetings Records, 
National Archives, at Box 58 (Mar. 1952–Sept. 1952) (declining to fund the request for air 
conditioning given fiscal constraints); Item 30 (1954), in Judicial Conference Meetings 
Records, at Box 67 (Apr. 1954–Apr. 1954) (noting the urgency of the problem and providing 
a list of requests of buildings to be air conditioned and the names of senators and 
representatives from those areas); Report, in Judicial Conference Meetings Records, at Box 
75 (Mar. 1955–Sept. 1955) (reporting some progress, as of June 16, 1955, from the Air 
Conditioning Committee, chaired by John Parker). The archival materials from the Judicial 
Conference can be found in the National Archives in Washington, D.C., and are catalogued 
under Record Group (RG) 116, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, and then by 
“entry” and the number of “containers” (or boxes). See also JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 
21–22 (Sept. 1955); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 30 (Sept. 1954); AO ANN. REP. 63–64 
(1954). Funding continued thereafter. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 29–30 (Sept. 
1956); AO ANN. REP. 70–72 (1956). Air conditioning becomes a part of the depiction of the 
use of the “Judicial Dollar” in drawings in 1957. AO ANN. REP. 144 (1957). 
 193. Figure 21, The Judicial Dollar, is reproduced from the AO ANN. REP. 144 (1957). 
Thanks to the AO and to Yale University Press, which created the facsimile. 
876 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 87:823 
 
Figure 21: The Judicial Dollar, 1957 Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts.
 
Facsimile, Yale University Press. 
 
Earl Warren’s chief justiceship succeeded not only in cooling courtrooms in the 
hot months of summer, it also amplified the sound (literally194) in the courtroom of 
the Supreme Court and transformed the institutional structure of the federal 
judiciary by adding a new tier of judges. In the 1960s, the Judicial Conference 
asked Congress to create a “judicial officer”—then called “magistrates” and today 
titled “magistrate judges”—who serve for statutorily fixed, renewable terms, in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 194. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT—
A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 130 (1983). Schwartz noted that before then, the Supreme Court’s 
acoustics had not made it easy for the justices to hear each other’s comments and questions. 
Id.  
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contrast to the life-tenured judges provided by Article III of the Constitution.195 The 
success of that effort has altered the constitutional understanding of who can hold 
aspects of the power associated with Article III judges. In earlier eras, as workloads 
seemed pressing, the Judicial Conference considered but rejected much by way of 
delegation to non-Article III judges. But, what once had seemed constitutionally 
troubling became administratively attractive.  
Initially, the role conceived for these new judicial officials was relatively 
modest. Modeled after English masters, magistrates were to specialize in pretrial 
discovery and in large cases, with a grab bag of additional duties delegated by 
life-tenured judges. The assignment of a magistrate to decide a state habeas petition 
prompted a challenge in the 1970s by a Kentucky prisoner who argued that neither 
the authorizing statute nor the Constitution permitted a magistrate judge to make 
the ruling.196 California, filing an amicus brief in support of the petitioner, agreed 
that a non-life-tenured judge ought not review state court judges, including the 
“highest state appellate courts.”197 The Supreme Court read the statute to provide 
no power for magistrates to do so.198 
Congress responded by enlarging the charter to magistrate judges, such that their 
additional duties grew to range from rendering habeas corpus judgments, subject to 
district court review, to presiding at civil trials with the consent of the parties—
followed by the possibility of direct appeals to circuit courts.199 The Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                 
 
 195. See Federal Magistrates Act, Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (1968). The Act was 
revised in 1976. See Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-577, 90 Stat. 2729 (codified at 28 
U.S.C. §§ 631–639 (2006)). The Executive Committee of the Judicial Conference opposed 
any formal name change, but in the 1990 Civil Justice Reform Act, Congress conferred the 
title “magistrate judge.” See Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990, 
Pub. L. No. 10-650, § 321, 104 Stat. 5104, 5117 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 631); see also Judith 
Resnik, “Uncle Sam Modernizes His Justice”: Inventing the Federal District Courts of the 
Twentieth Century for the District of Columbia and the Nation, 90 GEO. L.J. 607 (2002) 
[hereinafter Resnik, Inventing the District Courts]. 
 196. Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461 (1974). A Kentucky state prisoner, who had pled 
guilty to murder and was serving a life sentence, filed a petition relying on 28 U.S.C. § 2441. 
After the Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal, the district judge assigned the case to a 
magistrate who held an evidentiary hearing. The district judge then affirmed the magistrate’s 
proposed factual and legal findings. Id. at 461.  
 197. See Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 2, Wingo, 418 U.S. 461 
(1974) (No. 73-846). California argued that the “assignment to United States Magistrates of 
the duty to conduct evidentiary hearings in habeas corpus matters deprives the parties of the 
right to be heard before the ultimate trier of fact and therefore constitutes an improper 
delegation of the exercise of the judicial function in violation of the spirit of Article III.” Id.; 
see also Note, Article III Constraints and the Expanding Civil Jurisdiction of Federal 
Magistrates: A Dissenting View, 88 YALE L.J. 1023 (1979). 
 198. The Court concluded that the Magistrates Act, which had then authorized 
magistrates to undertake “preliminary review of application for post-trial relief,” did not 
permit judges to delegate to magistrates the task of conducting evidentiary hearings in 
federal habeas corpus cases. Wingo, 418 U.S. at 470. The Court did not reach the 
constitutional objections. Id. at 467 n.4. 
 199. Congressional amendments from 1976 onward have expanded the range of duties of 
magistrate judges that are expressly authorized. See 1976 Amendments to An Act of Oct. 21, 
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-577, 90 Stat. 2729 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 636 (2006)). 
878 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 87:823 
 
has also interpreted the statutory obligation that Article III judges make a “de novo 
determination” of certain magistrate judge rulings to mean that new evidentiary 
hearings are not required in all cases.200 Further, defense counsel can provide the 
requisite consent for magistrate judges to preside at a felony voir dire; in civil 
proceedings, litigant participation without objection constitutes sufficient 
consent.201 The more magistrate judges function as judges, the more they too need 
courtrooms and chambers in which to work.202  
Yet through and beyond the Warren era, the Judicial Conference continued to 
seek “buildings containing court quarters” or “court facilities” rather than campaign 
for more courthouses.203 While Earl Warren’s tenure marked significant changes in 
                                                                                                                 
The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-82, § 2, 93 Stat. 643 (codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 3401 (2006) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 631, 636 (2006)) permits magistrate judges with the 
consent of the parties to perform civil trials. While all the circuits have upheld this provision, 
a few judges, invoking Article III, disagreed. See Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 
742 F.2d 1037, 1045 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J., dissenting); Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc. 
v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 739 F.2d 1313, 1319 (8th Cir. 1984) (Arnold, J., dissenting); 
Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 547 (9th Cir. 
1984) (en banc) (Schroeder, J., dissenting). See generally Resnik, Inventing the District 
Courts, supra note 195, at 630–35. 
 200. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980) (concluding that a district judge 
could make a “de novo determination” to affirm a magistrate judge’s ruling rejecting a 
suppression motion). Whether a district judge could reverse without hearing witnesses 
remained a question, debated in the lower courts. See, e.g., Geras, 742 F.2d at 1044 (“A 
requirement of a new hearing would obviously defeat the purpose of the reference to a 
magistrate.”). Contra Jordan v. Hargett, 34 F.3d 310, 313 (5th Cir. 1994) (“If the district 
judge doubts the credibility determination of the magistrate, only by hearing the testimony 
himself does he have an adequate basis on which to base his decision.” (citations omitted)). 
 201. See Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580 (2003); Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 
242 (2008). Lower courts have concluded that defense attorneys’ consent to magistrate 
judges presiding over closing arguments suffices; that magistrate judges can conduct plea 
allocutions; and that magistrate judges have authority to decide criminal defendants’ motions 
to represent themselves. See United States v. Underwood, 597 F.3d 661 (5th Cir. 2010); 
United States v. Schultz, 565 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Gamba, 541 F.3d 
895 (9th Cir. 2008).  
 202. For example, in 1970, the Administrative Office noted that the creation of this new 
office meant that more courtrooms and chambers were needed, at a projected cost of $21 
million. See AO ANN. REP. 176 (1970). Article III judgeship numbers also continued to rise, 
and provided another prompt for space. For example, a judgeship bill in the mid-1960s 
added forty-five additional judgeships. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 32 (Sept. 1966). 
 203. The 1960 Judicial Conference Report discussed the effect of pending legislation 
regarding remodeling of federal buildings “to provide court quarters therein for the first 
time.” JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 28 (Sept. 1960); see also AO ANN. REP. 198–99 
(1960) (commenting on the completion of nine new federal buildings “containing court 
quarters,” seventeen under construction, with eight more in a design stage and fifteen more 
approved by Congress). Thereafter, when Congress chartered seventy-three additional 
judgeships, more “quarters”—courts and chambers—were needed, see AO ANN. REP. 120–
21, 197 (1961), and the Conference duly recorded its cooperative work with the GSA to 
obtain appropriations, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 16 (Mar. 1961). Also detailed were 
needs for “the cost of purchasing furniture and furnishings for judges’ chambers and 
courtrooms.” JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 65 (Sept. 1961); see also AO ANN. REP. 197 
(1961) (noting needs for “items of furniture, carpeting, draperies, etc., out of the regular 
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access to courts and the juridical staff within, his was not a time when the 
Conference sought specially designed buildings for the lower federal courts. But 
other sectors of government turned in the 1960s to the question of federal building 
in general—and found it wanting. 
E. Reframing “The Federal Presence”: The General Services Administration and 
the National Endowment for the Arts 
In addition to the institutionalizing and expanding judiciary, two other 
twentieth-century inventions—the General Services Administration and the 
National Endowment for the Arts—became central actors in federal building, 
courthouses included. Most accounts identify the election of President John F. 
Kennedy in 1960 as bringing attention to the contributions that art and architecture 
could make to civic life. Concerns about the financial underpinnings of major 
cultural institutions and about the national government’s own need for more space 
prompted President Kennedy in 1961 to charter an Ad Hoc Committee on Federal 
Office Space.204 He appointed as its chair Arthur Goldberg, then Secretary of Labor 
who later served on the U.S. Supreme Court before becoming the ambassador to 
the United Nations.205 The lead staffer, Daniel Patrick Moynihan (who thereafter 
served as a Senator from New York)206 is given credit for the vision represented by 
the Ad Hoc Committee’s 1962 report,207 as well as for drafting a one-page set of 
                                                                                                                 
appropriation designated for this purpose” to upgrade when items “had become antiquated”). 
In 1962, the GSA became responsible for providing all furnishings for court facilities. See 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 65 (Sept. 1961); AO ANN. REP. 161 (1963). 
 204. See H.R. REP. NO. 87-21 (1961); LEE, supra note 48, at 290–91. 
 205. Goldberg, who had served as general counsel for the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (the CIO and later the AFL-CIO), became Kennedy’s Secretary of Labor in 
1961 and was appointed in 1962 to the Supreme Court. He stepped down in 1965 when 
President Lyndon Baines Johnson asked him to become the U.S. Ambassador to the United 
Nations. Goldberg held that role until 1968, and served a decade later as the U.S. 
Ambassador to the Belgrade Conference on Human Rights in 1978. He died in 1990. See 
generally DAVID L. STEBENNE, ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG: NEW DEAL LIBERAL (1996).  
 206. Moynihan had been a sociology professor at Harvard, was as an assistant to Arthur 
Goldberg from 1961 to 1962, and the U.S. Ambassador to India from 1973 to 1974. In 1977, 
New Yorkers elected Moynihan to the Senate, where he served until 2001. He died in 2003. 
See Nathan Glazer, Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Federal Architecture, in CELEBRATING 
THE COURTHOUSE: A GUIDE FOR ARCHITECTS, THEIR CLIENTS, AND THE PUBLIC 224, 224–31 
(Steven Flanders ed., 2006) [hereinafter CELEBRATING THE COURTHOUSE]; Jeffrey O’Connell 
& Richard F. Bland, Moynihan’s Legacy, PUB. INT., Winter 2001, at 95. See generally 
DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN: THE INTELLECTUAL IN PUBLIC LIFE (Robert Katzmann ed., 2d 
ed. 2004). 
 207. See, e.g., 1 U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., VISION + VOICE: DESIGN EXCELLENCE IN 
FEDERAL ARCHITECTURE: BUILDING A LEGACY 7 (2002) [hereinafter 1 VISION + VOICE]. Two 
more volumes entitled Vision + Voice include commentary and reflections from various 
participants (including architects, members of selection panels, and administrators) in the 
GSA programs. Published four decades after Moynihan wrote the Guiding Principles for 
Federal Architecture, the set credits his work with changing “the course of public 
architecture in our nation.” F. Joseph Moravec, Preface to 1 VISION + VOICE, supra. Volumes 
II and III, both titled Changing the Course of Federal Architecture, were published in 2004.  
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what it termed “Principles” that remains standard setting in contemporary 
discussions of federal buildings.208  
Committee members thought that, in contrast to innovative private-sector 
buildings, government buildings were often undistinguished and sometimes 
mediocre.209 Pressures to economize had, the Committee thought, produced a 
dreariness representing “the least efficient use of public money.”210 The Ad Hoc 
Committee advocated for new federal investment in public architecture to 
exemplify public values. Shadowed by the Cold War, the 1962 Principles set forth 
a mantra repeated in the decades to follow. Federal buildings were to “provide 
visual testimony to the dignity, enterprise, vigor, and stability of the American 
Government.”211 The implicit comparison to the Soviet Union, coupled with 
distaste for cookie-cutter repetition (whether Beaux-Arts or Modern), produced 
another premise: that implementation of the Guiding Principles should not entail an 
adoption of a new “official style.”212 Rather, the “Government should be willing to 
pay some additional cost to avoid excessive uniformity in design of Federal 
buildings.”213  
Consistent with the 1893 Tarsney Act’s unease with government architects, the 
1962 Principles proposed that the private sector be the source of “standards” for 
quality building. “Design must flow from the architectural profession to the 
Government and not vice versa.”214 Competitions for design were to be held, 
“where appropriate,” and the “advice of distinguished architects ought to, as a rule, 
be sought prior to the award of important design contracts.”215 
                                                                                                                 
 
 208. The Guiding Principles for Federal Architecture are reproduced in the GSA’s 
publication, Vision + Voice. See Guiding Principles for Federal Architecture, in 1 VISION + 
VOICE, supra note 207, at 4–5 [hereinafter Guiding Principles]. The introductory four 
paragraphs of commentary to the three numbered principles overlap in several respects with 
the Guiding Principles themselves. Further, each of the three principles is set forth in several 
paragraphs entailing various precepts. 
 209. In remarks forty years later, Moynihan commented about the need to create “great 
monuments in architecture” and noted that the Seagram Building, designed by Mies van der 
Rohe, had opened in the early 1960s, and was one of the “best.” Daniel Patrick Moynihan, in 
1 VISION + VOICE, supra note 207, at 9–10. Another influence on the Principles was the 
publication of Jane Jacobs’s The Death and Life of Great American Cities in 1961. John 
Wetenhall, Camelot’s Legacy to Public Art: Aesthetic Ideology in the New Frontier, 48 ART 
J. 303, 304–05 (1989).  
 210. Guiding Principles, supra note 208, at 4. The introductory comments noted that the 
“belief that good design is optional or in some way separate from the question of the 
provision of office space itself does not bear scrutiny, and in fact invites the least efficient 
use of public money.” Id. 
 211. Id. As detailed below, in the 1990s, the GSA reiterated this approach by using 
identical wording about its aspirations for the selection of art. See Memorandum on Revised 
Art-in-Architecture Procedures from Kenneth R. Kimbrough, Pub. Bldgs. Serv. Comm’r, 
Gen. Servs. Admin. 2 (Feb. 10, 1995) (on file with the author). 
 212. Guiding Principles, supra note 208, at 5; Wetenhall, supra note 209, at 304. 
 213. Guiding Principles, supra note 208, at 5. 
 214. Id.; see also Wetenhall, supra note 209, at 305; GSA MODERNISM, supra note 188, 
at 44. 
 215. Guiding Principles, supra note 208, at 5. 
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Moynihan, “a master of the arts of publicity as well as government,” gave the 
Ad Hoc Committee’s report an unusual presence for a government document that, 
although regularly invoked in the decades thereafter, did not gain operational 
import until the 1990s.216 While the GSA folded the 1962 Principles into its 
“Standards for Federal Architecture,” few buildings met their goals because (as 
GSA publications later described), the chief “concerns” of the GSA remained 
“efficiency and economy.”217  
Additional pressures for change came from another initiative founded by 
President Kennedy and established after his assassination—the NEA.218 In the 
1970s and at the behest of the White House, the NEA charted its own Task Force 
on Federal Architecture, which criticized the selection of sites for building, the 
quality of construction, and the lack of concern paid to the diverse needs of those 
who worked in the buildings.219 During that decade, attention also turned to the 
challenges of persons with handicaps, to the need to preserve historic buildings 
from “renewal” that laid waste to neighborhoods and ignored earlier architectural 
innovations, and to the loneliness of the streets on which federal buildings had been 
sited. The 1974 NEA Task Force report concluded that more inviting atmospheres 
were needed to reduce the “diminished human vitality” of many downtowns.220  
By bringing together a series of federal statutes, one can track the emergence of 
additional building principles—on environmental conservation, sociability, 
accessibility, conservation, and historic preservation. In 1969, Congress enacted the 
National Environmental Policy Act, requiring federal construction to address the 
impact of buildings on their surroundings.221 Soon thereafter, the GSA began to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 216. Glazer, supra note 206, at 228–31. When Moynihan became a Senator in 1977, his 
political acumen insured not only appropriations for expensive buildings but that legislation 
authorizing various new courthouses (as well as the Marshall Judiciary Building) required 
design competitions.  
 217. GSA MODERNISM, supra note 188, at 3. Under Lyndon B. Johnson and the 
“Program for Beautification of Federal Buildings,” the GSA reported an improvement in 
landscaping. Id. at 48. 
 218. After President Kennedy was assassinated, Congress enacted the National Arts and 
Cultural Development Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-579, 78 Stat. 905 (codified as amended at 
20 U.S.C. §§ 781–788), followed in 1965 by the National Foundation on the Arts and the 
Humanities Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-209, 79 Stat. 845 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. 
§§ 951–960 (2006)), which created the National Foundation for the Arts (NFA). See NAT’L 
ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, 1965/2000: A BRIEF CHRONOLOGY OF FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR 
THE ARTS 9–11 (2000), available at http://www.nea.gov/about/Chronology/NEA 
ChronWeb.pdf; Wetenhall, supra note 209, at 307; Margaret Jane Wyszomirski, Congress, 
Presidents, and the Arts: Collaboration and Struggle, 499 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. 
SCI. 124–35 (1988).  
 219. See NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, FEDERAL ARCHITECTURE: A FRAMEWORK 
FOR DEBATE: AN INTERIM REPORT: THE FEDERAL ARCHITECTURE PROJECT (1974). 
 220. See NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, FEDERAL ARCHITECTURE: MULTIPLE-USE 
FACILITIES: STAFF REPORT FOR THE FEDERAL ARCHITECTURE TASK FORCE 5 (1974) 
[hereinafter NEA MULTIPLE-USE FACILITIES]. 
 221. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331–4375 (2006)).  
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focus on “energy conservation” technologies.222 Over time, terms like “green” and 
“sustainability” became part of the vocabulary. In 1976, Congress enacted the 
Public Buildings Cooperative Use Act, referencing the authority given to the GSA 
to lease federal building space to tenants for “social and commercial uses”—in 
other words, for restaurants and shops to foster “living buildings.”223 That 
legislation also picked up concerns from the 1966 National Historic Preservation 
Act, requiring that attention be made to “reusing historic and architecturally 
interesting buildings.”224  
Concern about physical access can be found in the 1962 Ad Hoc Committee’s 
Principles,225 but compliance issues were pervasive. Indeed, courthouse steps were 
dramatic examples of challenges to be surmounted. Federal legislation in 1968—
the (awkwardly named) Architectural Barriers Act of 1968—required that the 
United States use standards to ensure that “physically handicapped persons will 
have ready access to, and use of, such buildings.”226 In 1990, the Americans with 
Disabilities Act required accessibility of state and private facilities.227 One marker 
of such efforts is the 2004 Supreme Court decision in Tennessee v. Lane,228 in 
which a bare majority concluded that states could be required to pay damages for 
the physical inaccessibility of their courthouses.  
In the 1970s, another criterion, security, came to the fore—affecting aspirations 
for sociability for workers and visitors, environmental friendliness, preservation, 
and accessibility. In 1975, a bomb was found in a locker at Grand Central Station in 
New York City—prompting what in hindsight were very modest measures of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 222. GSA MODERNISM, supra note 188, at 11. 
 223. See Pub. L. No. 94-541, 90 Stat. 2505 (1976) (codified as amended at 40 U.S.C. § 
3306 (2006)). The Act imposed on the administrator of the Public Buildings Service the 
obligation to “encourage the location of commercial, cultural, educational, and recreational 
facilities and activities in public buildings,” 40 U.S.C. § 3306(b)(2), as well as to “acquire 
and utilize space in suitable buildings of historic, architectural, or cultural significance.” Id. 
§ 3306(b)(1). 
 224. CRAIG, supra note 48, at 441. The impact of the shift toward user friendliness can be 
seen in more recent GSA mission statements, describing itself as:  
responsible for providing work environments and all the products and services 
necessary to make these environments healthy and productive for Federal 
employees and cost-effective for the American taxpayers. As builder for the 
Federal civilian Government and steward of many of our nation’s most valued 
architectural treasures that house Federal employees, GSA is committed to 
preserving and adding to America’s architectural and artistic legacy.  
1 VISION + VOICE, supra note 207, at 75. 
 225. Guiding Principles, supra note 208, at 5. 
 226. Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-480, 82 Stat. 718, 719 (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. § 4151 (2006)).  
 227. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 337 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12165 (2006)), provides in Title II that “no qualified 
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation 
in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be 
subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” § 202, 104 Stat. at 337 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 12132 (2006)). 
 228. 541 U.S. 509 (2006). 
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security (such as sign-ins) at federal courthouses. In 1995, the bombing by Timothy 
McVeigh of a federal building in Oklahoma City killed more than 160 people.229 
Although Daniel Moynihan insisted that “[w]e will not let Timothy McVeigh be 
our most influential architect,”230 the GSA and the federal judiciary have since 
focused a good deal on barriers and fortification.231 One marker is that the federal 
judiciary’s budget devoted to security grew by 335%, from $42 million in 1989 to 
$185 million in 1999.232 Another is that security became the “Objective No. 1” in a 
late-1990s guide the GSA provided for architects and engineers competing for 
commissions.233  
That guide emphasized the importance of physical barriers, surfaces that could 
withstand “ballistic or blast attack,” control over vehicle access, enclosed parking 
for federal personnel, screening of persons and parcels, and installation of 
surveillance devices to monitor movements about buildings.234 In addition, 
designers needed to provide “dedicated, separate and restricted corridors” as well as 
elevators for the exclusive use of judges to provide “safe movement within the 
building.”235 The September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Center reinforced 
these requirements.  
This Lecture is not the occasion to provide cross-country comparisons, but I do 
want to note that the issues flagged here—from green courthouse buildings to 
secured internal flow patterns—are part of a transnational set of practices produced 
                                                                                                                 
 
 229. See generally HISTORY OF THE AO, supra note 30, at 198–99. The bombing of the 
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building also damaged the U.S. Courthouse nearby. “Although the 
blast caused no permanent structural damage, it shattered more than 160 windows” and 
rendered several of the building systems dysfunctional. Id. at 199. 
 230. Andrea Oppenheimer Dean, The Nation’s Biggest Landlord Just Found Style: GSA: 
Uncle Sam Speaks Up for High Design, 189 ARCHITECTURAL REC. 62, 62 (2000). In 1999, a 
conference of several hundred architects and engineers addressed the issues in the context of 
embassies as well as courthouses and other government buildings. See Benjamin Forgey, 
Fear and Loathing in Architecture: Moynihan Opens Debate on Security vs. Openness, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 1999, at C1; see also JANE C. LOEFFLER, THE ARCHITECTURE OF 
DIPLOMACY: BUILDING AMERICA’S EMBASSIES (Mark Lamster ed., 1998); Blair Kamin, 
Fortress Architecture: Don’t Let Terrorists Design Our Buildings, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 5, 1999, 
at C1.  
 231. Security concerns dot reports of the Judicial Conference. See, e.g., JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE REPORT 88–89 (Sept. 1998) (discussing relocation of day care facilities); 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 29 (Mar. 2000) (discussing the 1997 Design Guide 
amendments to require “ballistic-resistant glazing”). The Conference committee that had 
once been called “space and facilities” put the term “security” first. In 2005, the Conference 
divided “the Committee on Security and Facilities into two committees: the Committee on 
Judicial Security, and the Committee on Space and Facilities . . . enabling a separate 
committee to devote its full attention [to] judicial security.” LORRAINE H. TONG, JUDICIAL 
SECURITY: RESPONSIBILITIES AND CURRENT ISSUES 12 (2006) (footnote omitted). 
 232. HISTORY OF THE AO, supra note 30, at 200. 
 233. U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., THE DESIGN EXCELLENCE PROGRAM GUIDE: BUILDING A 
LEGACY: ARCHITECT/ENGINEER SELECTION AND DESIGN REVIEW 70–71 (2000) [hereinafter 
GSA DESIGN EXCELLENCE PROGRAM GUIDE]. 
 234. Id. at 70–71.  
 235. Id. at 70–74. 
884 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 87:823 
 
by interactions across boundaries among jurists, lawyers, architects, and 
politicians.236 Demands for adjudication, as well as for sustainability, accessibility, 
and security, have produced court construction projects around the globe. French 
courthouses, for example, also aspire to make important architectural statements 
while, like their U.S. counterparts, they also include three dedicated routes (“les 
trois flux”) to separate judges from the public and defendants from everyone.237 
F. Courthouse Financing: Paying Rent to the GSA 
One other facet of courthouse building decisions needs to be brought into 
focus—their cost. In 1878, a member of the House of Representatives’ Committee 
on Public Buildings and Grounds noted that forty-one proposed bills had come 
before that body for construction of federal buildings. In support of such proposals, 
he argued that the government was then “paying about $1,300,000 annually for rent 
of public buildings” and that “this enormous rent should be decreased as much as 
possible” by bringing construction in house—to the federal government.238 More 
than a century later, in 2005, the federal judiciary reported paying the GSA more 
than 20% of its budget ($900 million) in rent for occupying forty million square 
feet239—albeit with some significant amount of that money recycled to the federal 
judiciary as part of its allocations of funds for new and renovated buildings.  
Readers might well be perplexed at the term “rent,” a word now embedded in 
federal discourse. As detailed above, until the early twentieth century, Congress 
channeled building funds through site-by-site appropriations. Thereafter, Congress 
authorized buildings through omnibus bills, as well as individually. Concerns 
mounted that this approach did not inspire conservation of funds or space. In 
response, in the early 1970s, Congress reorganized its rules to require agencies to 
pay “rent” to the GSA for the buildings that they used. Those monies were to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 236. See JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION, 
CONTROVERSY, AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS 193–287 
(2011) [hereinafter RESNIK & CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE]. 
 237. The building program in France is discussed in RESNIK & CURTIS, REPRESENTING 
JUSTICE, supra note 236, at 193–208. See also Judith Resnik, Dennis Curtis & Allison Tait, 
Constructing Courts: Architecture, the Ideology of Judging, and the Public Sphere, in LAW, 
CULTURE, AND VISUAL STUDIES (Richard Sherwin & Anne Wagner eds., forthcoming 2012). 
 238. H.R. REP. No. 45-1006, at 2 (1878) (statement of Herman Leon Humphrey). 
Humphrey, who had served as a county judge in Wisconsin, served as a Republican member 
of Congress from 1877 to 1883.  
 239. 2006 Future of the Federal Courthouse Construction Program Hearings, supra note 
33, at 7 (statement of Mark Goldstein, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, Gov’t 
Accountability Office). “With slightly over 20 percent of its budget allocated for rent 
payments, in December 2004 the Judiciary requested a $483 million permanent annual 
exemption from rent payments to GSA.” Id. The judiciary paid “more money into the 
building fund than any agency of Government except for Justice,” which paid only 3% of its 
budget, while the judiciary paid 22%. The Judiciary’s Ability to Pay for Current and Future 
Space Needs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Econ. Dev., Pub. Bldgs. and Emergency 
Mgmt. of the H. Comm. on Trans. and Infrastructure, 109th Cong. 20 (2005) (statement of 
Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Director, Admin. Office of U.S. Courts, and Secretary, Judicial 
Conference of the United States). 
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support a Federal Building Fund to finance acquisition, construction, and 
maintenance and (Congress hoped) to have agencies internalize the costs of 
whatever space was inhabited.240 Under the 1972 amendments, the GSA, as owner 
and landlord, set the rent for its tenants (federal siblings included) in a manner 
determined by the GSA administrator. The GSA developed a measure of what it 
termed “commercially equivalent charges” to make agencies focus on the amount 
or cost of office space they occupy.241  
Those provisions went into effect in July of 1974.242 If the response from the 
judiciary is indicative, the new accounting system had an impact. Within a year, the 
annual reports of the Judicial Conference, which had before then regularly noted 
requests for construction and appropriations, began to include data on building 
costs. Above, in figure 21, the “1957 Judicial Dollar,” I provided a first example of 
the judiciary’s budget allocations for an aspect of its space—air conditioning for 
which the Conference had obtained direct appropriations. At the time, no “cents” 
were allocated to represent the cost of courthouses. In contrast, in 1975, as figure 
22 displays, the judiciary reported a separate and distinctively large slice of its 
pie—twenty-two cents or percent—for “space and facilities (including furniture 
and furnishings).”243 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 240. See Public Buildings Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-313, 86 Stat. 216, 219 
(codified as amended at 40 U.S.C. § 586 (2006)) (“[T]he Administrator is authorized and 
directed to charge anyone furnished services, space . . . or other facilities . . . at rates to be 
determined by the Administrator.”). 
 241. 2006 Future of the Federal Courthouse Construction Program Hearings, supra note 
33, at 2 (statement of Rep. Bill Shuster, Chairman, Subcomm. on Economic Development, 
Public Buildings, and Emergency Management). Because this revenue did not result in the 
full internalization of all building costs, Congress continued to appropriate funds for new 
work as well as to rely on contract-lease arrangements using private monies for construction, 
such as for the Thurgood Marshall Federal Judiciary Building. In an effort to impose control 
over the GSA as well as its federal “tenants,” Congress required that for projects over a 
certain value (as of 2008, pegged at $1.5 million), the GSA needed approval by resolutions 
from the Senate’s Committee on Environment and Public Works and the House’s Committee 
on Transportation and Infrastructure. See 40 U.S.C. § 3307(a) (2006); CLAY H. WELLBORN, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION PROSPECTUS THRESHOLDS FOR 
OWNED AND LEASED FEDERAL FACILITIES 3–4 (2008). 
 242. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 139–40 (Mar. 1974). The report noted that the 
federal judiciary wanted more security than GSA’s standards and, hence, had to pay an 
additional $13,000 for each officer it added above the GSA level. Id. at 140.  
 243. See AO ANN. REP. 113 (1975). Again thanks are due to the AO and to Yale 
University Press for the facsimile. 
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Figure 22: The Judicial Dollar, 1975 Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts.
 
Facsimile, Yale University Press. 
 
As long as the AO used this dollar diagram (retired in the mid-1980s), it marked 
the percentage spent for courthouses.244 To translate this 22% into real money and 
space, in 1975, the judiciary reported paying $46,148,500 in rent for its 400 
buildings with their 7.5 million square feet of space. And, seeking to reduce those 
                                                                                                                 
 
 244. E.g., AO ANN. REP. 76 (1984) (indicating sixteen cents); AO ANN. REP. 65 (1983) 
(also indicating sixteen cents); AO ANN. REP. 53 (1982) (indicating seventeen cents of the 
“judicial dollar” went to space and facilities); AO ANN. REP. 172 (1981) (indicating 
seventeen cents). By 1985, the image was no longer used in the reports.  
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costs, the Judicial Conference also released more than 84,000 square feet of 
“unneeded space.”245  
IV. RENOVATION, RECONFIGURATION, AND WILLIAM REHNQUIST 
Thus far, I have shaped a historical account of two centuries in which the 
national judicial system came into being—materialized through jurisdictional 
grants, judgeships, buildings, Supreme Court opinions, and administrative 
infrastructures. I turn now to consider the last few decades and hence to focus on 
developments that took place when Warren Burger and William Rehnquist chaired 
the Judicial Conference. During Rehnquist’s tenure, judges and staff in the federal 
judiciary secured remarkable commitments from Congress to replace, expand, and 
renovate hundreds of courthouse facilities.246  
By 1972, AO staff reported that the appellate courts had thirty-three courtrooms 
and the trial courts 661, providing a total of 694 courtrooms for use by federal 
judges.247 By then, Chief Justice Warren Burger was chairing the Judicial 
Conference, and his administrative goals, like his jurisprudence, differed from his 
predecessor Earl Warren. Burger was an advocate of downsizing, in jurisdictional 
and physical terms.248 In 1970, he commissioned an Ad Hoc Conference 
Committee on Court Facilities and Design, which, in 1971, proposed smaller 
courtrooms.249 The Judicial Conference concurred: in light of an increase in 
building costs, new technologies, and needs for “greater security and to simplify 
court room control,” the Conference recommended that the standard size of 
courtrooms be “cut back substantially” as long as each courthouse had “one or two 
large court rooms for special cases.”250 The less courtroom-centric approach 
reflected Chief Justice Burger’s commitment to alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR) programs, such as mediation or arbitration, and more generally his interest 
in retrenchment after the expansive role for federal adjudication identified with Earl 
Warren’s chief justiceship.251 
                                                                                                                 
 
 245. AO ANN. REP. 128 (1975). Later reports also focus on space utilization, the return of 
space to the GSA, and the ability to downsize spaces dedicated to personnel such as court 
reporters. See, e.g., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 9–12 (Mar. 1981). 
 246. See 1 VISION + VOICE, supra note 207, at 27. 
 247. AO ANN. REP. 223 (1972). An updated report the year after identified 705 
courtrooms. AO ANN. REP. 262 (1973). 
 248. See generally TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, THE BURGER COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, 
AND LEGACY 76–83, 232–33 (2000). 
 249. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 3 (Mar. 1971); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 63–64 
(Oct. 1971). 
 250. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 3 (Mar. 1971). The Conference adopted resolutions 
calling for various sizes of courtrooms (twenty-eight by forty as a standard, with twelve-foot 
ceilings, and forty by sixty, with sixteen-foot ceilings, as a larger space). JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE REPORT 64 (Oct. 1971). Thereafter, the Conference adopted three sizes, 1120 
square feet, 1496 square feet, and 2400 square feet. See AO ANN. REP. 138 (1975). By the 
1980s, the Conference settled on four sizes of courtrooms, in turn used by the GSA when 
making its design guide. See PUB. BLDG. SERV., GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., UNITED STATES 
COURTS DESIGN GUIDE, ch. 4, at 1 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 GSA COURTS DESIGN GUIDE].  
 251. See WARREN E. BURGER, YEAR-END REPORT ON THE JUDICIARY 3, 5 (1978), 
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As for allocation of space, during the 1970s, the Judicial Conference adopted a 
policy that judges could share courtrooms when possible: courtrooms were needed 
to be “available on a case assignment basis to any judge. No judge of a multiple 
judge court should have the exclusive use of any particular courtroom.”252 That 
injunction can also be found in a 1979 GSA Design Guide, prepared in cooperation 
with the AO, for the federal courts.253 At that time, many judges also shared 
cases—that is, different judges picked up different parts of cases under what was 
known as a “master calendar system.” The current practice of an individual case 
management system that assigns a case to a judge from filing to disposition had not 
yet come to be seen as the more efficient mechanism for judicial administration. 
A. The “Housing Crisis” 
In the late 1980s, Chief Justice Rehnquist and his senior staff departed from 
Chief Justice Burger’s embrace of downsized courtroom sharing.254 They took 
another tack—that each judge ought to have a courtroom of his (and occasionally, 
her) own. The rise in the number of trial judges (district, magistrate, and after the 
1978 and 1984 legislation, bankruptcy judges)255 coupled with commitments to 
dedicated and larger spaces provided the basis for serious complaints about the 
extant housing stock. 
The Judicial Conference sought control over both its property and courthouse 
design. The effort to extricate itself from the GSA by gaining independent real 
property authority became “a top legislative priority” in 1991.256 In pursuit of that 
goal, the Judicial Conference argued that its status as “a separate and independent 
                                                                                                                 
reprinted in STATE OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF 
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (Shelley L. Dowling ed., 2011) [hereinafter 
ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE]; WARREN E. BURGER, YEAR-END REPORT ON THE 
JUDICIARY 3 (1979), in ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE, supra; WARREN E. BURGER, 
YEAR-END REPORT ON THE JUDICIARY 5 (1980), in ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE, 
supra; see also J. Clifford Wallace, The Future of the Judiciary: A Proposal, 27 CAL. W. L. 
REV. 361, 361–62 (1991) (describing Chief Justice Burger’s request in 1980 that Judge 
Wallace help map a strategy for long-range planning). For a broader discussion, see Resnik 
& Dilg, supra note 138, at 1601–04. 
 252. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 64 (Oct. 1971). 
 253. See PUB. BLDGS. SERV., GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., UNITED STATES COURTS DESIGN 
GUIDE, ch. 4, at 1 (1979) [hereinafter 1979 GSA COURTS DESIGN GUIDE]. 
 254. Chief Justice Rehnquist departed from Burger’s approach in many respects, 
including opinion assignments. See Linda Greenhouse, How Not To Be Chief Justice: The 
Apprenticeship of William H. Rehnquist, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1365 (2006). 
 255. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of Titles 11 and 28 of the 
U.S. Code). That Act authorized 324 judgeships, many to be filled by those already holding 
such positions under the 1978 reforms, Bankruptcy Code of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 
Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–151326 (2006)), that had been 
struck by the Supreme Court in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line 
Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).  
 256. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 43 (Sept. 1991); see also JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
REPORT 81 (Sept. 1989). 
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branch of government” required it not be “fully dependent on another branch.”257 
Companion bills were introduced in the Senate and the House. But, despite Senator 
Moynihan’s support, GSA objections sent the question back to negotiations 
between the AO and the GSA.258  
Although legislative efforts failed, the Judicial Conference found another route 
to increase its authority. In 1987, soon after William Rehnquist became Chief 
Justice, the Judicial Conference created a standing subcommittee devoted to “space 
and facilities”259 that was charged with the oversight of long-term planning, 
construction priorities, and design standards. Two years later, in 1989, the judiciary 
proffered the term “Judicial Space Emergency” to capture concerns about its 
“housing crisis.”260 As the AO Director Ralph Mecham explained: “During the 
1980s, when the federal judiciary experienced its greatest caseload growth in 
history, very few courthouses were built, which resulted in a proliferation of court 
facilities with varying degrees of deteriorating and overcrowded conditions.”261 The 
AO complained of the “years of lack of attention from GSA,”262 and estimated that 
(as of 1994) “186 court buildings will be unable to accommodate additional judicial 
officers within the next five to 10 years.”263 
                                                                                                                 
 
 257. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 6 (Mar. 1991). 
 258. See Judicial Space and Facilities Management Improvement Act of 1989, H.R. 
4178, 101st Cong. (2d Sess. 1990); see also Judicial Space and Facilities Management 
Improvement Act of 1990, S. 2837, 101st Cong. (2d Sess. 1990) (introduced by Senator 
Moynihan to accomplish the same end). In 1992, Robert C. Broomfield, chair of Space and 
Facilities Committee of Judicial Conference, went before the Senate Subcommittee on Water 
Resources, Transportation and Infrastructure to seek the legislation, but the GSA opposed 
the bill. The legislation was never enacted. See The Renaissance of the Federal Courthouse, 
THIRD BRANCH, Dec. 2002, at 1, 2. 
 259. As discussed, ad hoc committees focused on space that had existed since the 1940s; 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s innovation was to establish standing committees. In 1987, two 
committees were delineated, one a Committee on Space and Facilities and the other a 
Committee on Court Security (later the Committee on Court and Judicial Security), both of 
which were reconfigured from a committee that had been called Court Administration. See 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 59 (Sept. 1987). In September of 1994, the two committees 
folded into one, the Committee on Security, Space, and Facilities. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
REPORT 36 (Sept. 1993); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 6 (Mar. 1993); JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE REPORT 8 (Mar. 1994). In the late 1990s, that Committee was renamed the 
Committee on Security and Facilities. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 49 (Sept. 1997). In 
2005, the Judicial Conference again reconfigured tasks, returning to the two-committee 
model, one called the Committee on Judicial Security and the other called the Committee on 
Space and Facilities. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 5 (Sept. 2005). The acute need to 
focus on security came in part from the “brutal murders of the husband and mother” of a 
U.S. federal court district judge. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 6 (Mar. 2005). The killings 
occurred “off-site” and hence prompted a need for reconsideration of safety provisions. Id. 
 260. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 82–83 (Sept. 1989). 
 261. AO ANN. REP. 45 (1994).  
 262. ACTIVITIES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES, in ADMIN. 
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, UNITED STATES COURTS: SELECTED REPORTS 39 (1993).  
 263. AO ANN. REP. 46 (1994).  
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The AO also created its own Space and Facilities Division and recruited former 
GSA employees to take leadership roles.264 To document needs, the AO developed 
“guidelines and worksheets” for judges to explain the problems, district-by-district 
and courthouse-by-courthouse. Such “long-range facility planning” was, according 
to the AO, “an essential building block toward the Judiciary’s successfully 
managing its own space and facilities program.”265 By 1994, the judiciary 
“identified approximately 200 of 731 existing court facilities as ‘out of space’” 
within the coming decade.266  
B. Controlling Design 
The other “building block” for obtaining authority over construction was the 
decision to have the judiciary’s Space and Facilities Committee draft its own 
“Design Guide.” GSA planners had long set forth standards for public buildings267 
and, as noted, during the late 1970s, the GSA developed guidelines for courthouse 
building by issuing guides in 1979 and 1984 written “in cooperation with the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts” for “architects and engineers 
who design federal courts.”268 But by the late 1980s, the AO reported “excessive 
                                                                                                                 
 
 264. The Renaissance of the Federal Courthouse, supra note 258, at 2. P. Gerald Thacker 
was the first head of the new division, joined by Clarence A. Lee, Jr., who had been a 
“senior official” of the GSA and who initially came “on loan to the AO” and then joined its 
staff permanently. Id.  
 265. AO ANN. REP. 66 (1989). By 1995, all of the 94 districts had completed plans, so 
that for “the first time the judiciary had both a short and long-term view of its facilities 
requirements.” HISTORY OF THE AO, supra note 30, at 196. 
 266. Oversight of the Courthouse Construction Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Oversight of Gov’t Mgmt. and the D.C. of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 104th 
Cong. 66 (1995) (prepared statement of J. William Gadsby, Director of Government 
Business Operations Issues, Gen. Gov’t Div., Gen. Accounting Office). 
 267. The Office of Supervising Architect created standards during the nineteenth century, 
and the GSA continued that function as it also regularly revised the standards. See, e.g., U.S. 
GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., FACILITIES STANDARDS FOR THE PUBLIC BUILDING SERVICE (2003). In 
addition, federal law requires compliance with various building codes as well as statutes 
specifying environmental, preservationist, or other concerns. See, e.g., Public Buildings 
Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-678, 102 Stat. 4049 (codified as amended at 40 
U.S.C. § 3312 (2006)).  
 268. Both the 1979 and the 1984 Guides, whose texts overlap a good deal, are prefaced 
by a foreword from GSA Administrator Jay Solomon that noted that they were crafted “in 
cooperation with” the AO. See Foreword to 1984 GSA COURTS DESIGN GUIDE, supra note 
250; Foreword to 1979 GSA COURTS DESIGN GUIDE, supra note 253. Both also note that 
provisions for the U.S. Attorneys and for the U.S. Marshalls were designed with input from 
those entities. The 1979 GSA Courts Design Guide was not, however, “approved . . . in its 
entirety” by the Judicial Conference. See To Establish Certain Public Buildings Policies for 
the Federal Government: Hearings [on H.R. 630] Before the Subcomm. on Public Buildings 
and Grounds of the H. Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 98th Cong. 177 (1983) 
(statement of James E. Macklin, Jr., Executive Assistant Director, Administrative Office of 
the United States Courts). In contrast, after circulation in 1982 to the judicial councils in 
each circuit, the updated 1984 GSA Design Guide was formally approved. See JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE REPORT 8 (Mar. 1984). The AO took some ownership of the 1984 Guide; a 
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delays and costs related to the acquisition and management of space and 
facilities.”269 Enlisting the National Academy of Public Administration, the AO 
explored whether responsibility for “defining requirements, designing, leasing, 
constructing, managing, and performing other functions related to space and 
facilities” could be transferred from the GSA to the AO.270  
The result, first published in 1991 and revised several times thereafter,271 is the 
U.S. Courts Design Guide, putting judges at the forefront of shaping courts by 
issuing “policy guidance for the overall planning, programming, and design of 
federal court facilities throughout the United States and its territories.”272 As the 
                                                                                                                 
memorandum from AO Director William E. Foley indicated the transmission to the GSA for 
publication and distribution. William E. Foley, Memorandum to Chief Judges (of Various 
Courts), in 1984 GSA COURTS DESIGN GUIDE, supra note 250. Thereafter, the Judicial 
Conference also made some modifications to the Guide, such as reflecting changes in 
bankruptcy court jurisdiction and approving new provisions for parking. JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE REPORT 59 (Sept. 1986). 
 269. AO ANN. REP. 53 (1986). By then, the AO had a “branch” devoted to space and 
facilities and that subgroup had studied the problem as well as developed an inventory of 
space and proposed budgets for rent. See id.  
 270. See AO ANN. REP. 70 (1987); HISTORY OF THE AO, supra note 30, at 195. According 
to the 1988 AO Report, the study “documented the need for the Judiciary to take a more 
aggressive role in managing its own space.” AO ANN. REP. 75 (1988). Or, as the AO put it in 
2000, the Academy “recommended that the judiciary play a greater role in planning for and 
designing court facilities.” HISTORY OF THE AO, supra note 30, at 195. Thereafter the 
director of the AO and the administrator of the GSA entered into a “Memorandum of 
Understanding establishing a planning process involving both GSA and the Judiciary, and 
defining relationships for funding space and facility projects.” AO ANN. REP. 75 (1988). To 
do so, the Judicial Conference launched a study of space standards and needs. Id. By the 
1990s, the AO had created a “space management information system.” AO ANN. REP. 24 
(1992). 
 271. See SPACE & FACILITIES DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S. COURTS 
DESIGN GUIDE (1991) [hereinafter 1991 U.S. COURTS DESIGN GUIDE]. As its preface 
explained, the Guide was “developed over a three-year period in a cooperative effort 
between the Federal Judiciary and a team of experts . . . under the direction of the National 
Institute of Building Sciences and the Judiciary.” Id. at 1. In 1992, the Judicial Conference 
joined the AIA and the National Center for State Courts as cosponsors of a conference on 
courthouse design, construction, and operation. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 72 (Sept. 
1991). A second edition of the Judiciary’s Guide was published in 1993 and then revised in 
1994 in the wake of the Americans with Disabilities Act. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 
98 (Sept. 1995). That version was altered through a 1995 “addendum” prior to the 1997 
revisions, which in turn were then supplanted by a 2007 edition. See SPACE & FACILITIES 
COMM., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., U.S. COURTS DESIGN GUIDE, Pref., at iii, 
Acknowledgments, at i–ii (2007) [hereinafter 2007 U.S. COURTS DESIGN GUIDE]. The 2007 
edition was thus the fifth edition and by 2008 had already been revised in some respects. 
Staff of the AO did the drafting, with many references to general building standards and 
other GSA materials. See HISTORY OF THE AO, supra note 30, at 195. The discussion in the 
text draws primarily on the 1997 and 2007 versions, which overlap substantially such that 
much of the text is repeated verbatim. See 2007 U.S. COURTS DESIGN GUIDE, supra; SPACE & 
FACILITIES COMM., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S. COURTS DESIGN GUIDE (1997) 
[hereinafter 1997 U.S. COURTS DESIGN GUIDE]. The 2007 preface by Chief Justice John 
Roberts detailed the history of the revisions.  
 272. See 2007 U.S. COURTS DESIGN GUIDE, supra note 271, ch. 1, at 1; 1997 U.S. COURTS 
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2007 GSA Design Guide’s introduction explained, one of the “three major 
objectives” was to provide “relevant information” to the GSA and 
architectural/engineering teams “to effectively plan, program, and design a 
functional, aesthetically appropriate, and cost-effective court facility.”273  
The dozen-plus chapters detailed “state-of-the-art design criteria for 
courthouses.”274 A comparison between the earlier 1979 and 1984 GSA Design 
Guides and the more recent U.S. Courts Design Guides clarifies the effect the 
judiciary has had on federal courthouse buildings. The utilitarian 1979 and 1984 
GSA Design Guides outlined the federal judicial structure275 and commended a 
decentralized process by which a “design team” sorted out what was needed and 
how to accomplish it.276 The 1984 GSA Design Guide, which, unlike the 1979 
version, was formally approved by the Judicial Conference, did put judges a bit 
more in view. The 1984 discussion included a paragraph commending architects, 
before design began, to “meet with the chief judge” and other court representatives 
to gain an understanding of courthouse functions.277  
What were the GSA “design goals”? “An important characteristic in a court’s 
design is flexibility within its operational space.”278 Moreover, while “expressing 
the dignity and solemnity of the administration of justice” was one goal, that 
aspiration was to be balanced by designs aiming to enhance the “efficiency of 
performance.”279  
In contrast, the 2007 U.S. Courts Design Guide, shaped directly by the Judicial 
Conference, offered “General Design Guidelines” emphasizing the need for 
courthouses to be expressive and impressive testaments to a national vision:  
The architecture of federal courthouses must promote respect for the 
tradition and purpose of the American judicial process. To this end, a 
courthouse facility must express solemnity, integrity, rigor, and 
                                                                                                                 
DESIGN GUIDE, supra note 271, intro., at 1. The 1991 Guide had these same three objectives, 
slightly differently worded. See 1991 U.S. COURTS DESIGN GUIDE, supra note 271, at 9. The 
1991 Guide also provided diagrams to specify the “spatial relationship, accessibility and 
circulation” (SRAC) for courtrooms and other rooms. See, e.g., id. at 16, 26–39, 100–09. 
 273. 2007 U.S. COURTS DESIGN GUIDE, supra note 271, ch. 1, at 1. The Guide’s other 
audiences were the “federal judges and key judicial personnel who are directly involved in 
the design of a federal court facility,” the Judicial Conference, “through its Committee on 
Space and Facilities,” and the AO. Id. 
 274. 1997 U.S. COURTS DESIGN GUIDE, supra note 271, intro., at 2. The Guide also 
cautioned users not to rely the criteria as “space entitlements” or as a means of enlarging 
spaces beyond those “originally contemplated” in approved projects. Id., intro., at 3; see also 
2007 U.S. COURTS DESIGN GUIDE, supra note 271, ch. 1, at 1–2. 
 275. Chapter 2 of the 1979 and the 1984 GSA Design Guides gave its users—architects 
and engineers—some basic information about the federal judiciary, functioning as a primer 
about organization, the levels of courts, the auxiliary services such as court reporters, pretrial 
services, probation, and marshals, and then cataloging the items needed to furbish each of 
the spaces to be accorded the different users. 
 276. See 1984 GSA COURTS DESIGN GUIDE, supra note 250, ch. 1, at 3–4; 1979 GSA 
COURTS DESIGN GUIDE, supra note 253, ch. 1, at 3–4. 
 277. 1984 GSA COURTS DESIGN GUIDE, supra note 250, ch. 1, at 3–4. 
 278. Id.; 1979 GSA COURTS DESIGN GUIDE, supra note 253, ch. 1, at 3–4. 
 279. 1984 GSA COURTS DESIGN GUIDE, supra note 250, ch. 4, at 1. 
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fairness. The facility must also provide a civic presence and contribute 
to the architecture of the local community. 
 Courthouses must be planned and designed to frame, facilitate, and 
mediate the encounter between the citizen and the justice system. All 
architectural elements must be proportional and arranged hierarchically 
to signify orderliness. The materials employed must be consistently 
applied, be natural and regional in origin, be durable, and invoke a 
sense of permanence. Colors should be subdued to complement the 
natural materials used in the design.280 
In addition to the shifting emphasis in the general goals, the GSA guidelines 
developed when Warren Burger was chief justice and the Judicial Conference 
guidelines written when William Rehnquist was chief justice differ in other 
respects of particular relevance here. First, instead of the premises of the Burger 
years that courtrooms were to be “available on a case assignment basis to any 
judge,” and that no judge on multijudge courts had “the exclusive use of any 
particular courtroom,”281 the Rehnquist-led Judicial Conference took the position 
that each judge was to have a courtroom of his or her own.282 Specifically, “one 
                                                                                                                 
 
 280. 2007 U.S. COURTS DESIGN GUIDE, supra note 271, ch. 3, at 1. The text of this section 
changed between the Conference’s first Guide in 1991 and the 2007 version. The 1991 
Guide’s “Aesthetic Considerations” stated that:  
Federal Court architecture should symbolize the Judiciary as a co-equal branch 
of Government. Courthouse design should reflect the seriousness of the judicial 
mandate and the dignity of the judicial system.  
The scale of a courthouse should be monumental, and the materials used on 
its exterior durable. The spirit of the architecture should be impressive and 
inspiring.  
1991 U.S. COURTS DESIGN GUIDE, supra note 271, at 71. But in the subsequent 1997 guide, 
the Conference deleted this in its entirety and replaced it with text nearly the same as in the 
2007 Guide. Compare 1997 U.S. COURTS DESIGN GUIDE, supra note 271, ch. 3, at 9, with 
2007 U.S. COURTS DESIGN GUIDE, supra note 271, ch. 3, at 1. The 1997 and 2007 text lack 
any reference to monumental scale or the desire to portray “the Judiciary as a co-equal 
branch of Government.” The 1997 and the 2007 U.S. Courts Design Guides discussions are 
identical with one variation; the opening sentence of the second paragraph. Compare 1997 
U.S. COURTS DESIGN GUIDE, supra note 271, ch. 3, at 9, with 2007 U.S. COURTS DESIGN 
GUIDE, supra note 271, ch. 3, at 1. In 1997, that sentence read: “To achieve these goals, 
massing must be strong and direct with a sense of repose, and the scale of design should 
reflect a national judicial enterprise.” 1997 U.S. COURTS DESIGN GUIDE, supra note 271, ch. 
3, at 9. That sentence was deleted in the 2007 Guide and replaced by: “Courthouses must be 
planned and designed to frame, facilitate, and mediate the encounter between the citizen and 
the justice system.” 2007 U.S. COURTS DESIGN GUIDE, supra note 271, ch. 3, at 1. Thus, the 
shift in 1997 to the focus on the impact of the architecture on the local community and the 
desire to convey “integrity” and “fairness” in courthouse form, see 1997 U.S. COURTS 
DESIGN GUIDE, supra note 271, ch. 3, at 9, is continued in 2007 with the elimination of 
references to large “scale” and “strong and direct [massing]” and the replacement with the 
idea of “the encounter between the citizen and the justice system.” 2007 U.S. COURTS 
DESIGN GUIDE, supra note 271, ch. 3, at 1. 
 281. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 64 (Oct. 1971). 
 282. This rule was formulized by 1997; the Judicial Conference adopted the policy that 
“[w]ith regard to district judges, one courtroom should be provided for each active judge. In 
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courtroom must be provided for each active judge.”283 That mandate included 
magistrate and bankruptcy judges and, ideally, those “senior judges” who had 
formally shifted from “active” status to make another slot available for the 
constitutional appointment process, as well as extra courtroom spaces for “visiting 
judges” who augmented a district’s workforce. This policy of a courtroom-per-
judge, coupled with more and different kinds of judges (magistrate, bankruptcy, 
and district) drove demand for more courtrooms and courthouses.  
Size and allocation of space are the other two differences of special relevance 
here. In the 1970s, the proposed square footage was 1120 to 2400 square feet, with 
suggested 12-foot ceilings. By the 1990s, 2400 square feet and 16-foot ceilings 
became the standard size for district judges.284 Moreover, designs insisted on 
increased isolation and segregation of spaces as judges were given a dedicated path 
by which to enter from a secured garage into a secured elevator and walk through a 
secured pathway so as to be kept apart from the public and lawyers.285 In some 
buildings, those paths also result in judges rarely seeing each other.  
Requiring three circulatory patterns to buffer against the possibility of contact 
results in bigger buildings; “circulation space often accounts for 30 to 50 percent of 
the useable space in a building.”286 The multiple paths and security add 
significantly to expenses. In 1993, the GSA estimated that courthouses cost “at 
least $44 per gross square foot more to build than a comparably sized federal office 
building,” and thus courts cost about $116 per gross square foot.287  
                                                                                                                 
addition, with regard to senior judges who do not draw caseloads requiring substantial use of 
courtrooms and to visiting judges, judicial councils should utilize the following factors as 
well as other appropriate factors in evaluating the number of courtrooms at a facility 
necessary to permit them to discharge their responsibilities.” JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 
17 (Mar. 1997). Further explanation comes from the 2007 U.S. Courts Design Guide:  
Recognizing how essential the availability of a courtroom is to the fulfillment 
of the judge’s responsibility to serve the public by disposing of criminal trials, 
sentencing, and civil cases in a fair and expeditious manner, and presiding over 
the wide range of activities that take place in courtrooms requiring the presence 
of a judicial officer, the Judicial Conference adopts the following policy for 
determining the number of courtrooms needed at a facility:  
With regard to all authorized active judges, one courtroom must be 
provided. 
2007 U.S. COURTS DESIGN GUIDE, supra note 271, ch. 2, at 8. 
 283. See 1997 U.S. COURTS DESIGN GUIDE, supra note 271, ch. 4, at 43–44.  
 284. See, e.g., 2007 U.S. COURTS DESIGN GUIDE, supra note 271, ch. 4, at 7 (appellate 
courtrooms); id. at ch. 4, at 15 (district courtrooms); id. at ch. 4, at 24 (magistrate 
courtrooms); id. at ch. 4, at 31 (bankruptcy courtrooms); 1997 U.S. COURTS DESIGNS GUIDE, 
supra note 271, ch. 4, at 40–42; 1991 U.S. COURTS DESIGN GUIDE, supra note 271, at 125–26 
(with a slightly smaller magistrate courtroom recommendation of 1500 square feet); 1984 
GSA COURTS DESIGN GUIDE, supra note 250, ch. 4, at 3 (limited-use courtrooms); id. at ch. 
4, at 7–8 (intermediate courtrooms); id. at ch. 4, at 9–10 (standard courtrooms); id. at ch. 4, 
at 11–12 (large courtrooms). All three Guides provided for “special proceedings courtrooms” 
of 3000 square feet, with 18-foot ceilings. 2007 U.S. COURTS DESIGN GUIDE, supra note 271, 
ch. 4, at 15; 1997 U.S. COURTS DESIGN GUIDE, supra note 271, ch. 4, at 41; 1991 U.S. 
COURTS DESIGN GUIDE, supra note 271, at 126. 
 285. See 2007 U.S. COURTS DESIGN GUIDE, supra note 271, ch. 16, at 4–5. 
 286. Id. at ch. 3, at 5. 
 287. More Disciplined Approach Would Reduce Cost and Provide for Better 
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C. Signature Buildings 
The judiciary’s hopes for more gracious architectural statements of federal 
authority intersected with shifts in the GSA, also aspiring to provide “design 
excellence” for its buildings. Modeling procedures after the methods used in the 
early 1990s when Justice (then Chief Judge) Stephen Breyer and Judge Douglas 
Woodlock selected Henry N. Cobb to design the Boston Courthouse,288 the GSA 
sought to enlist world-renown architects to shape important federal buildings. 
Congress provided the funds, and federal courthouses became a new signature of 
the national government. As forecast at the outset, during Rehnquist’s tenure as 
chief justice, plans were made for 150 courthouse constructions or renovations, to 
be supported by eight to eleven billion dollars. While not all projects came to 
fruition, the federal judiciary tripled the amount of space it occupied, and 
courthouse projects in turn represented 80 percent of the federal building program 
launched by the GSA during the 1990s.289  
Above, I offered a few details of the buildings of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. Contemporary parallels include the Thomas F. Eagleton Federal 
Courthouse (figure 23), which opened in 2000 in St. Louis, Missouri.290 Standing 
557 feet high, it became the tallest and the “largest Federal courthouse in the 
United States,”291 with more than one million square feet that took $200 million to 
                                                                                                                 
Decisionmaking: Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Gov’t Mgmt. and the D.C. 
of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 104th Cong. 3 (1995) (statement of J. William 
Gadsby, Director, Gov’t Bus. Operations Issues, Gen. Gov’t Div.). 
 288. See Stephen G. Breyer, Foreword to CELEBRATING THE COURTHOUSE, supra note 
206, at 9; Douglas P. Woodlock, Drawing Meaning from the Heart of the Courthouse, in 
CELEBRATING THE COURTHOUSE, supra note 206, at 155 [hereinafter Woodlock, Drawing 
Meaning]; see also Douglas P. Woodlock, The “Peculiar Embarrassment”: An Architectural 
History of the Federal Courts in Massachusetts, 74 MASS. L. REV. 268, 268–78 (1989); 
Douglas P. Woodlock, Guest Lecture for The Boston Society of Architects, 1994–1995 
Lecture Series, Architecture and the Design of the New Federal Courthouse in Boston (Jan. 
25, 1995) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 289. See Dean, supra note 230, at 62. 
 290. Thanks are due to Magistrate Judge David Noce of the Eastern District of Missouri, 
who provided me with a tour of the building and the photograph used in figure 23. 
 291. U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., THOMAS F. EAGLETON UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE, ST. 
LOUIS, MISSOURI 12 (2001) [hereinafter EAGLETON COURTHOUSE BOOKLET]; see also Thomas 
F. Eagleton U.S. Courthouse, U.S. GEN. SERVICES ADMIN., http://www.gsa.gov/ 
portal/content/101471. The Eagleton Building is the third highest in St. Louis, designed to avoid 
overshadowing the city’s logo, the Gateway Arch. The GSA website specified that the court 
was the “largest single” federal courthouse built, as contrasted with the Southern District of New 
York, which has two courthouse buildings within blocks of each other. See Thomas F. Eagleton 
U.S. Courthouse, U.S. GEN. SERVICES ADMIN., http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/101471 
(website as of August 7, 2008).  
  As noted at the outset, state court filings tower over federal court filings and likewise, 
the St. Louis federal courthouse is not the largest in the country. For example, the largest 
courthouse in New York State is the 2001 structure for the Brooklyn Supreme and Family 
Courts, which houses more than eighty courtrooms in more than 1.1 million square feet; that 
structure is thirty-two stories and 473 feet high. See Brooklyn Supreme and Family 
Courthouse, New York, DESIGN BUILD NETWORK, http://www.designbuild-network.com/ 
projects/brooklyn-supreme. 
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construct.292 Space devoted to courtrooms was far outstripped by space devoted to 
staff. The St. Louis Eagleton Courthouse, for example, was designed to house 700 
employees who worked in the building, of whom (as of 2011), 21 were district, 
magistrate, bankruptcy, or appellate judges.293 This building also illustrates the shift 
from prior decades, when structures had been denominated a “Federal Building,” or 
“U.S. Post Office and Court House.” Federal courthouses are now often named in 
honor of either a member of Congress or a judge from the area.294 In this instance, 
the honor went to Thomas F. Eagleton, who served three terms in the Senate before 
returning to St. Louis in 1987.295 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 292. See Gragg, supra note 33, at 36; City of St. Louis Development Activity: Eagleton 
Federal Courthouse, INTERNET ARCHIVE, http://web.archive.org/web/20070818174938/ 
http://stlcin.missouri.org/devprojects/projinfo.cfm?DevProjectID=47&isComGov=1 
(accessed through the Internet Archive index). 
 293. EAGLETON COURTHOUSE BOOKLET, supra note 291, at 24. In 2011, eleven district 
judges, seven magistrate judges, three bankruptcy judges, and one Eighth Circuit judge had 
chambers in the courthouse. See Judges of the Court, E. DISTRICT MO. U.S. DISTRICT COURT, 
http://www.moed.uscourts.gov/judges-court; Judge & Courtroom Information, U.S. BANKR. 
COURT E. DISTRICT MO., http://www.moeb.uscourts.gov/judge_info.htm; Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals Judges, CA8.USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/newcoa/ 
judge.htm. Twenty-five courtrooms were provided. 
 294. The authority to name and to rename buildings is provided to the GSA. “The 
Administrator of General Services may name or otherwise designate any building under the 
custody and control of the General Services Administration, regardless of whether it was 
previously named by statute.” 40 U.S.C. § 3102 (2006). It appears that “Congress first 
recognized an individual by naming a post office through freestanding legislation” in 1967 to 
honor Charles A. Buckley, who had been a member of the House who had chaired the House 
Public Works Committee. NYE STEVENS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21562, NAMING POST 
OFFICES THROUGH LEGISLATION 2 (2003). In 1999, the 106th Congress named forty-six post 
offices in honor of either persons of local renown, members of Congress, or other figures. 
See id. In 1999, the Judicial Conference concluded that one ought not, however, name a 
courthouse after a judge who had left the bench to practice law. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
REPORT 76 (Sept. 1999). “In order to avoid the potential for perceptions of bias or conflict of 
interest,” the Conference opposed “naming a courthouse or other federal building” after 
retired judges practicing law. Id. In 2007, the Conference set forth the following 
conventions: that a facility solely occupied by a court be called the United States 
Courthouse; that a “multi-tenant” courthouse be denominated “United States Courthouse and 
Federal Building” or “United States Courthouse and Post Office”; and that if named after a 
judge, only the proper name be used and not titles such as “Honorable” or “Judge.” JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE REPORT 32 (Mar. 2007). 
 295. See Thomas Francis Eagleton, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE U.S. CONGRESS, 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=e000004. 
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Figure 23: Thomas F. Eagleton Federal Courthouse, St. Louis, Missouri. Architects: 
Hellmuth, Obata + Kassabaum Inc., 2000.
 
Photographer: The Honorable David D. Noce, U.S. Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri. Photograph courtesy of and 
reproduced with the permission of the photographer. 
 
Another example, colloquially known as the Boston Courthouse and shown in 
figure 24, opened in 1998 and is named in honor of a local Congressman, John 
Joseph Moakley.296 The building, an expanse of some 760,000 square feet, houses 
                                                                                                                 
 
 296. Moakley served in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1972 until he died in 
2001. He helped to secure federal funds “to implement his vision of Boston with a clean 
harbor, renewed transportation system, and revitalized waterfront.” U.S. GEN. SERVS. 
ADMIN., JOHN JOSEPH MOAKLEY UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE AND HARBORPARK 39 (2003) 
[hereinafter BOSTON COURTHOUSE BOOKLET]. Henry N. Cobb is one of the founders of the 
firm of Pei Cobb Freed & Partners Architects LLP, based in New York. Id. at 40. My thanks 
to the Honorable Douglas P. Woodlock, United States District Judge of the District of 
Massachusetts, for assistance in helping me to understand the history of this building and 
courthouse construction more generally, and to Henry Cobb for his discussions of his thoughts as 
the building’s architect. 
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the federal district court for Massachusetts and serves as the headquarters of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, embracing Maine, New 
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Puerto Rico. Courtroom space 
represents under 10% of the footage but the architect brought the exterior brick 
inside to convey the sense that entering the courtroom marks the important moment 
of moving from outside to the interior.  
 
Figure 24: John Joseph Moakley United States Courthouse, Boston, Massachusetts.
Architect: Harry Cobb, 1998. 
 
Copyright © 1998 Steve Rosenthal. Photograph reproduced with the permission of the photographer and courtesy of the court. 
 
Indiana is the site of another new federal courthouse building, for the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, which Henry Cobb 
(joined by Browning Day Mullins Dierdorf) also designed.297 The 275,000 square 
foot building (figure 25), completed in 2002, sits on a 6.9-acre parcel in downtown 
Hammond.298 Its three major building materials are limestone, glass, and precast 
architectural concrete.299 The GSA praised its “carefully proportioned planes,” 
providing “a play of rectilinear and curved geometric forms.”300 Its courtrooms 
have 22-foot ceilings with octagonal clerestory monitors allowing light, and judges 
have floor-to-ceiling windows in chambers.301  
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 297. United States Courthouse, PEI COBB FREED & PARTNERS ARCHITECTS LLP, 
http://www.pcf-p.com/a/p/9411/s.html. During the 1990s, the question of construction of the 
building produced disputes about the court’s location and efforts to prevent the project from 
going forward. See Michael Abramowitz, Wielding Restraint with a Vengeance: 2 Judges’ 
Objections to Relocation May Kill New Courthouse, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 1992, at A19; 
Mike Magan, Hammond Federal Courthouse Survives Knockdown, IND. LAW., May 31, 
1995, at 3. 
 298. U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE, HAMMOND, INDIANA 4 
(2004) [hereinafter HAMMOND BOOKLET]. 
 299. Id. at 26. Its central vaulted hall, 43 feet wide and 138 feet long, is 64 feet high; the 
courthouse includes seven courtrooms, three for district judges, and two for each magistrate 
and bankruptcy judges, as well as offices for members of Congress. Id. at 2–7. In 2004, the 
building won the GSA Honor Award for Design. 
 300. Id. at 26. 
 301. Id. at 17. 
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Figure 25: Exterior of the United States Courthouse, Hammond, Indiana. Architect: PEI 
COBB FREED & PARTNERS ARCHITECTS LLP, 2004; Browning Day Mullins Dierdorf 
Architects LLP.
 
Copyright © Hedrich Blessing. Photographer: Jon Miller. Image provided by Hedrich Blessing.  
 
Adornments in the lobby include the work of artist Dale Chihuly, whose blown 
glass sculptures—“glittering constructions of light, color and volume”—interact 
with the great arches (figure 26) that are forms also central to the Boston 
Courthouse design.302 The GSA booklet on the Hammond Courthouse explains that 
“the arch of the great hall opens this impressive public space to the city, which 
illuminated at night, stands out on the skyline as a beacon of justice, affirming the 
dignity and vitality of American democracy.”303 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 302. Id. at 31. The artwork is an artifact of federal building budgets that include a set-
aside amount of about one-half of 1% for public art to be commissioned for those sites. See 
RESNIK & CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE, supra note 236, at 182–92. 
 303. HAMMOND BOOKLET, supra note 298, at 7. 
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Figure 26: Interior of the United States Courthouse, Hammond, Indiana. Architect: PEI 
COBB FREED & PARTNERS ARCHITECTS LLP, 2004; Browning Day Mullins Dierdorf 
Architects LLP.
 
Copyright © Hedrich Blessing. Photographer: Jon Miller. Image provided by Hedrich Blessing. 
 
One recap of the undertakings under the Rehnquist era comes by way of looking 
at a map of “Construction and/or Site & Design Projects” (figure 27), published by 
the newsletter of the federal judiciary and providing the locations of projects 
between 1985 and 2002.304 Another overview (figure 28)305 comes from the 2009 
GSA collage of nine courthouses renovated or built the decade before.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 304. Thanks for help for this facsimile, by Yale University Press, go to Karen Redmond 
and Linda Stanton from the Public Affairs Office at Administrative Office of the United 
States Courts. The map accompanied The Renaissance of the Federal Courthouse, supra 
note 258. 
 305. Thanks to the Design Excellence Program, Office of the Chief Architect of the 
GSA; to Thomas B. Grooms, then Director of GSA’s Design Excellence and the Arts 
Program; and to Taylor Lednum of the GSA for the compilation of their photographs and 
that of Frank Ooms. Several of the buildings are discussed in booklets, published by the 
GSA, detailing the fabrication materials and providing photographs. See generally JOHN 
BRIGHAM, DESIGN EXCELLENCE (2005), http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article 
=1015&context=john_brigham. 
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Yet the expansive picture painted thus far became more complex in the past 
fifteen years. Conflicts over rent put the GSA and the AO in direct dispute. As 
federal budgets were stretched and stressed after 9/11, debates ensued about 
resources and needs. Congressional oversight halted some projects and downscaled 
others, and the judiciary and GSA negotiated a new formula for calculating rent. 
Those issues (detailed below) are better understood after discussion of the shifts in 
jurisprudence and rule making for which the Rehnquist Court is famous. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 27: Construction and/or Site & Design Projects, 1985 to Present, graphic in The
Third Branch: Newsletter of the Federal Courts at 10 (Dec. 2002).
 
Facsimile, Yale University Press. 
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Figure 28: United States Courthouse Buildings and Renovations: A Sampling, 1998–2002. 
Photographs taken by Taylor Lednum, Thomas Grooms, and Frank Ooms, and provided
courtesy of the Design Excellence Program, Office of the Chief Architect, United States
General Services Administration. From the top, moving left to right, the courthouses and
their architects are John Joseph Moakley U.S. Courthouse (Boston, Massachusetts),
designed by Henry Cobb of Pei Cobb Freed & Partners Architects LLP and Jung/Brannen
Associates, completed 1998; Alfonse D’Amato U.S. Courthouse (Central Islip, New York),
designed by Richard Meier & Partners and The Spector Group, completed 2000; United
States Courthouse (Tallahassee, Florida), designed by Reynolds Smith and Hills Inc. and
William Morgan Architects, completed 1999; Wayne Lyman Morse United States
Courthouse (Eugene, Oregon), designed by Morphosis and DLR Group, completed 2006;
William B. Bryant United States Courthouse Annex (Washington, D.C.), designed by
Michael Graves & Associates and SmithGroup, completed 2005; Wilkie D. Ferguson United 
States Federal Courthouse (Miami, Florida), designed by Arquitectonica and Hellmuth,
Obata + Kassabaum Inc., completed 2007; Corpus Christi Federal Courthouse (Corpus
Christi, Texas), designed by Hartman-Cox Architects, William S. McCord—AIA-
Principal/Architect of Record, and WKMC Architects Inc., completed 2001; the Roman L.
Hruska U.S. Courthouse (Omaha, Nebraska), designed by Pei Cobb Freed & Partners and
DLR Group, completed 2000; and Spottswood W. Robinson III and Robert R. Merhige Jr. 
Federal Courthouse (Richmond, Virginia), designed by Robert A.M. Stern Architects and
HLM Design, completed 2008.  
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D. Reshaping Practices: Privatizing Adjudication 
1. More Courtrooms, More Judges, and Fewer Trials 
As charted at the outset, during much of the twentieth century, the trend line—in 
the vectors of the number of judges (constitutional and, since 1968, statutory), the 
number of rights, the number of cases in the system, and the number of 
courthouses—was upward. That confluence was reflected in courthouse designs 
emphasizing the centrality of courtrooms. Illustrative are GSA comments about the 
1998 Boston Courthouse, where the courtroom’s importance was signaled by 
“elliptical brick recesses with half domes—a derivation of the Greek and Rome 
exedra—[to] define the entrances that lead to vestibules, which in turn lead to the 
courtrooms.”306 Further, as can be seen from the photograph of an interior (figure 
29) laid out for district judges, the motif of arches reappears to outline each of the 
four walls, detailed by stenciled patterns taken from another historic courthouse to 
reference continuity over time.307 The judge’s bench is “elevated by only three 
steps to enable the judge to easily participate in rather than be set apart from the 
proceedings.”308 
 
 
Figure 29: Courtroom, John Joseph Moakley United States Courthouse.
 
Photographer and Copyright © 1998 Steve Rosenthal. Reproduced with permission of the photographer and the court. 
 
Yet, when that courthouse opened in 1998, fewer than 200 civil and criminal 
trials were held that year in the District of Massachusetts,309 or about seven or eight 
                                                                                                                 
 
 306. BOSTON COURTHOUSE BOOKLET, supra note 296, at 8. 
 307. Id. at 28–29. 
 308. Id. at 8. 
 309. In 1998, when that courthouse opened, a total of 142 civil and forty-eight criminal 
trials took place in the federal trial courts in Massachusetts. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
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per courtroom. Data from 2011 in St. Louis, where the Eagleton Courthouse (figure 
23) stands tall, are parallel. Trials per district judge numbered ten, down from 
nineteen when the Eagleton Courthouse opened in 2000.310 
Trial rates in Boston and St. Louis are not anomalous. The chart, Civil and 
Criminal Trial Rates, United States Federal Courts, 1976–2000 (figure 30), 
summarizing information about the last quarter of the twentieth century,311 maps 
that trend of declining rates. In 1980, trials began in about 18% of criminal cases; 
by 2000, the figure was under 10%. Civil cases declined from about 8% in the 
1970s to under 4% by 2000.  
 
Figure 30: Civil and Criminal Trial Rates, United States Federal Courts, 1976–2000. 
 
Copyright © 2002 The Honorable Patrick E. Higginbotham, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and used with his 
permission. 
 
This image is part of a now familiar story, and one that Marc Galanter named 
“the Vanishing Trial.”312 He spearheaded a research project (supported by the 
                                                                                                                 
COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 1998 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
DIRECTOR 178 tbl.C-7 (1999). 
 310. U.S. DISTRICT COURT—JUDICIAL CASELOAD PROFILE, http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
viewer.aspx?doc=/cgi-bin/cmsd2000.pl (select “Missouri Eastern”; select “generate”); U.S. 
DISTRICT COURT—JUDICIAL CASELOAD PROFILE, http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer. 
aspx?doc=/cgi-bin/cmsd2011Jun.pl (select “Missouri Eastern”; select “generate”). In the 
twelve-month period ending September 30, 2010, a total of 56 civil trials and 43 criminal 
trials were completed. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE 
UNITED STATES COURTS: 2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 182 tbl.C-7 (2011). Again, 
magistrate judges have courtrooms, but the trials they conducted are not likely reflected in 
the district court data. 
 311. Thanks to the Honorable Patrick Higginbotham for permitting use of the chart 
shown in figure 30.  
 312. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters 
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Litigation Section of the American Bar Association) that mapped decades of 
change. Galanter noted that in 1962, 5802 civil trials took place; forty years later in 
2002, with many more cases filed, 4569 civil trials were held around the United 
States.313 In percentage terms, the decline was from 11.5% to 2% in civil trials 
commenced during that time period. Galanter characterized the drop as both “recent 
and steep.”314 Further, while minor variations exist in terms of the kind of case, the 
percentages of cases going to trial (and the absolute numbers of trials) have 
declined. State courts reported parallel data, albeit harder to come by given 
variation in information collections.315 In short, by 2002, and continuing through 
2010, in the U.S. federal courts, a trial started in fewer than 2 of 100 civil cases 
filed,316 and approximately 10 to 11 of the criminal cases filed.317    
Of course, trials are not the only activities based in courtrooms. Motions are 
argued there, and public pleas and sentencing proceedings are required facets of the 
criminal process. Yet as judges promoted courthouse construction that posited 
courtrooms as the centerpiece of their work, they also joined in the development of 
doctrine, practices, and cultures that came to look upon trials as suspect—as time 
consuming, expensive, and not as productive as other ways of resolving disputes. 
Moreover, and returning to the role of William Rehnquist, the United States 
Supreme Court has, through its constitutional and statutory interpretation, been 
central in limiting access to courts.  
2. Moving into Chambers and ADR Suites for Management and Settlement 
The judicial repertoire has long reached beyond the activity of presiding at trials. 
But the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of the 1930s, as amended in the 1960s, the 
1980s, and thereafter, and federal criminal practice increasingly focused on 
settlements. Beginning in the 1980s, the rules pressed judges to serve as 
                                                                                                                 
in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004) [hereinafter Galanter, 
Vanishing Trial]; see also Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the 
Thirty Years War, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1255 (2005). 
 313. Galanter, Vanishing Trial, supra note 312, at 461. 
 314. Id.  
 315. See id. at 506–13; Brian J. Ostrom, Shauna M. Strickland & Paula L. Hannaford-
Agor, Examining Trial Trends in State Courts: 1976–2002, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 755 
(2004). 
 316. Data from 2009 and 2010 make plain the relatively small numbers of cases 
beginning trials; the rates were 1.2% in 2009 and 1.1% in 2010. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE 
U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2009 ANNUAL REPORT OF 
THE DIRECTOR 165 tbl.C-4 (2010); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 168 tbl.C-4 (2011). 
 317. Criminal trial rates are extrapolated from data published by the Administrative 
Office of the U.S. Courts. In 2009, 76,655 criminal cases were commenced, and 8051 trials 
were completed, for a trial rate of approximately 10.5%. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2009 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
DIRECTOR 178 tbl.C-7, 201 tbl.D (2010). In 2010, 78,428 criminal cases were commenced, 
and 8445 trials were completed, for a trial rate of approximately 10.8%. See ADMIN. OFFICE 
OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2010 ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 181 tbl.C-7, 204 tbl.D (2011). Given the requirements of the 
Speedy Trial Act, using the assumption of filing and trial within the same year is plausible.  
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multitaskers, sometimes managers of lawyers and of cases, sometimes mediators, 
and sometimes referral sources sending people outside of courts to alternative fora. 
By 1998, for example, the local rules for federal courts in Massachusetts instructed 
that at “every conference conducted under these rules, the judicial officer shall 
inquire as to the utility of the parties conducting settlement negotiations, explore 
means of facilitating those negotiations, and offer whatever assistance may be 
appropriate in the circumstances.” 318 
That effort was part of a general embrace of ADR, promoted by local and 
national rules319 and by federal legislation.320 This is not the occasion on which to 
rehearse the many reasons proponents advanced for the shift, but instead to record 
its impact through the words of one jurist, Brock Hornby, who has served in several 
leadership positions within the Judicial Conference. Judge Hornby described judges 
in civil cases as working in  
an office setting without the robe, using a computer and court 
administrative staff to monitor the entire caseload and individual case 
progress . . . . For federal civil cases, the black-robed figure up on the 
bench, presiding publicly over trials and instructing juries, has become 
an endangered species, replaced by a person in business attire at an 
office desk surrounded by electronic assistants.321  
For a few years, form followed function. The federal judiciary’s Design Guides 
called for “alternative dispute resolution suites”—spaces designed for mediation, 
arbitration, or settlement conferences rather than courtrooms laid out for trials.322 
Amendments were formally made in 1994 to incorporate that change but revisions 
to the U.S. Courts Design Guide—crafted in 2007 in response to pressures to cut 
back space requirements—deleted those provisions. Courtrooms thus continue to 
be the central feature of federal courthouses. Specifications detailed the necessary 
appointments and furniture, even as courtrooms are a small percentage of a 
courthouse’s square footage and the site of only a fraction of judges’ daily work.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 318. See LR, D. Mass. 16.4(b) (1990); see also LR, D. Mass. 16.4(a) (1990) (“The 
judicial officer shall encourage the resolution of disputes by settlement or other alternative 
dispute resolution programs.”). 
 319. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16; Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 144; Judith Resnik, 
Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. 
REV. 924 (2000) [hereinafter Resnik, Trial as Error]; see also Owen M. Fiss, Against 
Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); Amy J. Cohen, Revisiting Against Settlement: Some 
Reflections on Dispute Resolution and Public Values, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1143 (2009). 
 320. See Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-315, 112 Stat. 
2993 (1998) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 651–658 (2006)); Administrative Dispute 
Resolution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2736 (1990) (codified as amended at 
5 U.S.C. §§ 571–583 (2006)). 
 321. D. Brock Hornby, The Business of the U.S. District Courts, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 453, 
462 (2007). 
 322. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 98 (Sept. 1995). 
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3. Empowering Outsourced Adjudicators and Constraining Court-Based Judges 
Initiatives to shift towards court-based ADR are often associated with Chief 
Justice Burger who, as noted above, sought doctrinal cutbacks of rights gained 
when Earl Warren was the Chief Justice. Burger’s agendas of constricting federal 
courts’ roles in favor of both ADR and state court authority were mirrored in his 
interest in cutting down the size of federal courtrooms.  
In contrast, even as Chief Justice Rehnquist supported increasing staffing levels 
of courts and efforts to obtain resources for courthouse construction, he used his 
jurisprudence and his bully pulpit to limit federal judicial power. Often referencing 
the rubric of federalism, Chief Justice Rehnquist helped to craft doctrines that 
ceded authority to state courts,323 thereby narrowing access to the federal courts for 
various groups, such as civil rights plaintiffs324 and habeas corpus petitioners.325  
To do so, Rehnquist-era case law declined to imply causes of action from 
statutes and the Constitution.326 In addition, the Rehnquist Court imposed limits on 
congressional power to rely on the Commerce Clause. Chief Justice Rehnquist 
wrote the five-person decision in United States v. Lopez, holding that Congress had 
exceeded its authority when creating the federal crime of possession of guns within 
a certain distance from schools,327 and he wrote the five-person majority in United 
States v. Morrison, ruling that Congress lacked authority under either the 
Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment to enact the civil rights remedy in 
the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) providing a federal civil action for 
victims of violence predicated on gender-based animus.328 In addition, the 
Rehnquist Court imposed constraints on the common law remedial powers of 
federal judges.329  
Moreover, the tone set by Chief Justice Rehnquist as chief spokesperson for the 
federal courts fit his doctrinal approach. He repeatedly used his annual “State of the 
Judiciary” addresses to counsel against expansion of federal jurisdiction. Both 
before and after the enactment in 1994 of VAWA’s civil rights remedy, for 
example, the Chief Justice invoked the statute as an example of the overuse of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 323. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist 
Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429 (2002); see also Chemerinsky, supra 
note 26. 
 324. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v. 
Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).  
 325. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). See generally Judith Resnik, 
Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 
223 (2003) [hereinafter Resnik, Constricting Remedies]. 
 326. See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002); Corr. Servs. Corp. v. 
Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987). 
 327. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 328. 529 U.S. 598 (2000); see Judith Resnik, Drafting, Lobbying, and Litigating VAWA: 
National, Local, and Transnational Interventions on Behalf of Women’s Equality, 11 GEO. J. 
GENDER & L. 557, 563–68 (2010); Judith Resnik, The Programmatic Judiciary: Lobbying, 
Judging, and Invalidating the Violence Against Women Act, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 269 (2000) 
[hereinafter Resnik, Programmatic Judiciary]. 
 329. See Resnik, Constricting Remedies, supra note 325, at 231–56. 
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federal remedies.330 Further, during his tenure chairing the Judicial Conference, it 
pressed Congress to cut back on federal jurisdiction. In the 1995 Long Range Plan, 
the Judicial Conference opposed “federaliz[ing]” crime.331 As for civil cases, the 
Conference recommended that Congress ought to have a presumption against 
creating new federal rights, if enforced in federal court.332 More generally, the 
Judicial Conference’s Long Range Plan urged Congress to rely, when possible, on 
state courts and federal agencies in lieu of the federal courts.333 
The attitudes found in Rehnquist’s jurisprudence and policy making are 
recounted by many scholars; the flavor of much of the commentary comes from 
one overview entitled “The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an 
Organizing Principle of the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence.”334 Below, I focus on 
two areas of doctrine the Rehnquist Court developed concerning access to courts—
the enforcement of mandatory arbitration contracts proffered by manufacturers, 
sellers, and employers to consumers, and the limitations placed on civil rights 
claimants seeking remedies from states. Through varying substantive paths and 
different legal analysis, fewer litigants had direct access to the federal courts. Some 
were sent to state courts, others to federal agencies or to private dispute resolution, 
and yet others left without legal redress. 
a. Mandating Arbitration 
Figure 31 reproduces the cell phone contract that was provided to me in 2002.335 
As the text indicates, it requires that I waive all rights to court, to class action 
treatment, and to aggregate treatment of my claims in arbitration. Instead, I am 
                                                                                                                 
 
 330. William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice’s 1991 Year-End Report on the Federal 
Judiciary, THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 1992, at 1, 3; see also Resnik, Programmatic Judiciary, 
supra note 328, at 271–74.  
 331. LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 22. 
 332. Id. at 28–29. 
 333. Id. at 134 (“[T]he Judicial Conference could consider seeking more extensive 
reductions in federal court jurisdiction to fulfill the mission of the federal courts, 
[including] . . . (b) Eliminate or substantially curtail the jurisdiction of the district court in 
those categories of cases that may be appropriately resolved in federal administrative or state 
forums.”); see also id. at 135 (“In addition to restoration of a minimum 
amount-in-controversy requirement for federal question cases, federal court jurisdiction 
could be curtailed in cases appropriately resolved in Article I tribunals, administrative 
agencies, or state courts. Examples of such case categories include social security benefit 
clams, contract claims, benefit claims under ERISA welfare plans, forfeiture proceedings, 
and cases primarily involving state law issues . . . .”). 
 334. Siegel, supra note 26. 
 335. The excerpts in figure 31 come from a contract that we had with the service then 
providing us with cell phones. See Customer Agreement, VERIZON WIRELESS, 
http://www.verizonwireless.com/customer-agreement.shtml. These materials exemplify this 
genre of contract; other providers had similar contracts. See, e.g., Terms & Conditions, 
SPRINT, http://shop2.sprint.com/en/legal/legal_terms_privacy_popup.shtml. Thanks to 
Professor Peter Jaszi for advice on copyright and reproduction rights and to Verizon’s vice 
president and associate general counsel, Sarah B. Deutsch, who in 2006 confirmed the 
propriety of the publication of a portion of the contract for this particular use. 
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required to use a private dispute resolution procedure selected by the company. 
That proceeding is not court-based; indeed, no member of the public has a right to 
attend.336 Data on the categories of claims, the issues raised, the responses, 
outcomes, participants, and the costs are not readily available, aside from a few 
states that oblige reporting about certain forms of arbitration.337  
                                                                                                                 
 
 336. See Wireless Industry Arbitration Rules, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N (2009), 
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22010 (providing in Rule 24 that “[t]he arbitrator shall ensure 
the privacy of the hearings”). The Better Business Bureau’s “Arbitration Rule 12” permits 
outside observers to attend as long as there is “room and no objection” from either the parties 
or the arbitrator. BETTER BUS. BUREAU, RULES OF ARBITRATION [BINDING] 14 (2010), 
available at http://www.bbb.org/us/Dispute-Resolution-Services/Binding-Arbitration; see 
also id. (Rule 13 states: “Unless there is approval of all parties and the arbitrator, no one is 
permitted to bring cameras, lights, recording devices or any other equipment into the 
hearing.”). 
 337. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96 (West 2011). After this 2002 enactment, the 
American Arbitration Association complied by providing quarterly reports including 
nationwide data. See also MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3903 (West 2011); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1394 (2010); D.C. CODE § 16-4430 (2008). Providers do not, 
however, provide comprehensive data. See CAL. DISPUTE RESOLUTION INST., CONSUMER 
AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION IN CALIFORNIA: A REVIEW OF WEBSITE DATA 
POSTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 1281.96 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 5 (2004), 
available at http://www.mediate.com/cdri/cdri_print_Aug_6.pdf. Further, aside from such 
statutes, 
no government agency . . . collects statistics on the number of employees 
covered by employer-promulgated arbitration programs or the outcomes of 
arbitration cases filed under these programs. What research has been done is 
based on data made available to individual researchers by arbitration service 
providers, most notably the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and the 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). 
Alexander J.S. Colvin, Employment Arbitration: Empirical Findings and Research Needs, 
DISP. RESOL. J., Aug.–Oct. 2009, at 6–7. Public records as well as contracts offered to 
purchasers have given researchers other windows into arbitration use. See, e.g., Theodore 
Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An 
Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 871 (2008). 
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Figure 31: Example of cellular phone contract, 2002. 
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Figure 31 (continued): Example of cellular phone contract, 2002. 
 
 
As is familiar, voluntary arbitration has a long history, both in and outside the 
United States.338 Yet, during the nineteenth century and some of the twentieth, 
courts protected their own jurisdiction by concluding that “public policy” did not 
permit the enforcement of ex ante arbitration agreements over the objection of one 
side.339 A shift came through legislation; in 1925, Congress enacted the United 
                                                                                                                 
 
 338. See Amalia D. Kessler, Deciding Against Conciliation: The Nineteenth-Century 
Rejection of a European Transplant and the Rise of a Distinctively American Ideal of 
Adversarial Adjudication, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 423 (2009); Lisa Bernstein, 
Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 
21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW 
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991). 
 339. See generally IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION—
NATIONALIZATION—INTERNATIONALIZATION 19–20 (1992). 
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States Arbitration Act, which recognized certain kinds of arbitration contracts as 
enforceable obligations.340 That statute (now known as the “Federal Arbitration 
Act,” or FAA) was focused on commercial contracts rather than the consumer 
agreements illustrated by my cell phone contract. Indeed, in 1925, congressional 
power over intrastate consumer as well as over employment transactions was not 
obvious.  
The reach of the FAA was, until the 1980s, limited. The issue of its applicability 
to consumer contracts was reached in Wilko v. Swan, a decision rendered in 1953, 
just two months after Warren became Chief Justice.341 A securities customer sued a 
brokerage firm for allegedly violating the 1933 federal securities laws by making 
false representations about a merger. The question was the enforceability of a form 
agreement that suits would be stayed, at the behest of either party, in favor of 
arbitration.  
The Court refused to enforce the contract, in part because the adhesive 
agreement was based on one party’s superior bargaining power. When rejecting a 
reading of federal statutes to require enforcement of adjudication-precluding 
clauses, the Court discussed the differences between buyers’ court-based rights 
under federal securities laws and arbitration.342 Then, arbitration was seen as too 
flexible, too informal, and too unreviewable. Writing for the Court, Justice Reed 
described the problems to be that arbitrators’ awards “may be made without 
explanation of their reasons and without a complete record of their proceedings,” 
and hence, that one could not examine “arbitrators’ conception of the legal meaning 
of such statutory requirements as ‘burden of proof,’ ‘reasonable care’ or ‘material 
fact.’”343 In contrast, the majority praised adjudication for its regulatory role in 
monitoring adherence to congressional mandates protecting purchasers of stock.344 
But thereafter, the Court revised its views on arbitration and its interpretation of 
federal statutes. First under Chief Justice Burger and then under Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, the Supreme Court reread federal statutes to require enforcement of 
arbitration contracts.345 Whether invoking rights under state or federal law, as long 
                                                                                                                 
 
 340. See United States Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified 
as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (2006)). 
 341. 346 U.S. 427 (1953). Warren became chief justice on October 5, 1953; the decision 
was issued on December 7, 1953. 
 342. Id. at 433–38. The holding was premised on the interpretation that the arbitration 
constituted a “condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security 
to waive compliance” with the 1933 Act, which Congress has prevented parties to do. Id. at 
430 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77n (2006)). 
 343. Id. at 436. That decision was overruled in Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). See also Judith Resnik, Many 
Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 211, 223 (1995). 
 344. Justice Jackson concurred, and Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice Minton, 
dissented, arguing that no evidence had been presented that “the arbitral system as practiced 
in the City of New York” would not afford the rights to which the purchaser was entitled, as 
contrasted with the “tortuous course of litigation, especially in the City of New York.” 
Wilko, 346 U.S. at 439–40. 
 345. See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985); Rodriguez 
de Quijas, 490 U.S. 477; Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 
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as the mandatory arbitration provided what the Court deemed to be an adequate 
alternative mechanism for protecting such rights, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts 
insisted on enforcing contracts putting dispute resolution outside of courthouses 
and away from open and public hearings. 
Since 1985, a good many cases have litigated the parameters of the FAA’s 
obligations to arbitrate, the clarity and content of contract terms mandating 
arbitration,346 the relevant parties required to provide consent,347 and the impact of 
the costs entailed.348 After a series of decisions holding that consumer contracts 
were within the FAA, the Court ruled (five to four) in 2001 that employees who 
signed contracts requiring arbitration were likewise bound, even when waivers 
appeared in job application forms349 and even when claiming state law rights to be 
free from discrimination.350 In addition, when parties disagreed about how to 
interpret contractual provisions about whether arbitration was required, the 
Supreme Court has generally held that such issues were to be decided, at least 
initially, by arbitrators and not judges.351 And, in many of these decisions, the 
                                                                                                                 
U.S. 614, 640 (1985); Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89–92 (2000). 
The developments are detailed in Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 179, at 113–18. 
As a consequence, a wide range of claims are kept out of federal court. See, e.g., Guyden v. 
Aetna Inc., 544 F.3d 376, 384 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that claims under the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act’s whistleblower protection provisions are subject to arbitration and concluding that “the 
loss of a public forum in which to air allegations of fraud does not undermine the statutory 
purpose of a whistleblower protection provision”). 
 346. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (upholding 
mandatory arbitration clause in an employment contract); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 
U.S. 1 (1984) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act applies to contracts executed under 
state law and thus, applies to franchisee contracts). Compare PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE 
ARBITRATION TRAP: HOW CREDIT CARD COMPANIES ENSNARE CONSUMERS (2007), available 
at http://www.citizen.org/documents/ArbitrationTrap.pdf, with Stephen J. Ware, The Case 
for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements—with Particular Consideration of Class 
Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251 (2006). 
 347. For example, in 2009, the Court concluded (five to four) that employees under a 
collective bargaining agreement lost their individual rights to go to court for age 
discrimination claims, even though they had not personally signed the agreement. 14 Penn 
Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1472–73 (2009). 
 348. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala., 531 U.S. at 92. 
 349. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 282–83 (2002). 
 350. See Circuit City Stores, Inc., 532 U.S. at 119. On remand, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that, under California law, the contract was not enforceable because it was a 
contract of adhesion. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2002), 
cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1112 (2002). See generally Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593 (2005). 
 351. The point was sharply made in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 
440 (2006), where the Supreme Court heard an appeal of the Florida Supreme Court’s 
decision that an arbitration provision was unenforceable because the underlying contract had 
a provision that, under Florida law, was invalid and nonseverable. See Cardegna v. Buckeye 
Check Cashing, Inc., 894 So. 2d 860, 862–64 (Fla. 2005). The Supreme Court of the United 
States disagreed; it ruled that federal law required that the issue of the contract’s 
enforcement be presented in arbitration. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 546 U.S. at 445–49. 
Further, even when state law would send an issue to an administrative forum, federal law 
superseded state rules and required arbitration. See Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 349–50 
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Court has read the FAA to preempt state court rulings on court access and 
state-based contract rights to be free from adhesive or unconscionable 
provisions.352  
b. Constitutional Limits by Way of the Commerce Clause and the Eleventh and the 
Fourteenth Amendments 
Another line of cases resulted in a different method by which to constrict 
judicial authority—Rehnquist-era interpretations of the Eleventh and Fourteenth 
Amendments.353 As Dawn Johnsen has documented, the Rehnquist Court’s 
achievements were embedded in decades of efforts to use judicial appointments and 
government litigation to reshape constitutional assumptions. One focus was the 
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment as a brake on litigation against states.354 
That provision is the subject of a complex body of jurisprudence, as the import of 
its words—“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to 
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any 
Foreign State”355—has divided the Court.  
In 1996, in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, the Court addressed the 
question of whether an Indian tribe could, under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
(IGRA), sue a state for failure to negotiate in good faith.356 Under prior law, states 
had no role in regulating tribal gaming, which was understood as exclusively under 
the control of either the tribes or Congress as their overseer.357 Enacted pursuant to 
                                                                                                                 
(2008). In 2010, the Court held (again five to four) that a challenge to the enforceability of 
an entire agreement, which the Ninth Circuit had held unconscionable because of the lack of 
meaningful consent, was for the arbitrator to decide. Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 
130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010). However, in Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, which 
involved a labor contract, the Court held that the district court, and not the arbitrator, was to 
decide whether a collective bargaining agreement with a no-strike provision had been 
“validly formed during the strike period.” 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2853 (2010). 
  Another line of cases addresses the question of aggregate procedures. In Green Tree 
Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452–53 (2003), the Supreme Court concluded that the 
question of whether an arbitration contract precluded a class arbitration was an issue to be 
determined initially by an arbitrator rather than a judge. In the 2010 Stolt-Nielsen decision, 
the Court held arbitrators could not permit a class arbitration if a contract did not expressly 
authorize it. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). In the 
spring of 2011, the Court held that a state law provision, concluding that preclusion of class 
arbitrations violated the prohibition on adhesive contracts, was preempted by the FAA. See 
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 352. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc., 532 U.S. at 105; Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 
546 U.S. at 440; AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1740. 
 353. Elsewhere I have examined constraining interpretations of judicial equitable powers. 
See Resnik, Constricting Remedies, supra note 325, at 231–71. 
 354. See Dawn E. Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on Congressional 
Power: Presidential Influences on Constitutional Change, 78 IND. L.J. 363 (2003). 
 355. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 356. See Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988) 
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2721 (2006)). 
 357. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S 202 (1987). 
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congressional authority to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among 
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes,”358 IGRA altered that approach by 
authorizing states to play a role as it also required them to enter into negotiations 
with Indian tribes about certain kinds of gaming activities.359 
Writing for the five-member majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that “Article 
I cannot be used to circumvent” what he termed a “constitutional” limitation 
imposed by the Eleventh Amendment.360 As a consequence, Congress lacked the 
power to subject states to actions predicated on federal laws enacted under its 
Commerce Clause authority. Seminole Tribe overturned Pennsylvania v. Union Gas 
Co., which seven years before had concluded that Congress could—in its superfund 
legislation passed under its Commerce Clause authority—subject states to suit as 
part of clean-up efforts.361 Moreover, in the 1970s, then-Justice Rehnquist had 
concluded in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer362 that Congress could rely on its Fourteenth 
Amendment authority to subject states to claims under Title VII.  
But in Seminole Tribe, the Chief Justice distinguished Fitzpatrick as predicated 
on efforts to implement the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection guarantees. 
His majority also concluded that while injunction actions against state executive 
officials might proceed through the fiction of Ex parte Young,363 the statute at issue 
had not provided that route and would not be interpreted to do so.364 As William 
Marshall detailed, in the 1970s when Rehnquist had joined the Court, “state 
immunity was a fading doctrine.”365 Under Rehnquist’s “stewardship,” however, it 
gained a vitality that is “a testament to his skills as a judicial craftsman and 
tactician.”366  
Moreover, the Chief Justice’s commitment to the Fourteenth Amendment has 
not provided plaintiffs with a safe haven for obtaining relief. The Rehnquist Court 
also took up oversight of the constitutionality of congressional reliance on that part 
of the Constitution as a basis for federal rights. The Court elaborated a test that 
congressional remedial action pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment must be 
related and “proportionate” to the injuries documented before it. Under this 
approach, the Court struck federal statutes authorizing money damages against 
states, for example under certain parts of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA).367  
                                                                                                                 
Congressional powers over tribes are themselves a complex set of constitutional questions. 
See Phillip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, and 
the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707 (2002). 
 358. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 359. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (2006). 
 360. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996). See generally Vicki C. 
Jackson & Judith Resnik, Sovereignties—Federal, State, and Tribal: The Story of Seminole 
Tribe of Florida v. Florida, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES, supra note 74, at 329–57. 
 361. See 491 U.S. 1 (1989). 
 362. 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). 
 363. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
 364. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 74. 
 365. William P. Marshall, The Battle over State Immunity, in THE REHNQUIST LEGACY, 
supra note 24, at 240, 264. 
 366. Id. 
 367. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368–74 (2001); see also 
Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72–78 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 
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As noted above, accessibility to courthouses and other public buildings became 
a concern during the last several decades. In 1990, Congress mandated in the ADA 
that state and private facilities be accessible so that “no qualified individual with a 
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be 
denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be 
subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”368 But problems of compliance 
were pervasive and examples came from inside state courthouses. For example, in 
public hearings convened in the late 1990s at the behest of Chief Justice Ronald 
George of the Supreme Court of California, some 60% of the speakers reported on 
physical barriers to and in courts.369 California’s specially chartered task force 
detailed the many courts that could only be entered by way of staircases and 
recommended significant changes.370  
The Supreme Court took up an aspect of the ADA’s reach in Tennessee v. Lane. 
The underlying facts of the case at bar (a term sadly apt) involved George Lane, 
wheelchair-bound because he was a paraplegic. Lane had “crawled up two flights 
of stairs to get to the courtroom” where he was to answer to criminal charges.371 In 
2004, a bare majority—that did not include Chief Justice Rehnquist—upheld the 
provision of the ADA permitting individuals such as Lane to seek monetary 
damages from states for failing to accommodate disabled persons’ use of courts.372 
For the majority, Justice Stevens detailed the record before Congress on exclusion 
of individuals with disabilities from state courthouses and the importance of 
affording individuals court-based rights. As the opinion explained, “affirmative 
obligations” flowed because the “right of access to the courts” was such a 
foundational constitutional value.373  
                                                                                                                 
U.S. 507 (1997). See generally Linda Greenhouse, Court Had Rehnquist Initials Intricately 
Carved on Docket, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2002, at A1 (discussing the thirty years of 
Rehnquist’s service and that he had accomplished a good many of his goals, including 
expanding the doctrine of sovereign immunity).  
 368. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 202, 104 Stat. 327, 
337 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12165 (2006)). 
 369. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., PUBLIC HEARINGS REPORT: ACCESS FOR PERSONS WITH 
DISABILITIES 2-1 (1996).  
 370. See id. at 5-71, 5-73. The Task Force recommended that a “substantial improvement 
in physical access” be a priority, along with changing the signage, providing transportation, 
and educating staff to make accommodations for disabilities. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., 
SUMMARY OF SURVEY AND PUBLIC HEARING REPORTS OF THE ACCESS FOR PERSONS WITH 
DISABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL COUNCIL’S ACCESS AND FAIRNESS 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE 18 (1997). 
 371. 541 U.S. 509, 513–14 (2004). 
 372. Id. at 531–34. 
 373. Id. at 532 & n.20. Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, concurred, as they also 
noted how courts had perpetuated discrimination based on handicap. Id. at 534 (Souter, J., 
concurring). After the decision was issued, one lawyer, herself “in a power wheelchair,” 
lamented that the ruling had not addressed impaired access to a range of state services. See 
Harriet McBryde Johnson, Stairway to Justice, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 30, 2004, at 11. 
Accompanying her essay was a photograph by Zigy Zaluzny of an individual in a wheelchair 
attempting to scale a high and long staircase to an indeterminate site.  
For many decades, long flights of stairs made statements about the grandeur 
and power of the law. . . . By design, they were humbling, even disempowering. 
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The year before Lane was decided, Chief Justice Rehnquist had authored the 
majority opinion in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, upholding 
congressional power to enact the Family and Medical Leave Act with its 
authorization of damage actions against states.374 But in Tennessee v. Lane, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist dissented, arguing that Congress could not authorize individual 
damage suits for state failures to make accessible their courthouses.375 His dissent 
found the record before Congress inadequate to support a finding that “disabled 
persons were systematically denied the right to be present at criminal trials, denied 
the meaningful opportunity to be heard in civil cases, unconstitutionally excluded 
from jury service, or denied the right to attend criminal trials.”376 Noting that Lane 
had been given a hearing on the “first-floor library” as an accommodation, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist characterized the information before Congress as “anecdotal 
evidence and conclusory statements”; the “mere existence of an architecturally 
‘inaccessible’ courthouse . . . does not state a constitutional violation. . . . We have 
never held that a person has a constitutional right to make his way into a courtroom 
without any external assistance.”377  
He knew from whence he spoke, for the courthouse in which he sat imposed 
obstacles for those seeking to walk up its main stairway. When Tennessee v. Lane 
was argued before the U.S. Supreme Court, several newspapers focused on the 
grand steps of that building rather than the side entrance that has no stairs. The 
photographs showed demonstrators climbing, on their hands and knees, the stairs of 
the building that William Howard Taft had brought into being.378  
V. THE UNDERUTILIZED FEDERAL COURTS 
At the outset, I provided charts graphing the rise in the number of authorized 
judgeships and in filings during the twentieth century (figures 2 and 3), and 
thereafter sketched the changing legal rules and statutes governing the federal 
courts. The numbers fit other facts. According to the AO, between 1974 and 1998, 
Congress enacted some 474 provisions that expanded “the workload and 
                                                                                                                 
Ramps, elevators and appropriate use of government spaces have the opposite 
effect. For people with disabilities, it is impossible to conceptualize equal 
protection of the law without them. 
Id. 
 374. 538 U.S. 721, 724–25 (2003). Pending as of 2011 is a question of the authority of 
Congress to do so under another provision of that Act. See Coleman v. Md. Court of 
Appeals, 626 F.3d 187 (4th Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. Coleman v. Court of Appeals 
of Md., 131 S. Ct. 3059 (2011).  
 375. Lane, 541 U.S. at 538 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Analysis of the tension between 
Hibbs and Lane is provided in Linda Greenhouse, Foreword: The Third Rehnquist Court, in 
THE REHNQUIST LEGACY, supra note 24, at xiii, xix–xx. In Lane, Justice Scalia and Justice 
Thomas each explained their further disagreements with the majority in separate dissents. 
See Lane, 541 U.S. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 565 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 376. Id. at 543–44 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).  
 377. Id. at 543 n.4, 546–47 (emphasis in original). 
 378. See Linda Greenhouse, Dispute Heard on States’ Duties Under Disabilities Act, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2004, at A16. The article was accompanied by a photograph of the 
protestors on their hands and knees. 
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jurisdiction of the federal courts.”379 As of 2003, 1366 courtrooms were available 
for district court judges,380 with others for magistrate and senior judges—in total, 
about 1800 to 2000 courtrooms. From the 400 facilities in the 1960s, the judiciary 
had, by 2008, housing in some 800 locations.381 
Yet two additional charts, focused on the years between 1995 and 2010 (figures 
4 and 5), demonstrated the flattening of filing rates, reflecting the contraction of 
litigation rights produced by many variables, of which procedural rules and 
doctrine are but one part. As federal budgets came under pressure, as federal 
judicial culture entrenched skepticism about the wisdom of a ready welcome to the 
federal courts, and as filings slowed, questions came to the fore about the need to 
expand courtroom housing stock.  
A. Congressional Investigations of Courtroom Usage:  
Conflicts over A-Courtroom-Per-Judge 
Expensive courthouse building budgets coupled with vanishing trials attracted 
the attention of members of Congress. Estimates were that new courtrooms cost 
about $1.5 million, and the question arose about how often judges used them. 
During the 1990s, “courtroom sharing” became a particular point of contestation, as 
members of Congress probed the judiciary’s insistence that a dedicated courtroom 
be provided for each judge as well as for judges who had taken senior status to 
open up vacancies.382  
Focused on what it called “courtroom utilization,” Congress commissioned 
studies from the General Accountability Office (GAO) and the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO), which found underutilization of federal courtrooms.383 A 
                                                                                                                 
 
 379. See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Revision of List of Statutes Enlarging 
Federal Court Workload (Sept. 18, 1998) (on file with author). Tracking of such statutes 
began in the 1970s and was updated periodically. 
 380. Fredric L. Lederer, The Courtroom in the Age of Technology, in CELEBRATING THE 
COURTHOUSE, supra note 206, at 189.  
 381. 2006 Future of the Federal Courthouse Construction Program Hearings, supra note 
33, at 179 (statement of Hon. Jane R. Roth, Chair, Judicial Conference Comm. on Space and 
Facilities). 
 382. For example, the Judicial Conference objected to a proposed bill, the General 
Services Administration Improvement Act of 1997, H.R. 2751, 105th Cong. (1st Sess. 1997), 
that would have required that the judiciary or GSA submit data on courtroom use, courtroom 
sharing, and the design guide. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 30 (Mar. 1998). On the 
other hand, the Judicial Conference registered its support for a bill pending in 1997, H.R. 
623, 105th Cong. (1st Sess. 1997), because it would provide a “more realistic and favorable 
treatment of capital investments in the federal budget to the benefit of the judiciary.” 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 31 (Mar. 1998).  
 383. See, e.g., 2006 Future of the Federal Courthouse Construction Program Hearings, 
supra note 33; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COURTHOUSE CONSTRUCTION: SUFFICIENT 
DATA AND ANALYSIS WOULD HELP RESOLVE THE COURTROOM-SHARING ISSUE 8, 19 (2000) 
[hereinafter GAO COURTHOUSE CONSTRUCTION (2000)]; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, COURTHOUSE CONSTRUCTION: IMPROVED 5-YEAR PLAN COULD PROMOTE MORE 
INFORMED DECISIONMAKING (1996). A note on nomenclature is in order: The GAO, once 
called the General Accounting Office, is now the General Accountability Office. 
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1997 study defined courtroom usage as “any activity” (including but not limited to 
trials) for any portion of a day384—a measure later noted to be generous in counting 
“lights-on” when courtrooms were in use for a small part of the day.385 With that 
metric, the GAO reported a 54% usage rate of available days in the sixty-five 
courtrooms at the seven locations studied in 1995.386  
The judiciary responded by underscoring the need for courtrooms for arguments 
on motions, sentencing, and some pretrial conferences, as well as the complexity of 
scheduling. Judges regularly reported that courtroom availability was an important 
factor in bringing cases to conclusion. The point was even made in case law; in 
1997, the Third Circuit reversed a conviction because a judge in the Virgin Islands 
had refused to grant a continuance based on the lack of courtroom space to 
accommodate a delay.387 
To document the need for individual courtrooms, the Judicial Conference 
employed the firm of Ernst & Young to conduct its own study.388 That report 
concluded that courtroom sharing would not be feasible in small districts and 
would impose serious scheduling problems in larger ones. That analysis prompted 
criticism from the GAO, which described the report as predicated on a flawed 
mathematical formula (lacking “data, rationale, or analytical basis”).389 Yet another 
                                                                                                                 
 
 384. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COURTHOUSE CONSTRUCTION: BETTER 
COURTROOM USE DATA COULD ENHANCE FACILITY PLANNING AND DECISIONMAKING 8–10 
(1997) [hereinafter GAO COURTHOUSE CONSTRUCTION (1997)]. 
 385. GAO COURTHOUSE CONSTRUCTION (2000), supra note 383, at 8, 18 (disagreeing 
with an analysis by Ernst & Young and noting that the “lights-on measure overstated the 
number of hours judges actually spent in the courtrooms” and that the GAO’s measure was 
“actually a measure of workdays when there was any use at all, even if the events lasted for 
less than an hour”). 
 386. GAO COURTHOUSE CONSTRUCTION (1997), supra note 384, at 9–10. The report also 
noted that in all but two locations, “courtrooms were used more often for nontrial purposes 
than they were for trials.” Id. at 11. To determine the nature of the activity, the researchers 
reviewed the calendars and minute order books of court clerks. Id. at 39. In a related letter 
from Bernard L. Unger, the director of the Government Business Operations Issues for the 
GSA, the GSA detailed the use of courts for “nontrial use only—2 hours or less.” See U.S. 
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COURTHOUSE CONSTRUCTION: INFORMATION ON THE USE OF 
DISTRICT COURTROOMS AT SELECTED LOCATIONS 9 (1997). 
 387. Virgin Islands v. Charleswell, 115 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 1997). The appellate court 
noted that the “unfortunate circumstances of this case illustrate the serious drawbacks of a 
courthouse planning philosophy that encourages sharing of courtrooms by a number of 
judges to promote efficiency in space utilization. . . . When a courtroom is not available as 
the need arises, the result is a loss of efficiency in other phases of judicial administration. . . . 
[E]xperience teaches that the brick and mortar construction expense of building larger 
facilities may be less expensive in the long run than the other costs associated with delay in 
processing cases. The results of coping with an insufficient number of courtrooms 
demonstrates that the old adage of ‘penny wise and pound foolish’ is particularly apt.” Id. at 
175.  
 388. AO ANN. REP. 28 (1999). 
 389. GAO COURTHOUSE CONSTRUCTION (2000), supra note 383, at 8, 16. Ernst &Young 
had designated districts with fewer than five courtrooms in one category and looked at places 
with six to ten courtrooms in another. The GAO commented that 91% of the courthouses fall 
within the category of five or fewer courtrooms. But “about 40 percent of all current, active 
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study, from the CBO, modeled the effects of a reduction in courtroom space based 
on trial rates as of 1995; the CBO concluded that some delays would occur but that, 
depending on the assumptions, even with fewer courtrooms, no one would be using 
them between about 20% to 40% of the time.390 
Congressional inquiries were complemented by concerns from the Executive. 
To the chagrin of the judiciary, on more than one occasion the Executive Branch 
did not forward judicial requests to Congress for buildings.391 By 1997, while 
maintaining its commitment to dedicated courtrooms, the Judicial Conference 
announced a “space cost containment plan” through which it would explore 
whether courtroom sharing was feasible.392 At issue was whether circuits or 
districts might ask senior or visiting judges to share courtrooms.393  
In the fiscal year 2001 budget request, the Executive Branch requested funding 
for seven courthouse construction projects—on a budget assuming two courtrooms 
for every three judges.394 The Judicial Conference objected that the proposal was a 
“direct contradiction” of the judiciary’s policy, “developed after analysis of two 
major studies on courtroom utilization and case management” that had recognized 
“the indispensable need for a courtroom to fulfill the essential judicial 
responsibilities.”395 The Conference “strongly condemned the unilateral efforts” of 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to “impose a courtroom sharing 
policy on the judicial branch, as an unwarranted and inappropriate intrusion into the 
constitutionally mandated independence of the judiciary.”396 
The judiciary also tried to ward off proposed legislation obliging it to submit 
detailed plans to Congress for building projects of a certain value.397 Instead, the 
Conference decided to present its housing needs directly by way of a “formal 
narrative statement” intended “to educate key legislative and executive branch 
decision makers.”398 Making that case, the judiciary returned to the late 1980s 
theme of a housing crisis and described a “judicial space emergency” as impairing 
“the ability of each court to execute its responsibilities . . . by the unavailability of 
space.”399 The Judicial Conference identified certain courts (such as those with 
                                                                                                                 
district judges are located in the remaining 9 percent of the courthouses.” Id. at 19. 
 390. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE ONE-COURTROOM, ONE-JUDGE POLICY: A PRELIMINARY 
REVIEW 12 (2000). 
 391. In 1997, for example, the Office of Management and Budget did not include 
proposed funds for court construction. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 89 (Sept. 1998). 
 392. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 17 (Mar. 1997). 
 393. See, e.g., GAO COURTHOUSE CONSTRUCTION (2000), supra note 383, at 57 app. 
(underscoring the “value of unfettered access to a courtroom and its importance to the fair 
and efficient administration of justice”).  
 394. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 30 (Mar. 2000). 
 395. Id. For further protests, see JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 64–67 (Sept. 2000).  
 396. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 30–31 (Mar. 2000). 
 397. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 71 (Sept./Oct. 2001). 
 398. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 32 (Mar. 2001). 
 399. The General Services Administration’s Fiscal Year 2005 Capital Investment and 
Leasing Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Econ. Dev., Pub. Bldgs., and 
Emergency Mgmt. of the H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 108th Cong. 35 (2004) 
(statement of Judge Jane R. Roth, Chair, Judicial Conference Comm. on Security and 
Facilities). Judge Roth had sounded a similar theme in previous years. As she explained, 
projects for the then-pending “Five-Year Plan are urgently needed . . . and delays only 
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heavy immigration dockets derivative of efforts to close the Southwest border) as 
having such emergencies and requiring funds in light of “intolerable security and 
operational problems.”400 
The other two branches pushed back. The Judicial Conference then imposed its 
own internal two-year moratorium on planning for upgraded projects in order to 
reevaluate the “underlying assumptions” in light of “constrained budgetary 
environments.”401 In 2004, the Conference called on chief circuit judges to cancel 
space requests wherever possible.402 (In 2006, some exemptions from that 
moratorium were authorized.403) In an effort to take the theory of internalizing the 
costs of buildings from the national to the circuit level, the Conference also 
imposed a “rent budget cap” per circuit.404  
In 2005, at the request of the chair of the House subcommittee focused on 
federal building, the FJC undertook yet another study of courtroom utilization.405 
To answer the “ultimate question” of whether judges could “share courtrooms 
without compromising the administration of justice,”406 the FJC looked at 422 
courtrooms in twenty-three districts. When evaluating those facilities, the FJC 
added to the metric of “actual courtroom use” the concept of “latent use,” a term 
                                                                                                                 
exacerbate operational problems.” Courthouse Construction Delays Hurt Judiciary, THIRD 
BRANCH, June 2001, at 2, 2. 
  In 2006, the Conference set forth a definition of a “space emergency” as a building 
that is “severely damaged or . . . has an excessive caseload that impacts its space. The 
Committee on Space and Facilities will examine each emergency situation on a case-by-case 
basis to determine whether to recommend” that the project be declared an emergency. 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 27–28 (Mar. 2006). 
 400. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 37 (Sept. 2003). The effort was to “convey critical 
housing needs” in Southern California and Texas. The courts designated as in need of 
priority funding were those in Los Angeles, California; El Paso, Texas; San Diego, 
California; and Las Cruces, New Mexico. Id. 
 401. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 34–35 (Sept. 2004). 
 402. Id. at 36. 
 403. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 6 (Sept. 2006). 
 404. Id. at 10; see also A Changed Judiciary Still Needs To Save, THIRD BRANCH, Aug. 
2008, at 1 (explaining that “each circuit judicial council now has an allocated rent budget, 
and must decide which projects it can afford”).  
 405. Two FJC documents reported the outcomes. See JAMES C. DUFF, SEC’Y OF THE 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT ON THE USAGE OF FEDERAL DISTRICT 
COURT COURTROOMS (2008) [hereinafter 2008 AO USAGE REPORT] (Duff later served as the 
Director of the Administrative Office); FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE USE OF COURTROOMS IN 
U.S. DISTRICT COURTS: A REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON COURT 
ADMINISTRATION & CASE MANAGEMENT app. 1 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 FJC COURTROOM 
USE STUDY] (reproducing the November 4, 2005 letter from Rep. Bill Shuster, Chairman of 
the Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings and Emergency 
Management of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, to the Hon. Jane 
R. Roth in her capacity as chair of the Judicial Conference Committee on Security and 
Facilities). As that report outlined, Representative Shuster had asked that the study 
document, based on a statistical sampling, how often courts were “actually in use” with 
people there for official functions, that the study be designed with “input from the 
Government Accountability Office,” and that it incorporate “other factors the judiciary 
deemed necessary.” Id. at 7.  
 406. 2008 FJC COURTROOM USE STUDY, supra note 405, at app. 4, at 9. 
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coined to denote time scheduled in a courtroom but subsequently cancelled.407 
Availability rather than actual use was relevant because “a firm trial date and 
availability of a courtroom ‘often’ prompt parties to settle or plead.”408 Further, the 
FJC distinguished among judicial users, separately assessing how much time 
active, senior, and magistrate judges spent in courtrooms.409  
The FJC reported widespread enthusiasm for dedicated courtrooms from the 
judges surveyed as well as from lawyers.410 Moreover, the 2008 study found a 
higher rate of use (69% of work days for district judges) than had earlier studies.411 
On any given day, “50% to 74% of the courtrooms were in use . . . for either actual 
or scheduled events.”412 On the other hand, in the courts where judges shared 
courtrooms, there “were no days on which a courtroom was not available.”413 
While the study was underway, the relevant House subcommittee passed a 
resolution that directed a revision of the U.S. Courts Design Guide to provide, in 
new court construction, “for one courtroom for every two senior judges.”414  
                                                                                                                 
 
 407. Id. at app. 4, at 1. In a questionnaire distributed to District Judges and Magistrate 
Judges, the FJC explained that “[a]ctual courtroom use is fairly straightforward . . . . Some 
have suggested, however, that the availability of a courtroom serves important functions, 
even when the courtroom is not actively being used. This is known as latent use.” Id. at app. 
10, at 13 (emphasis in original). 
  The FJC used a variety of sources of information, including the questionnaire sent to 
all judges, a questionnaire to attorneys, and direct data collection in thirteen districts in two 
“waves” of two different three-month periods. Id. at app. 4, at 3. A total of twenty-three 
districts were analyzed. Id. at app. 4, at 4. Appendix 7 of the 2008 FJC Courtroom Use Study 
detailed the kinds of proceedings coded, ranging from case proceedings conducted by a 
judge to ceremonies, education, set-up or short adjournments, maintenance, and unoccupied 
and usable or not. Id. at app. 7, at 1–3. The survey questionnaire went to more than 1500 
judges; more than 1000 replied, yielding a response rate of 68%. Id. at app. 10, at 1. 
  Courtrooms were, on average, in “actual courtroom use” for 2.9 hours a day if a 
judge was an active judge, id. at 18, and 4.1 hours if “scheduled time” (or latent use) was 
included, id. at 37. Judges spent a great deal of time in chambers, often in conferences. Id. at 
27. In those districts where senior and active judges shared courtrooms, the actual use time 
was somewhat lower, as was the scheduled time. Id. at 47. 
 408. Id. at 42 (stating that 81% of judges believed that this latent use “often” prompted 
settlement). 
 409. Id. at app. 8. 
 410. Id. at 53–54, 60–61; 2008 AO USAGE REPORT, supra note 405, at 8. 
 411. 2008 FJC COURTROOM USE STUDY, supra note 405, at 20–21. 
 412. Id. at 48. 
 413. Id. 
 414. When approving additional appropriations for courthouse construction in San Diego, 
California, the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee resolved that within “one 
year of the date of approval of this Resolution, the Judicial Conference of the United States 
shall amend the U.S. Courts Design Guide to require that each U.S. Courthouse construction 
project provide one courtroom for every two senior judges.” 152 CONG. REC. 15,552 (2006). 
Also mandated were more process and oversight for departures. See id.; see also JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE REPORT 11 (Mar. 2007) (stating that although the resolution stated that the 
Guide was to be altered within a year, the Conference reported in 2007 that its 
subcommittees and the AO were working with the House Committee on the issue). 
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In the summer of 2008, the federal judiciary’s newsletter highlighted efforts 
undertaken to economize. Crediting Chief Justice Rehnquist with identifying the 
need for cost containment,415 the story began: “Over five years ago, the federal 
Judiciary looked into the future and saw its rent projected to top $1.2 billion by 
2009. . . . Massive layoffs of staff seemed inevitable.”416 Instead, as the 2008 
newsletter continued, changes in “planning assumptions” had helped to protect the 
judiciary. The Conference committed itself to some courtroom sharing for senior 
judges and magistrate judges, exploration of “opportunities” for courtroom sharing 
for active district judges on large (ten or more) multijudge courts, and studying 
“courtroom allocation policies” for bankruptcy judges.417  
As then-AO Director James Duff (who had replaced Ralph Meacham) 
explained, those provisions struck “the appropriate balance between the Judiciary’s 
fundamental responsibility of ensuring the fair and efficient administration of 
justice and the general governmental responsibility to be good stewards of the 
taxpayers’ money.”418 But as the judiciary retreated somewhat from its 
“one-courtroom-per-judge” stance, what it got in return was a new way in which to 
calculate the money it paid to the GSA in rent. The revised fee assessments were 
estimated to save the courts some $140 million over the coming two decades.419  
B. The Politics of Buildings, Rights, and Salaries 
This review of the decades from the 1950s through the beginning of the 
twenty-first century demonstrates the judiciary’s success in obtaining congressional 
commitments of jurisdiction and facilities. Along the way, Congress imposed a 
modest degree of supervision on the judiciary’s building plans. Some projects were 
                                                                                                                 
 
 415. A Changed Judiciary Still Needs to Save, THIRD BRANCH, Aug. 2008, at 1, 1.  
 416. Id. 
 417. 2008 AO USAGE REPORT, supra note 405, at 10–11. That Report also noted that, 
while the Judicial Conference had no “formal position” on magistrate judge assignments, it 
had applied the “one-for-one policy” to them. Id. at 10. One concern raised by a former chief 
judge of a circuit about the new approach is that magistrate and bankruptcy judges may have 
the most intense need for ready access to courtrooms. See Letter from Gerald Bard Tjoflat, 
Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, to Judith Resnik 6 
(Jan. 25, 2010) [hereinafter Tjoflat 2010 Letter] (on file with author). 
 418. 2008 AO USAGE REPORT, supra note 405, at 1. 
 419. According to MOA GSA/AO, Feb. 19, 2008, the different methods yielded a rent 
reduction from $47.73 to $39.36 per square foot. See Office of Real Property Asset 
Management, ROI Pricing (Sept. 2006) at 4 (appended to MOA). The estimate in 2008 was 
that the revised method of accounting would, over twenty years, save the judiciary more than 
$140 million. Interview with Ross Eisenman, Assistant Director of the Office of Facilities 
and Security (Dec. 2008); see also A Changed Judiciary Still Needs to Save, THIRD BRANCH 
Aug. 2008, at 1, 2 (stating that the modified rent mechanism also provided “the Judiciary 
with certainty about the amount of rent it will pay for a 20-year period”). 
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cut back,420 and the Judicial Conference stepped up its own monitoring of what had 
been decentralized and delegated decision making.421  
When restating its aspirations in 2006, the judiciary espoused “core values” for 
space and facilities that sounded somewhat more utilitarian than the call in the 
earlier U.S. Courts Design Guide for “solemnity, stability, integrity, rigor, and 
fairness.”422 The revised goals were “availability, function, adequacy, sufficiency, 
cost, and structural security.”423 By 2008, the judiciary acceded to reducing space 
demands by requiring senior judges to share courtrooms and by considering a 
return to the 1970s presumption under Warren Burger that, in large districts, judges 
could share courtrooms. Yet the judiciary’s leadership also took up what Chief 
Justice Rehnquist had sought in 1989—“independent real property authority” to get 
out from under the GSA.424 
Even as some projects were scaled back, a new cycle of building proposals came 
into shape for fiscal years 2008–2012,425 accompanied again by interbranch 
conflicts. In 2009, the judiciary was designated to “receive 80 percent of the $300 
million provided for the construction of federal buildings in the recent stimulus 
legislation package,” with an additional “several hundred million dollars” slated for 
modernization of some “100 court facilities.”426 But by 2010, the GAO was once 
again criticizing courthouse investments; its study prompted the headline: 
“Building Oversize Federal Courts Wastes Millions.”427 The GAO’s review of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 420. See, e.g., Joseph P. Fried, A Bigger Home for the Federal Courts in Brooklyn, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 30, 1999, at B8 (detailing the cutbacks in the project, down from eighteen 
floors to fifteen, from 300 feet to 252 feet, and from twenty-four courtrooms to seventeen).  
 421. The House had required the judiciary to “provide a specific list of each departure” 
from the parameters if costs would be raised, along with a “justification and estimated cost” 
for such departures. The resolution further required GSA to submit a recommendation to the 
relevant committees as to whether to approve departures from the Design Guide. 152 CONG. 
REC. 15,552 (2006); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 27, 32 (Mar. 2007). As the Judicial 
Conference noted, what constituted an “exception” was not always agreed upon by the GSA 
and the AO. Id. at 31.  
 422. 1997 U.S. COURTS DESIGN GUIDE, supra note 271, at 3-9. 
 423. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 24 (Mar. 2006). 
 424. Id. at 25–26. In 2005, the Conference had started to draft a plan to do so. JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE REPORT 40 (Sept. 2005). In 1990, a bill to do so had been introduced to create 
that separation. Judicial Space and Facilities Management Improvement Act of 1989, H.R. 
4178, 101st Cong. (2d Sess. 1990). GSA objected, and the sponsoring congressman urged 
the two agencies to develop a compromise. See Judicial Space and Facilities Management 
Improvement Act of 1990, S. 2837, 101st Cong. (2d Sess. 1990) (introduced by Senator 
Moynihan to accomplish the same end). The Post Office’s authority to determine and 
provide for its building needs is set forth in 39 U.S.C. § 404(a)(3) (2006). 
 425. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 37 (Sept. 2007). Thirteen projects were then 
approved. Id. Ten space requests were approved in March of 2007. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
REPORT 31 (Mar. 2007). 
 426. Judiciary’s Projects Part of Stimulus Package, THIRD BRANCH, Apr. 2009, at 7, 7. 
The funding came from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. Id.  
 427. Matthew Cella, Building Oversize Federal Courts Wastes Millions: Maintenance 
Adds to Costs, WASH. TIMES (May 25, 2010), http://www.washingtontimes.com/ 
news/2010/may/25/federal-building-oversize-courts-wastes-millions/. 
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thirty-three projects completed since 2000 tallied 3.56 million square feet of “extra” 
space428 due to the lack of courtroom sharing and overestimates of the number of 
judges to be appointed.429 Eleanor Holmes Norton, the Democratic Representative 
from the District of Columbia, blamed the GSA for attending more to its users than 
to “the American Taxpayer,” as she argued against permissive approaches to 
design.430 Hank Johnson, her colleague in the House and a Democrat representing a 
district in Georgia, disagreed; he convened another hearing a few months later that 
focused instead on the need for more and more secure federal courthouses.431  
The AO and the GSA offered an interrelated defense in their shared quest for 
first-rate federal architecture.432 The Commissioner of the GSA, Robert Peck, and 
the Chair of the Judicial Conference Committee on Space and Facilities, Michael 
Ponsor, disputed the methodology, accuracy, presentation, and conclusions of the 
GAO study.433 They argued that, given the politics involved in the creation of new 
judgeships and the amount of time needed for construction, projections had been 
reasonable.434 Further, they focused on the importance of “safe” and “adequate 
space” for users, so as to “ensure the effective and efficient delivery of justice.”435 
                                                                                                                 
 
 428. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-753T, FEDERAL COURTHOUSE 
CONSTRUCTION: PRELIMINARY RESULTS SHOW BETTER PLANNING, OVERSIGHT, AND 
COURTROOM SHARING COULD HELP CONTROL FUTURE COSTS 6 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 
COURTHOUSE CONSTRUCTION REPORT]. The report noted that twenty-seven of the thirty-three 
courts analyzed exceeded “their congressionally authorized size” and fifteen did so by ten or 
more percent. Id. at 8–9 (also noting that six were smaller than authorized). 
  The buildings that the GAO considered included the Eagleton Courthouse in St. 
Louis, where the GAO reported that “the building common and other space . . . is 77 percent 
larger than planned, and the courthouse has an efficiency of 56 percent.” Id. at 14. That 
building had “two empty elevator shafts,” not in use. Id. The GAO also noted that the 
Eastern District of Missouri, where that courthouse was situated, had 3182 filings in 1994 
and had 3241 filings in 2008. Id. at 20. 
 429. Id. at 18 fig.4. Specifically, the GAO estimated that some 946,000 square feet of 
extra space was attributable to the failure to adopt a courtroom-sharing policy, while an 
additional 887,000 square feet was attributable to judicial overestimates of authorized 
judgeships. Id.  
 430. 2010 Eliminating Waste and Managing Space in Fed. Courthouses, supra note 11, 
at 58–62 (statement of Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton, Chair, Subcomm. on Econ. Dev’t, Pub. 
Bldgs., and Emergency Mgmt.); see also Cella, supra note 427 (quoting Norton).  
 431. See 2010 Courtroom Use: Access to Justice, supra note 11. 
 432. Id. at 29–43 (statement of Judge Michael A. Ponsor, Chair, Comm. on Space and 
Facilities); id. at 44–49 (statement of Robert A. Peck, Comm’r, Pub. Bldgs. Serv., U.S. Gen. 
Servs. Admin.); 2010 Eliminating Waste and Managing Space in Fed. Courthouses, supra 
note 11, at 116 (statement of Robert A. Peck, Comm’r, Pub. Bldgs. Serv., U.S. Gen. Servs. 
Admin.); id. at 123 (statement of Judge Michael A. Ponsor, Chair, Judicial Conference of the 
U.S. Comm. on Space and Facilities).  
 433. See Judiciary Counters GAO’s Courthouse Assessment, THIRD BRANCH, June 2010, 
at 1, 1–2. 
 434. 2010 Eliminating Waste and Managing Space in Fed. Courthouses, supra note 11, 
at 117 (statement of Robert A. Peck, Comm’r, Pub. Bldgs. Serv., U.S. Gen. Servs. Admin.); 
id. at 123 (statement of Judge Michael A. Ponsor, Chair, Judicial Conference of the U.S. 
Comm. on Space and Facilities). 
 435. Participants in Judicial Process Entitled to Safe Facility with Adequate Space, 
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In the fall of 2010, the judiciary put into its 2011 fiscal funding request to Congress 
a “special plea for inclusion of $92 million for the Los Angeles courthouse 
project,” its “top space priority” that was “much-needed” for “one of the busiest 
courts in the country.”436 
When introducing this Lecture, I pointed to a tension between the reluctance of 
Chief Justice Rehnquist in his jurisprudence and speeches to license federal court 
power and the expansion, during his tenure, of federal administrative power 
measured in terms of staff, research, rule making, and courthouses. One 
explanation of that divergence comes from an understanding of how differently 
situated within the court infrastructure Rehnquist was as compared to Chief Justice 
Taft. Even as Taft campaigned for a standing judicial conference, he enjoyed the 
freedom of being unencumbered by other judges with bureaucratic authority, and 
he was relatively free to pursue his own agendas. In contrast, Rehnquist sat at the 
pinnacle of a structure that enabled a variety of jurists and administrators leadership 
roles by which to affect “the judiciary’s” goals. Scholars of Rehnquist describe him 
as a delegator, moving business rapidly and promoting larger roles for various 
committees, the members of which he appointed.437 As some lower court judges 
have argued, while Rehnquist was supportive of their efforts, it was they who 
labored (with love) for various districts to obtain funds for—and to make special—
the courthouses they succeeded in planning.438  
Underscoring the role played by lower court judges in pressing for expanded 
facilities serves also as a reminder of the jurisprudential divisions within “the 
federal courts.” As Vicki Jackson has pointed out, during the Rehnquist Chief 
Justiceship, the Court overturned rulings by lower court judges who had welcomed 
claimants and shaped remedies in response.439 Many lower court judges—including 
some who were spearheading building projects—had both an acute understanding 
of the needs of litigants and a more robust conception of federal court authority 
than did Rehnquist. Their efforts at building mirrored their jurisprudential 
commitments to adjudication as an important public act, and to courts as service 
providers. Some members of the Supreme Court shared that approach. Justice 
Stevens’ majority opinion in Tennessee v. Lane made the point about courts being 
                                                                                                                 
THIRD BRANCH, Oct. 2010, at 1, 5 (quoting the Hon. Michael Ponsor).  
 436. Judiciary Makes Appeal on Fiscal Year 2011 Funding, THIRD BRANCH, Nov. 2010, 
at 2, 3. 
 437. Wheeler, supra note 24, at 117–18. Wheeler also noted that many appointed were 
also named judges when the Republican Party was in charge. Wheeler argued the utility of 
such appointments from a pragmatic political point of view, as the committees’ tasks were 
often to seek resources from Congress. Id. 
 438. An example of the details provided by judges of special needs comes from 2010 
Courtroom Use: Access to Justice, supra note 11, at 49–53 (statement of Robert James 
Conrad, Jr., Chief U.S. District J., W.D.N.C.) (discussing the facilities of the U.S. District 
Court for the Western District of North Carolina, housed with various other federal offices in 
a building originally constructed in 1915 to house the Charlotte Post Office, and the 
problems of crowded facilities and poor security); Tjoflat 2010 Letter, supra note 417, at 4; 
see also Participants in Judicial Process Entitled to Safe Facility with Adequate Space, 
supra note 435, at 2. 
 439. See Vicki C. Jackson, Congressional Control of Jurisdiction and the Future of the 
Federal Courts—Opposition, Agreement, and Hierarchy, 86 GEO. L.J. 2445, 2452–55 
(1998). 
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available in the context of individuals with disabilities.440 Justice Breyer’s comment 
about the goals for the Boston Courthouse made a parallel claim:  
A court, unlike a government agency, deals not with the public en 
masse but with the individual citizen who appears before it. . . . In this 
modern age, when people fear government’s dehumanizing tendencies, 
it is particularly important to emphasize that the judicial branch of 
government treats each citizen before it not as a member of a group but 
as a separate human being with a right to call upon the court’s 
considerable resources to resolve his or her specific dispute with 
whatever effort that may take.441 
Chief Justice Rehnquist chaired the Judicial Conference and, working with AO 
Director Ralph Meacham, created committees that forwarded some of his interest in 
limiting access to the federal courts (such as the charter to an ad hoc committee 
examining the Violence Against Women Act). But Rehnquist was also a part of a 
bureaucracy able to generate agendas. Judges from around the country sought his 
support for building improvements. Widespread concerns stemming from 
nonsecure federal facilities and the demands of the criminal docket, coupled with 
politicians open to constituent desires for local federal buildings, garnered funds for 
construction—even as individual judges bore the brunt of heated attacks, 
nominations and new judgeship lines were held up by partisan strategic interaction, 
and litigation was decried as a field day for unscrupulous trial lawyers.  
Thus, just as it is important to disaggregate the judiciary when identifying 
administrative agendas and jurisprudential approaches, it is also important to 
disaggregate the different kinds of political successes judges have been able to 
achieve. To the ongoing frustration of the judiciary’s leadership, support for 
buildings has not been complemented by raises in pay. Throughout the twentieth 
century, federal judges repeatedly complained that their remuneration was too low. 
Focusing on the same thirty years that spawned the remarkable tripling of its 
facilities, judges’ “real” dollar income declined.442 By the early part of the 
twenty-first century, a special commission chaired by Paul Volcker, the former 
head of the Federal Reserve, documented the economic loss in judicial pay.443 Yet 
numerous appeals by Chief Justice Rehnquist444 were not successful, as Congress 
repeatedly refused to provide raises and sometimes withheld cost-of-living 
increases.  
At the end of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s tenure, life-tenured appellate judges 
earned about $170,000 a year and district judges about $160,000 a year.445 While 
                                                                                                                 
 
 440. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533 (2004); see also supra notes 371–78. 
 441. Breyer, supra note 288, at 11; see also Woodlock, Drawing Meaning, supra note 
288, at 155–57. 
 442. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE PUB. SERV., URGENT BUSINESS FOR AMERICA: REVITALIZING 
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 23 (2003). Federal judicial salaries lost 
24% of their purchasing power between 1969 and 2003. Id. at 22. 
 443. Id. at v. 
 444. See AO ANN. REP. 2 (2002); AO ANN. REP. 6 (2003). 
 445. In 2005, federal appellate judges earned $171,800, and district court judges earned 
$162,100. Judicial Salaries: U.S. Court of Appeals Judges, FED. JUD. CENTER, 
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better compensated than many state judges, federal judges saw their former law 
clerks, hired as associates by law firms, making more money. To capture the 
problem, the judiciary switched its nomenclature from seeking “pay raises” to 
pressing for “salary restoration.”446  
Following in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s footsteps, in January of 2006, Chief 
Justice Roberts devoted a good part of his first year-end annual address to buildings 
and salaries. He complained that escalating rents for courthouses were a “drain” on 
judicial resources, needed for other activities “for the courts to fulfill their vital 
mission.”447 Chief Justice Roberts’s second year-end address was devoted entirely 
to “the failure to raise judicial pay.”448 Chief Justice Roberts argued that the 
payment levels “threaten[ed] to undermine the strength and independence of the 
federal judiciary.”449 The following year, Chief Justice Roberts committed to 
continuing “Chief Justice Rehnquist’s twenty-year pursuit of equitable salaries for 
federal judges.”450 Yet, by 2010, as the country became focused on debt and fiscal 
                                                                                                                 
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/js_2.html; Judicial Salaries: U.S. District Court 
Judges, FED. JUD. CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/js_3.html. 
 446. AO ANN. REP. 4–5 (2007). 
 447. JOHN ROBERTS, 2005 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 3 (2006). 
 448. JOHN ROBERTS, 2006 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 1–3 (2007) 
(discussing that federal district judges are now paid “about half” of what deans and senior 
law professors make (emphasis omitted)). 
 449. Id. at 1; see also Federal Judicial Compensation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 7, 
66 (2007), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/110th/34757.pdf 
(testimony of Supreme Court Justices Stephen Breyer and Samuel Alito). See generally 
James E. Pfander, Judicial Compensation and the Definition of Judicial Power in the Early 
Republic, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2008).  
  Parallel concerns came from state courts. In 2008 the chief judge of the New York 
state system filed a lawsuit against the Speaker of the New York State Assembly and the 
governor; the lawsuit argued that the failure to raise judges’ salaries since 1999 constituted a 
violation of separation of powers. A motion to dismiss was denied. Maron v. Silver, 925 
N.E.2d 899 (N.Y. 2010). In December of 2010, the New York State Legislature passed a bill 
establishing an independent commission with authority to set judicial salaries, a move 
expected to result in increased pay. William Glaberson, Judges May Get First Raises in 
Years After Legislature Backs Panel to Set Their Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2010, at A27. 
 450. JOHN ROBERTS, 2007 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 6 (2008). That 
speech focused on the importance of judicial integrity (and the new procedures for bringing 
complaints against federal judges) and on interbranch communications. Id. The 2008 report 
addressed how the “dedicated men and women in the Judiciary” were seeking to “control the 
costs of administering justice.” JOHN ROBERTS, 2008 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIARY 3 (2009). Examples included limits on growth in space and in personnel, 
technological efficiency, and limiting the budget of the Supreme Court itself, whose building 
was also under renovation. Further, although he was “tired of saying it,” he again made the 
“plea” for better compensation. Id. at 7. In January of 2009, the chief justice limited his 
report to a page, focusing on “what is essential: The courts are operating soundly.” JOHN 
ROBERTS, 2009 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 1 (2010). Linda Greenhouse 
reported that this decision to be largely silent was, as the chief justice himself noted, a break 
with the tradition begun in 1970 by Chief Justice Warren Burger. Linda Greenhouse, Calling 
John Roberts, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (Oct. 21, 2010, 9:44 PM), http://opinionator. 
blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/21/calling-john-roberts/. 
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austerity became the byword, Chief Justice Roberts reported instead on how the 
judiciary could, through strategic planning, join in searching for cost savings and 
efficiency.451 But the concerns about judicial budgets needs to be put into the 
context of the budgetary successes achieved. Even with economic retrenchment, the 
federal judiciary has over the last decade expanded and maintained its budgetary 
allocations. 
The judiciary’s capacity to obtain additional resources during the past three 
decades could be read as a remarkable victory for the judiciary, which developed 
the political acumen to obtain funds on many fronts. Alternatively, one could look 
at the interbranch disputes detailed above as more bureaucratic than ideological. 
While agency turf battles laced the decades, Congress and the executive have 
repeatedly equipped the federal court system and instantiated the national identity 
through court facilities.  
The history I have traced thus provides a counternarrative to the doctrinal focus 
on constitutional interpretations, such as the Commerce Clause and Eleventh and 
Fourteenth Amendments decisions sketched above, in which the Court overrides 
Congress. This context puts those debates at the margin of the larger agreement to 
vest enormous authority and resources in federal courts. As one long-time observer 
and former chief judge of a circuit explained, in “the end, . . . the authorization for 
courthouse construction has been the product of compromises between the 
Judiciary, GSA, and Congress, salted with considerable amounts of lobbying (of 
Congress) by the judges and others in the local community.”452  
VI. JUDICIAL POWERS: INDIVIDUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL, FEDERAL AND STATE  
A. The Complex Legacies of Taft, Warren, and Rehnquist:  
Large Images and Small Volume 
The history that I have excavated makes plain that, as the national government 
gained resources and ambitions, Congress repeatedly authorized buildings to serve 
as icons of federal authority. What has changed—but only in the last century—is 
the function of the buildings designated for that symbolism. Custom Houses and 
the U.S. Post Offices once provided the “federal presence,” as illustrated by the 
1861 U.S. Custom House in Galveston, Texas, shown in figure 32.  
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 451. JOHN ROBERTS, 2010 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 2–6 (2011). In 
addition, the chief justice called for Congress to fill vacancies. Id. at 7; see also Greenhouse, 
supra note 450.  
 452. Tjoflat 2010 Letter, supra note 417, at 5–6. 
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Figure 32: United States Custom House, Galveston, Texas. Supervising Architect: Ammi B.
Young, 1861; converted for use as a federal courthouse in 1917.
 
Image reproduced courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration. 
 
As the national judicial power expanded under Chief Justices Taft and Warren, 
the cultural and political import of courts grew such that, by the Rehnquist era, the 
demand curve for federal adjudication seemed unrelenting and more buildings the 
obvious response. Given that government spending could be (and is) also devoted 
to prisons, border stations, and other facilities, devotees of the rule of law should 
take pride in the political commitment made to the federal judiciary that its 
jurisdiction, judges, staff, and buildings represent. Appreciation of the saliency of 
that investment comes in part through underscoring its disproportionality, for the 
federal courts are both a tiny fraction of the federal footprint and of the judicial 
services offered in the United States.  
The inventory of federal buildings, upwards of 400,000 facilities, ranges from 
visitor centers and fish hatcheries to space labs.453 Today’s 800 federal court 
facilities are but a small subset, measured either by the number of facilities or their 
square feet. To be specific, by 2006, the GSA oversaw “40 percent of Federal 
workspace, adding up to over 342 million square feet” (about half owned and half 
leased), resulting in what the GSA describes as its supervision of the “largest office 
real estate portfolio in the world.”454  
                                                                                                                 
 
 453. CRAIG, supra note 48, at 440. As of then, another 50,000 buildings were leased in 
the United States, and many more installations were outside the country. By 1974, “[d]irect 
federal public works spending . . . was about $5 billion annually.” Id.  
 454. GSA MODERNISM, supra note 188, at 16. By 2008, the government footprint had 
grown to 342 million square feet of owned or leased space, housing the more than one 
million federal employees. Forty-nine percent of that space was leased from the private 
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Similarly, however one charts the workload of the federal courts, it is dwarfed 
by other adjudicatory institutions now operating (thanks in part to Taft and Warren) 
in the shadow of the federal courts. The number of judges residing in federal 
courthouses is around 2000, including the constitutional Article III judiciary and 
the statutory magistrate and bankruptcy judges, as well as those who have taken 
senior status. In contrast, the federal agencies house some 5000 administrative law 
judges and hearing officers. State courts are the homes of more than 30,000 judges 
working in tens of thousands of buildings.455  
Turn from the number of jurists to claimants. At the outset, I charted federal 
filing rates of about 325,000–350,000 civil and criminal cases over the last several 
years, with more than a million bankruptcy petitions.456 Caseloads per district court 
judgeship average between 350–500 cases annually.457 In contrast, each year the 
Social Security Administration receives more than a half-million claimants 
contesting benefits,458 and as of 2008, the 238 immigration judges averaged more 
than 1200 cases each year.459 
Consider the volume of evidentiary hearings by comparing a snapshot from 
2001. In that year, some 100,000 evidentiary proceedings—in which district, 
magistrate, or bankruptcy judges received testimony of any kind (on motions as 
well as trials)—took place before federal judges sitting inside the hundreds of 
federal courthouses around the United States.460 In contrast, an estimated 700,000 
evidentiary proceedings took place in the four federal agencies with the higher 
volume of adjudication.461  
Yet all of the federal adjudication—in courts and in agencies—is but a small 
fraction of activities in the state courts, as shown at the outset in figure 6, where the 
almost forty million cases filed in state courts in 2001 towered over the federal 
                                                                                                                 
sector. WELLBORN, supra note 189, at 1–2.  
 455. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, STATE COURT 
CASELOAD STATISTICS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2008 STATE COURT CASELOADS 37 (2010).  
 456. In 2010, bankruptcy petitions rose to almost 1.6 million. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE 
U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF 
THE DIRECTOR 292 tbl.F (2011). 
 457. As of 2010, weighted filings were on average 490 per judge, of which 372 were civil 
filings. See id. at 26–28. 
 458. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY 
BULLETIN tbl.2.F8 (2010), available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/ 
supplement/2010/2f8-2f11.html. 
 459. Marcia Coyle, Immigration Judges Seek Article I Status; Driving Force Behind 
Movement to Get Out from Under DOJ Is the Need to Ensure Independent Decision-Making, 
NAT’L L.J., Aug. 10, 2009, at 13; see also Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & 
Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
295 (2007). 
 460. The sources for this calculation are detailed in Judith Resnik, Migrating, Morphing, 
and Vanishing: The Empirical and Normative Puzzles of Declining Trial Rates in Courts, 1 
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 783 (2004) [hereinafter Resnik, Migrating]; see also Natalie Ram 
& Bertrall Ross, Analyzing Federal Administrative Adjudication (June 6, 2006) 
(unpublished paper) (on file with author).  
 461. Resnik, Migrating, supra note 460, at 800 fig.2. Those agencies were the Social 
Security Administration, the Veterans Administration, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, and the Immigration Court. For details of these data, see id. at 798–811.  
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filings, bankruptcy included. State court chief justices and administrators report 
acute problems dealing with this volume.462 California alone has more than 450 
buildings with trial facilities,463 and 4.3 million people were tallied in 2009 as 
pursuing their rights in those courts without lawyers.464 That state’s Supreme Court 
handles about 10,000 cases yearly, and justices consider about 250 matters each 
week.465 In New York, 2.3 million litigants appeared in 2010 without a lawyer; that 
number includes almost all tenants facing evictions, most consumer credit debtors, 
and 95% of parents in child support matters.466 As of 2009, some 42,000 people 
were entering Massachusetts’s courts daily, as budgets necessitated staff cuts of 
about 10%.467  
Keeping their doors open is a problem for state courts. In New Hampshire in 
2009, civil jury trials were suspended because of a lack of funds. In Maine, clerks’ 
offices closed at noon on Wednesdays because of costs. In 2009, Margaret 
Marshall, then-chief justice of the Massachusetts courts system, warned that state 
courts were at risk; like other important institutions, they were not “too big to fail” 
and hence also needed federal support as did other industries and infrastructure 
services.468  
Placing federal courthouse construction in the contexts of other national 
construction and of other sites of adjudication opens up different ways to reason 
about the political decisions to feature federal courthouses as the nation’s signature 
structures. A first is appreciation of how the confluence of twentieth-century 
activities, in which Taft, Warren, and Rehnquist were central, succeeded in 
inscribing the idea of federal law and adjudication as foundational to national 
                                                                                                                 
 
 462. See Am. Judicature Soc’y, Editorial, An Impending Crisis in State Court Funding, 
92 JUDICATURE 52 (2008). 
 463. See Ray McDevitt, Introduction to COURTHOUSES OF CALIFORNIA: AN ILLUSTRATED 
HISTORY, at xvii (Ray McDevitt ed., 2001). 
 464. This information comes from materials submitted in support of the provision of 
legal services to some indigent civil litigants. See infra note 549 and accompanying text. See 
Assemb. B. No. 590, 2009–2010 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009). See generally Gillian K. Hadfield, 
Higher Demand, Lower Supply? A Comparative Assessment of the Legal Resource 
Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 129 (2010). 
 465. Brief for California Attorneys for Criminal Justice & the California Academy of 
Appellate Lawyers as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 3, Harrington v. Richter, 
131 S. Ct. 770 (2011) (No. 09-587); see also Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 784. 
 466. JONATHAN LIPPMAN, STATE OF THE JUDICIARY 2011: PURSUING JUSTICE 4 
(2011), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/CTAPPS/news/SOJ-2011.pdf; see also S. 
Res. 6368, Assemb. Res. 1621, 2010 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2010) (applauding the 
Chief Judge’s efforts and requesting annual reports of findings, work, and recommendations 
of the Task Force to Expand Access to Civil Legal Services in New York). 
 467. Margaret H. Marshall, Chief Justice, Supreme Judicial Court, Commonwealth of 
Mass., Testimony Before Joint Committee on Ways and Means 1–2 (Mar. 1, 2010), 
available at http://www.mass.gov/courts/fy2011-marshall-testimony.pdf. That number did 
not include staff or jurors. Id. 
 468. See Margaret H. Marshall, Chief Justice, Supreme Judicial Court, Commonwealth of 
Mass., The Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture, New York City Bar Ass’n, At the Tipping Point: 
State Courts and the Balance of Power (Nov. 10, 2009), available at 
http://www.abcny.org/pdf/Cardozo_post_final.pdf. 
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identity and well-being.469 New and renovated courthouses thus demonstrated the 
prestige and power of the federal judiciary, richer on various measures (fewer 
cases, more staff, larger facilities, and often better salaries and pensions) than its 
state counterparts. The federal government’s presence is marked by courthouse 
buildings—rather than legislative offices in each district or executive agency 
facilities for services such as social security. The decision to build on a large scale 
pays tribute to the peculiar contours of courts, which serve as the local outposts of 
the one branch of the federal government that is required to respond to all 
individuals who file claims.  
Spectacular buildings were facilitated by congressional earmarking of certain 
funds for specific projects. Court construction helped to enhance the stature of 
members in Congress in their home districts, and appreciation for this instrumental 
facet of courthouse construction helps to solve the puzzle about why, as noted, the 
federal government has been willing to support buildings while judicial salaries 
declined in “real” dollar value as the buildings rose. Building contracts bring work 
to an area and, in an era of naming federal buildings after politicians, recognition to 
the individuals responsible for securing those contracts. West Virginia has more 
than one “Robert C. Byrd Federal Building & U.S. Courthouse,”470 and the 
relatively small state of Arkansas, with a population of 2.91 million, has eight 
federal courthouses.471  
                                                                                                                 
 
 469. As architects involved in courthouse construction put it, federal courthouses 
provided “[v]isible expression of this third branch of government as separate from the 
legislative and executive branches.” Jordan Gruzen, Cathy Daskalakis & Peter Krasnow, The 
Geometry of a Courthouse Design, in CELEBRATING THE COURTHOUSE, supra note 206, at 83, 
83; see also GEYH, supra note 15. 
 470. West Virginia Federal Buildings, U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., http://www.gsa.gov/ 
portal/content/105014 (listing Robert C. Byrd Federal Building & U.S. Courthouses in both 
Beckley and Charleston, West Virginia). The Beckley facility opened in 1999. Robert C. 
Byrd United States Courthouse and Federal Building, ROBERT A.M. STERN ARCHITECTS, 
http://www.ramsa.com/project.aspx?id=17. The Charleston facility opened in 1998. George 
Hohmann, Byrd Gave Resources to His State Until the End; Every Region of W. Va. Was 
Aided by Funds that the Senator Had Secured, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, June 29, 2010, at 
P6A. 
 471. The population of Arkansas in 2010 was 2,915,918. State & Country Quick Facts: 
Arkansas, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/05000.html. 
Arkansas’s federal courthouses are located at (1) the U.S. Post Office and Courthouse in El 
Dorado; (2) the John Paul Hammerschmidt Federal Building in Fayetteville; (3) the Judge 
Isaac C. Parker Federal Building in Fort Smith (built in 1937, and formerly known as the 
Fort Smith U.S. Post Office and Courthouse, Judge Isaac C. Parker Federal Building and 
Courthouse, U.S. GEN. SERVICES ADMIN., http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/101661); (4) 
the U.S. Post Office and Courthouse in Hot Springs; (5) the Federal Building in Jonesboro; 
(6) the Richard Sheppard Arnold U.S. Courthouse in Little Rock (originally built in 1881 
and formerly known as the Little Rock Old Post Office and Courthouse, Little Rock Old Post 
Office and Courthouse, U.S. GEN. SERVICES ADMIN., http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/ 
101142); (7) the George Howard, Jr. Federal Building and U.S. Courthouse in Pine Bluff 
(built in 1966 and recently renamed in honor of the late U.S. District Judge George Howard 
Jr., the first African American to serve as a federal judge in Arkansas and to serve as a 
justice on the Arkansas Supreme Court, George Howard, Jr. Federal Building and U.S. 
Courthouse, U.S. GEN. SERVICES ADMIN., http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/101746); and 
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But because other federal buildings can also be a source of revenue for 
localities, more than the political economy of members of Congress is needed to 
explain why federal courthouses became the designer buildings of the federal 
government during the Rehnquist era. The cultural capital of adjudication was 
reflected and shaped by the three chief justices on which I have focused, who 
deployed remarkable administrative, strategic, and pragmatic skills as they 
contributed to building the identity of the federal courts, even as the three did not 
share views about why and how lower court judges should be deployed. And, of 
course, Taft, Warren, and Rehnquist were each the beneficiaries of their own eras, 
for their aspirations intersected with a confluence of political, economic, and social 
trends that helped these men entrench their visions.472 
William Howard Taft’s “temple,” disdained by some of his Supreme Court 
colleagues for its “chilly opulence” and its bombastic pretentions,473 has come to 
provide a national icon, supporting what psychologists might call a “schema,” 
marking the centrality of the federal courts to the country’s function. Despite what 
architectural critic Paul Spencer Byard explained to have been Cass Gilbert’s 
problem—“that modernists were on to something very important . . . that the world 
had had enough of pomp and papering over”474—the building soon became 
“officially old” and admired.475 Although the Supreme Court itself sits to hear oral 
arguments but a few days a month for only some months of the year, its building is 
a major tourist destination. Before 9/11, more than 850,000 visitors came each 
year; by 2007, the number was at about 300,000 plus more than twelve million hits 
to its internet site.476 
Taft’s brilliance helped to turn the Court into the object of national attention. 
Before the 1920s, the Supreme Court, like state courts, dealt with a large number of 
appeals. Through obtaining license from Congress for the Court to pick its cases, 
the Court was able to distinguish itself from these other appellate review bodies. 
Once the Court gained control over case selection, it also gained the ability to 
complete the work it set out to do. By Warren’s time, the Court rarely held cases 
over for another term; Burger and then Rehnquist solidified that practice by 
insisting that all opinions be filed before the Court recessed for the summer. Thus 
the Court continues to perform its own competence; it is the one branch of the 
                                                                                                                 
(8) the U.S. Courthouse and Post Office Building in Texarkana. See generally Court 
Locator, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/ court_locator/CourtLocatorSearch.aspx? 
city&zip&state=AR (listing federal court facilities by state). 
 472. See generally Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, Lecture Two: The Civil 
Rights Revolution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1757–93 (2007). 
 473. Geoffrey Blodgett, The Politics of Public Architecture, in CASS GILBERT, LIFE AND 
WORK: ARCHITECT OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 62, 72 (Barbara S. Christen & Steven Flanders 
eds., 2001). 
 474. Paul Spencer Byard, Representing American Justice: The United States Supreme 
Court, in CASS GILBERT, LIFE AND WORK: ARCHITECT OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, supra note 
473, at 272, 283. 
 475. Id. at 287. 
 476. Financial Services and General Government Appropriations for 2008: Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Servs. and Gen. Gov’t of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 
110th Cong. 18 (2007) (statement of Justice Anthony Kennedy). 
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federal government in which individuals or entities petitioning for a response are 
guaranteed answers (usually certiorari denied) every time a response is requested. 
The Court’s power to pick and decide cases makes it attractively functional and 
has permitted it—and others—to identify its workload as uniquely “important.” As 
that impression took root, so did the cultural capital of the federal courts. 
Illustrative is the phrase, “don’t make a federal case” out of it, which entered the 
lexicon in the 1940s and 1950s as an admonishment not to turn a minor injury into 
a major affront477 and as evidence of the aura ascribed to the federal courts more 
generally. 
Earl Warren’s aspirations for using the Supreme Court portals—and the doors of 
the lower federal courts—to respond to claims of injustice solidified an 
understanding of the centrality of federal adjudication, even as some objected to the 
remedies imposed. The Warren Court has been accused of being “lawless” as well 
as praised for providing a “sorely needed moral dimension to American 
government,”478 and for the solicitude paid to the roles of states.479 But whether 
seen as invasive or temperate, the Warren Court’s insistence on speaking to the 
questions of segregation, voters’ rights, criminal defendants, and the scope of the 
First Amendment shaped an appreciation for the role federal courts can play.480 
                                                                                                                 
 
 477. One commentator located that phrase in comic exchanges of the 1940s. See Barry 
Popik, “Make a Federal Case (Out of It),” BARRYPOPIK.COM (Dec. 28, 2008), 
http://www.barrypopik.com/index.php/new_york_city/entry/make_a_federal_case_out_of_it
/. Thanks to Fred Shapiro for pointing me to this source. Others have dated it from 1950. A 
review of decisions reported in commercial databases identified the phrase in opinions as of 
the 1960s. For example, a judge in Florida commented that a “person who suffers a major 
upset over a minor grievance is admonished not to ‘make a federal case out of it.’” See 
Reynolds v. State, 224 So. 2d 769, 769 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (upholding a prisoner’s 
claim of access to Florida’s post-conviction process to review a conviction allegedly 
obtained in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)); see also Resnik, Trial 
as Error, supra note 319, at 972–82 (discussing the ways in which the federal judicial 
leadership sought to shape identity through distinctions that elaborated the importance of 
federal, as contrasted with state, cases). 
 478. Vince Blasi, A Requiem for the Warren Court, 48 TEX. L. REV. 608, 621 (1970). 
Blasi saw the Court’s contribution as providing inspiration to young lawyers about what 
their work could achieve. See id. at 621–23. 
 479. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, The Early Hours of the Post–World War II Model of 
Constitutional Federalism: The Warren Court and the World, in EARL WARREN AND THE 
WARREN COURT, supra note 22, at 137, 181–82. 
 480. Earl Warren’s tenure as chief spokesperson entails more complexity, for his was 
also the era when the Judicial Conference first articulated opposition to congressional 
jurisdictional grants. See Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note 319, at 976–80. For example, in 
1954, the Conference reviewed a proposal to put unfair labor practice cases directly into 
federal courts. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 8 (Sept. 1959). That proposal was met 
with the comment that to do so would overburden the federal docket by enlarging “the 
jurisdiction of the district courts to embrace litigation of controversies of a type and 
character which the district courts are not organized or equipped to adjudicate and for which 
there appears [to be] no historical precedent.” Id. at 8; see also Resnik, Trial as Error, supra 
note 319, at 976–77. That position pioneered several other instances in which the Conference 
objected to legislative expansion of its jurisdiction. But the Conference’s responses varied 
depending on the proposed legislation. For example, in the 1960s, when Congress proposed 
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While no construction campaign is associated with Warren, his hallmark is the 
figurative opening of the legal doors of the federal courts.481  
A biographer of Warren credits him with shaping exchanges at the Supreme 
Court’s weekly case conferences to engender efficient discussions.482 Rehnquist is 
well known for his style of court management, described as limiting discussion to 
complete the docket on schedule. Yet Rehnquist ought also to be understood as 
having opened courthouse doors, in the literal sense. Even when skeptical of, if not 
hostile to, the reach of federal court authority, Rehnquist supported those with 
whom he worked in securing the significant physical presence of the courts.  
Morton Horowitz has described the great contribution of the Warren Court as 
rediscovering the “inseparable connection between political culture and political 
equality,” and thereby “transforming the cultural premises of American 
liberalism.”483 As has become clear in the last decade, the infusion of the country 
with constitutional awareness cannot be equated with liberalism, for “constitutional 
conservatism” has come to the fore.484 Whether seeking progressive or conservative 
policies, popular discourse is replete with the connection between courts, the 
Constitution, and the polity.485 From across the political spectrum, advocates 
embrace constitutionalism, and that discourse has prompted many constitutional 
scholars to seek to understand the nature of the “faith,” “loyalty,” and “fidelity” 
inspired.486  
What I turn to below is how the Warren Court—and the social movements that 
produced it—transformed not only the political imagination of the polity but also 
the “cultural premises” of what a court itself entails. Many features of adjudication, 
assumed today to be intrinsic facets of courts, have been relatively recently 
acquired. 
                                                                                                                 
new civil rights legislation, the Judicial Conference deferred to Congress, for such 
“questions of policy” were for Congress to decide. Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note 319, at 
978 & nn.211–12 (citing 1964 archival records of the Judicial Conference). A similar 
discussion accompanied questions about many other topics, such as the jurisdictional 
authority of a proposed Court of Veterans’ Appeal, also described as “public policy . . . [for] 
Congress to decide.” JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 73 (Sept. 1963).  
 481. See Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary 
in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980). 
 482. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 194, at 142–50. 
 483. Morton J. Horwitz, The Warren Court: Rediscovering the Link Between Law and 
Culture, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 450, 456 (1988). 
 484. Lincoln Caplan, Exploring the Meaning of ‘Constitutional Conservatism,’ N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 2, 2010, at A36; see also REPUBLICANS IN CONG., A PLEDGE TO AMERICA: A 
NEW GOVERNING AGENDA BUILT ON THE PRIORITIES OF OUR NATION, THE PRINCIPLES WE 
STAND FOR & AMERICA’S FOUNDING VALUES 33 (2010), available at http://pledge.gop.gov/ 
resources/library/documents/pledge/a-pledge-to-america.pdf; SARAH PALIN, AMERICA BY 
HEART: REFLECTIONS ON FAMILY, FAITH, AND FLAG 259 (2010). 
 485. See, e.g., Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, 
and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1027 (2004). 
 486. See Symposium, Fidelity in Constitutional Theory, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1247 
(1997). 
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B. Revitalizing Public Spaces: Adjudication’s Democratic Possibilities  
Having focused on the grandeur of some new courthouses, I turn to reflect on 
the monumentality of the idea that they have come to stand for: that all can be 
rights holders. Public and open courts—to which all persons have access to bring 
claims before independent judges—represent a great and a recent understanding of 
the meaning of sovereignty in democratic governments.487 
Women and men of all colors only gained full juridical voice in the last century. 
The radical reconception of all persons as rights holders has driven up the volume 
of disputes. Potential defendants are likewise repositioned, as private stakeholders 
and governments are reconceived as subject to litigation to hold them to their 
promises—in contracts, statutes, regulations, and constitutional or transnational 
conventions of human equality and dignity. The result has been an avalanche of 
claims, ranging from veterans seeking benefits within administrative tribunals to 
victims of crimes against humanity seeking acknowledgment in domestic as well as 
in international courts for wrongdoing of horrific dimensions. What is often 
underappreciated is the degree to which those filings represent private as well as 
public investments in law production by courts. Litigants invest resources by 
employing attorneys and thereby turn courts into lively sources of law 
production.488 
Federal courthouse buildings—even if now underutilized—could be seen as 
pledges to maintain what can be conceived as the four pillars (again borrowing 
building metaphors) of modern adjudication—independent judges, public courts, 
fairness in procedural opportunities, and equal access for all. Open courts are not 
only a product of democracy, they also make significant contributions to 
democracy—providing lessons about citizen access and about government 
obligations of fair treatment, made plain when judges must publicly explain their 
exercise of power.489 
Courts can themselves be a site of democratic practices. Public courts are one 
of many venues to understand, as well as to contest, societal norms. Courts model 
the democratic precepts of equal treatment and subject the state itself to democratic 
constraints. The obligations of judges to protect disputants’ rights and the 
requirements imposed on litigants (the government included) to treat their 
opponents as equals are democratic practices of reciprocal respect. By imposing 
processes that dignify individuals as equals before the law, litigation either makes 
good on democracy’s promises or reveals failures to conform to those ideological 
precepts.  
Moreover, rights of audience divest the litigants and the government of 
exclusive control over conflicts and their resolution. Empowered, participatory 
audiences can therefore see and then debate what legal parameters ought to govern. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 487. See Judith Resnik, Bring Back Bentham: “Open Courts,” “Terror Trials,” and 
Public Sphere(s), 5 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 1 (2011).  
 488. See Gillian K. Hadfield, The Levers of Legal Design: Institutional Determinants of 
the Quality of Law, 36 J. COMP. ECON. 43 (2008). 
 489. This argument is elaborated in RESNIK & CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE, supra note 
236, at 288–305.  
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Open court proceedings enable people to watch, debate, develop, and contest the 
exercise of both public and private power.  
But the idea of courts as vibrant contributors to public debates needs to be 
tempered by the data on their underutilization. Above, I focused on flattening 
federal filings, stemming from a mix of new doctrinal and procedural barriers, 
undue expense, and preferences or pressures for other forms of dispute 
resolution.490 In a similar vein, obtaining a robust audience for courts also requires 
structural attention. Despite legal obligations of openness (stemming from a mix of 
criminal defendants’ rights to a speedy and public trial and civil litigants rights to 
juries, the contours of the First Amendment, and principles of due process), many 
judges report their courtrooms to be lonely spaces. Those experiences fit analyses 
that, through the 1930s, courts functioned as local gathering places, but those 
activities have shifted to other locales, including specialized buildings for the 
diverse services government offers and virtual exchanges via newer 
technologies.491  
In contrast to the popularity of media shows about courts, real judges often find 
themselves without an audience. Indeed, while in 2009, the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed the principle that when courtrooms are in use, everyone has a right to 
attend, it did so on facts that make the point. The Court overturned a state judge 
closure of a jury voir dire because the trial judge had failed to provide sufficient 
explanation for the blanket closure.492 The state court judge had said that the 
courtroom could not accommodate everyone—that “42 jurors [were] coming up,” 
insufficient “space” existed for the public “to sit in the audience” in light of the 
“very small courtrooms,” and the public mingling with jurors might have become 
“grounds for a mistrial . . . because of a tainted jury panel.”493 In contrast, the 
defendant argued that the four rows of seats could have held fifty-eight people; 
further, the dissenting jurist on the Georgia Supreme Court, which upheld the 
closure, noted that the trial judge could simply have seated fewer prospective jurors 
at a time.494 The United States Supreme Court agreed that the trial judge had not 
sufficiently probed alternatives to court-closing. Yet “the public” that was excluded 
by the trial judge was, according to the Court, a “lone courtroom observer”495—a 
relative of the defendant.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 490. Efforts to reorganize procedure in order to be responsive to the burdens of the 
current system are set forth in Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen Subrin, Litigation and 
Democracy: Restoring a Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399 (2011).  
 491. See, e.g., VICTOR C. GILBERTSON, MINNESOTA COURTHOUSES, at xvi (2005). 
 492. Presley v. Georgia, 130 S. Ct. 721, 724–25 (2010). 
 493. Presley v. State, 674 S.E.2d 909, 910 (Ga. 2009) (quoting the trial court), rev’d, 130 
S. Ct. 721 (2010). 
 494. Id. at 910; id. at 912 (Sears, C.J., dissenting) (“A room that is so small that it cannot 
accommodate the public is a room that is too small to accommodate a constitutional criminal 
trial.”).  
 495. Presley, 130 S. Ct. at 722. In contrast, the Georgia Supreme Court reported that no 
“testimony was offered at the hearing on the motion for new trial regarding how many 
observers were in the courtroom at the time of the trial court’s announcement regarding voir 
dire.” Presley v. State, 674 S.E.2d at 911 n.1.  
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The court system is not the only branch of government in need of participants. 
United States data on elections reflect that half or more of those eligible do not vote 
in many elections, even as candidates invest heavily in media to gain attention. 
Thus, to constitute courts as lively spaces of democratic interaction requires 
targeted efforts. In the nineteenth century, Jeremy Bentham, committed to 
“publicity” in courts, advocated for providing economic incentives for 
attendance.496 In 2009, the Honorable Vaughn Walker, presiding over a trial about 
the legality of an amendment to the California Constitution prohibiting same-sex 
marriage, suggested permitting broadcasts to other courthouses to which interested 
members of the public could go.497 Rather than have documentation of 
underutilization of federal courthouses serve as a justification for cutting back 
construction, that information should be used as a sign of the need to revitalize the 
spaces. To do so requires finding ways to bring litigants in and making what 
transpires there available to a broad audience.  
C. The Fragility of Stone 
In the decades since the Warren Court, many of its precedents have been 
dismantled. The Warren Court’s case law may appear, on first glance, to be more 
vulnerable than the buildings associated with Taft and Rehnquist. But the history of 
the federal building projects that I have mapped ought to serve as a warning against 
too ready an assumption of the invulnerability of the material accomplishments of 
all three chief justices. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 496. JEREMY BENTHAM, Constitutional Code, in 9 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 27, 
489–94, 535–56 (John Bowring ed., Edinburgh, William Tait 1843); see also FREDERICK 
ROSEN, JEREMY BENTHAM AND REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY: A STUDY OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CODE 153–55 (1983); PHILIP SCHOFIELD, UTILITY AND DEMOCRACY: THE 
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JEREMY BENTHAM 310 (2006). 
 497. In 2009, the Ninth Circuit authorized the use of cameras in certain cases, at the 
discretion of the district court. A district judge relied on that provision to permit the 
televising to other federal courthouses of a trial addressing the legality of an amendment to 
California’s constitution outlawing same-sex marriage. In a five-to-four decision, however, 
the U.S. Supreme Court intervened to prohibit that transmission. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 
130 S. Ct. 705, 715 (2010) (overturning limited effort to enable broadcast to other sites 
because of procedural failures). Thereafter, the Judicial Conference authorized a project for 
some broadcasting. See Press Release, Judicial Conference of the United States, Judiciary 
Approves Pilot Project for Cameras in District Courts (Sept. 14, 2010), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/News/NewsView/10-09-
14/Judiciary_Approves_Pilot_Project_for_Cameras_in_District_Courts.aspx. In the fall of 
2011, the district court ordered that the digital recording of the trial be unsealed and released 
to the public, a ruling which the Ninth Circuit reversed as an abuse of discretion, on the 
“narrow” ground that the judge presiding at trial had, following the Supreme Court's ruling 
in Hollingsworth, “on several occasions unequivocally promised [the parties] that the 
recording of the trial would be used only in chambers and not publicly broadcast.” Perry v. 
Brown, 667 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2012); see Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. C 09-02292 
JW, 2011 WL 4527349 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2011). The Ninth Circuit emphasized that it did 
not reach the issue of “whether the First Amendment right of public access to judicial 
records applies to civil proceedings.” Perry v. Brown, 667 F.3d at 1088. 
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Recall that custom houses marked the presence of the national government 
during the eighteenth century. Some of those elegant buildings remain, now 
recycled for use, including for use as courts and museums.498 The post office 
became a dominant and highly visible mode of federal authority, offering a local 
presence and, during the New Deal, a site for investment in art and architecture.  
More recently, however, the stability of national, subsidized postal services has 
been called into question. In March of 2009, press reports ran stories that the 
United States Postal Service was tottering.499 In that year, 13,000 fewer post offices 
existed than had in 1951, with more closings underway.500 As the system continued 
to lose money (with $2.8 billion cited as the amount lost in 2008),501 some 
commentators called for the dissolution of the Postal Service as an obsolete 
institution, to be replaced by the Internet and private providers.502 And, of course, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 498. For example, the Alexander Hamilton U.S. Custom House at Bowling Green in 
downtown New York currently hosts the Smithsonian National Museum of the American 
Indian, a United States Bankruptcy Court, and a Department of Transportation office. 
Alexander Hamilton U.S. Custom House, New York, NY, U.S. GEN. SERVICES ADMIN., 
http://www.gsa.gov/portal/ext/html/site/hb/category/25431/actionParameter/exploreByBuildi
ng/buildingId/644. Following extensive restoration in the 1960s, the Custom House in New 
Bedford, Massachusetts “became part of the New Bedford Whaling National Historical Park 
in 1996.” U.S. Custom House, New Bedford, MA, U.S. GEN. SERVICES ADMIN., 
http://www.gsa.gov/portal/ext/html/site/hb/method/post/actionParameter/searchCriteriaForm
/buildingId/410/category/25431.  
 499. See, e.g., Randolph E. Schmid, Postal Chief Says Post Office Running Out of 
Money, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 25, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/03/25/ 
post-office-funding-neede_n_179077.htm (noting that the Postal Service “stopped 
construction of new facilities” and “began selling unused facilities”); see also The Financial 
State of the U.S. Postal Service: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fed. Workforce, Postal 
Serv., & the D.C. of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 111th Cong. 15 (2009) 
[hereinafter 2009 Financial Stability of Post Offices Hearing] (statement of John E. Potter, 
Postmaster General) (noting that “[s]ince 1988, there has been a steady erosion of First-Class 
Mail . . . as . . . correspondence shift[s] from the mail to electronic communications”). 
 500. 2009 Financial Stability of Post Offices Hearing, supra note 499, at 108–10 
(testimony of Dale Goff, President, National Association of Postmasters of the United 
States), available at http://www.napus.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/325Statement.pdf. 
While mail volume peaked at 213 billion pieces in 2006, it declined to 180 billion in 2009, a 
“staggering decline of 15 percent.” Id. at 48 (statement of Carolyn Gallagher, Chairman, 
Board of Governors, U.S. Postal Service), available at http://about.usps.com/news/ 
testimony/2009/pr09-bog0325.htm. 
 501. See Press Release, United States Postal Service, Economy-Driven Mail Volume 
Decline Contributes to Postal Service $2.8 Billion Year-End Loss (Nov. 13, 2008); see also 
2009 Financial Stability of Post Offices Hearing, supra note 499. The Postal Service losses 
have continued to mount. The Postal Service reported $5.7 billion in losses through the first 
three quarters of FY 2011. Press Release, U.S. Postal Serv., U.S. Postal Service Loss 
Continues in Third Quarter (Aug. 5, 2011), http://about.usps.com/news/national-releases/ 
2011/pr11_094.htm. 
 502. Discussion of this viewpoint can be found in JOHN T. TIERNEY, THE U.S. POSTAL 
SERVICE: STATUS AND PROSPECTS OF A PUBLIC ENTERPRISE 212–18 (1988). 
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one can elaborate the patterns of privatization and transformation of other 
institutions, such as the police, prisons, libraries, and parks.503 
The contemporary defense of the post office as a public institution rests on 
arguments that ready communication through public services binds the nation and 
local communities while servicing the needs of the economy.504 The 1958 Postal 
Policy Act made such a claim: the Postal Service was “to unite more closely the 
American people, to promote the general welfare, and to advance the national 
economy.”505 Yet by the 1970s, Congress had limited the cross subsidies that made 
the exchange of newspapers inexpensive,506 thereby lessening the degree to which 
the public fisc subsidized a universal service facilitating wide ranging exchanges.507 
At the century’s turn, concerns were expressed that the Postal Service had already 
been transformed, favoring “junk mailers and big media over political opinion 
journals.”508  
The question is whether the fragility of the postal services forecasts what awaits 
courts. Evidence of deep concern about the solvency of courts can be found 
throughout the state systems. As noted above, in the fall of 2009, Chief Justice 
Margaret Marshall of Massachusetts warned that state courts were at risk of a “slow 
and painful demise” unless, like other institutions also perceived to be “too big to 
fail,” federal assistance was to be made available.509 Federal courts are, as detailed, 
richer but so, once, were post offices. Herein is the reminder that, while the granite 
and marble may remain, the purposes to which the stones are put can be changed.  
D. Federal Retrenchment and the Warren Court’s Revival in State Courts 
My conclusion for this Lecture comes from three interrelated artifacts of 2010, 
reiterating this Lecture’s interest in the judiciary’s corporate voice, its 
jurisprudence, its material practices, and its relationship to initiatives in the state 
courts. First, in the fall of 2010, an Ad Hoc Advisory Committee on Judiciary 
Planning proposed, and the Judicial Conference approved, a new “Strategic Plan” 
                                                                                                                 
 
 503. See, e.g., Robert Darnton, Google & the Future of Books, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 
12, 2009, at 9. 
 504. See The U.S. Postal Service: 101: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fed. Workforce, 
Postal Serv., & the D.C. of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 232 
(2007) (testimony of Charles W. Mapa, President, Nat’l League of Postmasters). Mapa 
focused on the harm to rural communities. See id.; see also OREN BEN-DOR, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE: A CRITICAL STUDY OF BENTHAM’S 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 193–98, 237–38 (2000). 
 505. Postal Policy Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-426, 72 Stat. 134, 134. 
 506. See Postal Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 91-375, 84 Stat. 719 (1970) (codified as 
amended at 39 U.S.C. (2006)). 
 507. See Richard R. John, Post Office, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NEW AMERICAN 
NATION: THE EMERGENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1754–1829, at 575, 576 (Paul Finkelman 
ed., 2006); Richard B. Kielbowicz, Preserving Universal Postal Service as a 
Communication Safety Net: A Policy History and Proposal, 30 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 383, 
404–11 (2006).  
 508. Richard R. John, Mail Matters, NATION, Feb. 23, 2009, at 23, 23. 
 509. Marshall, supra note 468, at 12, 16. 
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for the federal judiciary.510 Fifteen years earlier, the Rehnquist Judicial Conference 
had produced its 1995 Long Range Plan. The work had entailed a good deal of 
public discussion, an expansive committee structure, appointments across a 
political and professional spectrum, and the circulation of a draft report replete with 
data.511 In contrast, the 2010 Ad Hoc Committee consisted largely of district 
judges,512 who put forth a document without soliciting public comment in advance 
or attracting public attention during or after the completion of its project.513 
The 144-page 1995 Long Range Plan had begun with a series of warnings about 
a possible “scenario” of a “bleak” future—that the federal courts were in 
“jeopardy” due to the “[h]uge burdens” placed upon them (in part because of undue 
“federalization”)514 of caseloads spiraling out of control with the specter of more 
than a million cases filed annually.515 Perceiving the problem to include the filing 
of too many federal cases and congressional interest in generating more kinds of 
federal claims, the Long Range Plan had counseled Congress against adding new 
causes of action to the federal docket.516  
In contrast, the 2010 Strategic Plan is a slim, eighteen-page report that began 
instead by looking at how the “future may provide tremendous opportunities for 
improving the delivery of justice.”517 Given that the federal judiciary was 
“noteworthy for its accessibility, timeliness, and efficiency,” the goals were to 
“preserve” its successes while bringing about “positive change” in the “delivery of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 510. The Judiciary’s New Strategic Plan Encourages Collaborative Approach to Issues 
Facing the Federal Courts, THIRD BRANCH, Nov. 2010, at 10, 10–11. That successor 
document was not a “rescission of the recommendations and strategies” of the 1995 Long 
Range Plan but superseded some aspects of it as an instrument to guide future policy 
making. Id. at 10–12 (quoting Judge Charles Breyer, who chaired the Ad Hoc Advisory 
Committee on Judiciary Planning). The Plan itself, an eighteen page document, can be found 
at JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2010) 
[hereinafter 2010 STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY]. The effect on the 1995 
Long Range Plan as not an “across-the-board rescission of the individual policies 
articulated” can be found in the Plan. Id. at 18. 
 511. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at vii, 1–3, 165–74 (describing the many 
committees that participated and the planning process). 
 512. The chair, District Judge Charles R. Breyer, was joined by ten other district judges, 
one district clerk, one appellate judge from the Federal Circuit, and three administrators, two 
of whom were circuit executives and the other the Director of the Administrative Office of 
the U.S. Courts. 2010 STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, supra note 510, at 
Acknowledgement. 
 513. A review of various databases finds no mention in newspapers or legal journals of 
the ongoing effort. Reports of its existence come from the Judicial Conference, see, e.g., 
REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES AND MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
OF THE UNITED STATES (2009); from the director of the AO, in a brief mention, AO ANN. 
REP. 38 (2008); and, in November of 2010, from the newsletter of the federal courts, The 
Judiciary’s New Strategic Plan Encourages Collaborative Approach to Issues Facing the 
Federal Courts, THIRD BRANCH, Nov. 2010, at 10, 10–12.  
 514. LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 6, 8–10, 18. 
 515. Id. at 18.  
 516. Id. at 23, 28–29 (recommendations one and six). 
 517. 2010 STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, supra note 510, at 3. 
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justice,” “effective” resource management, interbranch relations, and public 
confidence.518  
The 2010 Strategic Plan reiterated the need to “secure resources” for the 
judiciary to “accomplish its mission.”519 The lack of new judgeships, the lack of 
salary raises, and the forty-dollar per day pay for jurors were noted.520 The rest of 
the document was focused on management of judicial resources, staff and 
workload, morale, retention, and technology. Reflecting the anxieties of its era and 
responding to specific acts of violence against judges and their families, the 
Judicial Conference’s 2010 “Strategy 1.2” was more “protection of judges, court 
staff and the public at court facilities.”521  
The topic entitled “Enhancing Access to the Judicial Process” is addressed 
largely in terms of “rules, processes and procedures” that met “the needs of lawyers 
and litigants.”522 Commentary noted that despite the provision of “settlement 
conferences, mediation programs, and other forms of alternative dispute resolution 
to parties interested in resolving their claims prior to a judicial decision,” “some 
lawyers, litigants, and members of the public continue to find litigating in the 
federal courts challenging.” 523 Time and expense were the problems, and clearer 
and more flexible rules, under judicial superintendence, the answer.524 The goals 
were to ensure that “those who participate” were treated with “dignity and respect” 
and provided with a process that was comprehensible.525  
Public trust was also essential, and the mechanisms proposed were public 
education as well as commitments to high ethical standards and dissemination of 
decisions to the public.526 The attention paid to access as part of the Strategic 
Plan’s initial discussion of equal justice translated into better case management, 
resources for criminal defense lawyers, and the like.527 Not on the list of goals were 
methods to improve the ability of those not currently in the courts to make their 
way to them. 
A second marker comes by way of turning from the judiciary’s corporate voice 
to its adjudication. The lack of attention in the 2010 Strategic Plan to finding new 
paths to the federal courts is mirrored by decisions of the Roberts Court limiting 
access. A new list of cases now stand for the propositions that causes of action are 
                                                                                                                 
 
 518. Id. This statement followed a list of “core values”—rule of law, equal justice, 
judicial independence, accountability, excellence, and service. Id. at 2.  
 519. Id. at 7 (Strategy 1.3). 
 520. Id. 
 521. Id. at 6. The issue of security received increased attention after a federal district 
court judge’s husband and mother were murdered by a former litigant. The judge testified 
before Congress on the need to improve security for judges. Protecting the Judiciary at 
Home and in the Courthouse: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 
6–13 (2005) (statement of Joan Humphrey Lefkow, United States District Judge, Northern 
District of Illinois, Chicago, Illinois). 
 522. 2010 STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, supra note 510, at 12–14. 
 523. Id. at 13. 
 524. Id.  
 525. Id. at 14. 
 526. Id. at 16–17. 
 527. Id. at 5–6. “Accessibility of court processes” was detailed as part of “equal justice.” 
Id. at 2.  
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not to be implied from statutes, that pleadings are to be tested for “plausibility,” 
that state actors enjoy broad immunities from suit, that state habeas petitioners have 
larger hurdles to federal court review, and that the preemptive reach of the FAA is 
broader.528 Another example of door-closing is a “small” case—in dollar terms—
that has yet to garner the attention it deserves. The question, on which the circuits 
had split,529 was how to interpret the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) of 1980, 
providing that a “prevailing party” can recoup fees from the United States 
government if the government’s position was not “substantially justified.”530  
Catherine Ratliff represented Social Security claimant Ruby Willow Kills Ree, 
who succeeded in obtaining benefits and then sought a fee award of $2112.60, as 
authorized under the EAJA.531 (In fiscal year 2006, the average amount paid for 
successful attorney’s work was $3573.47.532) However, and at variance with 
practices of prior administrations, the federal government sought to have the funds 
paid directly to the party, Ms. Kills Ree, so as to use the litigant’s fee owed to her 
attorney as partial payment of her unrelated federal debt.533 While the district court 
did so, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the statute had plainly been enacted to 
encourage lawyers to take cases by providing fee awards to lawyers534 and 
therefore required the lawyer to get the $2112 owed.535  
Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas resolved the split in favor of the literal 
interpretation that meant that the lawyer did not receive compensation for her 
work.536 Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, concurred 
that, while the text was plain, Congress was unlikely to have intended EAJA fees to 
be subjected to offsets.537 The concurrence explained that the government had 
offered “no compelling response” as to why the statute ought to be interpreted to 
make “it more difficult for the neediest litigants to find attorneys to represent them 
in cases against” the United States.538  
                                                                                                                 
 
 528. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 
1350 (2011); Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011); AT&T v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 
1740 (2011). See generally Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. 
L.J. 119 (2011); Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its 
Consequences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809 (2010). 
 529. See, e.g., Reeves v. Astrue, 526 F.3d 732 (11th Cir. 2008); Manning v. Astrue, 510 
F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 530. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (2006). 
 531. Equal Access to Justice Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2325 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2006)); Astrue v. Ratliff, 130 S. Ct. 2521 (2010). 
 532. Respondent’s Brief at 4, Astrue v. Ratliff, 130 S. Ct. 2521 (2010) (No. 08-1322) 
(noting that the SSA paid 5481 awards in that year). 
 533. Id. at 1–2. The federal statute invoked by the government was one directing that 
each federal agency “shall try to collect” monetary claims owed to the government. 31 
U.S.C. § 3711(a) (2006); see Brief for the Petitioner at 2, Astrue v. Ratliff, 130 S. Ct. 2521 
(No. 08-1322). 
 534. Ratliff v. Astrue, 540 F.3d 800 (8th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 2521 (2010). 
 535. Id. at 802. 
 536. Astrue v. Ratliff, 130 S. Ct. 2521 (2010). 
 537. Id. at 2529–30 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 538. Id. at 2532 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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A third event of 2010 returns to the relevance of physical space. I opened this 
Lecture with a vista of the 1935 Supreme Court; pictures of it in 2010 provide the 
bookend. Then, the United States Supreme Court announced that it was closing its 
front door.539 The Court meant that literally. In lieu of entering by way of the grand 
staircase on the western plaza, visitors are routed to a side entrance for weapons 
screening. I went to the Court soon thereafter, and that trip is recorded in Figures 
33 and 34. Shown are the bollards (figure 33) protecting the steps from vehicles but 
permitting pedestrians to pass through. Figure 34 provides a glimpse of the small 
sign pointing to each side as the “entrance” to the court. 
 
 
Figure 33: United States Supreme Court Plaza, Washington D.C.
 
Copyright © 2010 Judith Resnik. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 539. Press Release, Supreme Court of the United States, Supreme Court Visitor Entrance 
(May 3, 2010), http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/press/viewpressreleases.aspx? 
FileName=pr_05-03-10.html. The Supreme Court provides information on the building 
including the plaza, steps, and statues on their website. U.S. Supreme Court, The Court 
Building, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/courtbuilding.aspx. 
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Figure 34: United States Supreme Court Staircase, Washington D.C.
 
Copyright © 2010 Judith Resnik. 
 
In their objection to closing the Supreme Court’s main entrance, Justices 
Stephen Breyer and Ruth Bader Ginsburg noted that people approaching it were 
greeted by the words “Equal Justice Under Law,” inscribed to represent “the ideal 
that anyone in this country may obtain meaningful justice through application to 
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this Court.”540 Under the new rule, people can exit by using the grand steps, with 
those words to their backs. 
The steps, like the buildings, the chief justices, and federal law are polyphonic 
symbols—to which multiple and sometimes contradictory meanings can attach as 
vantages and contexts change. The set of forty-four marble steps, metaphorically 
signifying the openness of courts, has also served as a marker of inaccessibility. 
The steps challenge those who find walking up them difficult, as the Court’s 
decision in Tennessee v. Lane discussed. Thus, these two photographs evoke both 
aspirations for open access and the need to rethink the format of courts to 
reconfigure them to make room for those previously excluded. Absent support 
systems—from ramps to rules, doctrine, and practices—neither courts nor their 
users can flourish. While the 2010 Strategic Plan and Astrue v. Ratliff’s reading of 
the Equal Access to Justice Act case have not (yet) prompted a good deal of public 
discussion, closing off the Court’s steps did. News coverage was coupled with 
objections from more than twenty members of Congress who called on the Court to 
reverse course,541 arguing that “even in the face of threats from enemies, it is of 
critical and symbolic importance that the United States demonstrates to the world 
that its most sacred institutions will continue to be open for business to all who 
seek justice.”542  
That proposed resolution serves as a reminder that Congress could, were the 
political will available, remove various barriers. A response to underusage of 
federal facilities could be to find ways of enhancing access to help bring litigants 
back into courts.543 Ready examples include revising the Court’s interpretations of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 540. Statement Concerning the Supreme Court’s Front Entrance, Memorandum of 
Justice Breyer, 2009 J. SUP. CT. U.S. 807, 831 (joined by Justice Ginsburg).  
 541. See H.R. Con. Res. 314, 111th Cong. (2010) (introduced by Rep. Anna Eshoo, a 
Democrat from California). 
 542. Id. ¶ 2. 
 543. When testifying at a hearing on this issue, I suggested the creation of 
district-by-district committees, akin to those deployed under the Civil Justice Reform Act 
(CJRA) of 1990. See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471–82 (2006)); see also JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS AND 
DELAY IN CIVIL LITIGATION: REPORT OF A TASK FORCE (1989). Each chief judge of a district 
could be asked to appoint a committee that included a diverse set of courtroom users. 
Relevant participants would include lawyers from different segments of the bar (for 
example, the United States Attorneys’ offices, federal public defenders, and civil litigators 
specializing in different kinds of cases) as well as court staff, representatives from relevant 
administrative agencies, from state courts, and members of the public. In terms of the scope 
of inquiry, these local “courtroom usage committees” should consider the number and kind 
of courtrooms available, including appellate as well as trial level courtrooms, the degree of 
sharing already under way, and any unique circumstances of particular courthouses. Further, 
if a district sits where a federal administrative agency conducts hearings (such as 
proceedings before immigration judges, social security judges, and the like), consideration 
should be directed to whether any of those proceedings could use courtroom space, if 
available. 2010 Courtroom Use: Access to Justice, supra note 11, at 85 (statement of Judith 
Resnik). 
  Such “courtroom usage committees” should be asked to review the circumstances of 
each district so as to provide proposals based on the varying needs of districts about a) how 
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the EAJA, the habeas statutes, and the FAA. Indeed, proposals to reverse the 
Court’s application of the FAA to consumer and to employment arbitration have 
been pending for several years, and after a 2011 decision preempting state law 
invalidation of a clause banning class arbitrations, members of Congress proposed 
to do so again.544 Constitutional interpretations are, of course, less easily 
susceptible to legislative override, but over time, social movements can erode or 
consolidate the import of the decisions. 
While thus far, the federal courts and Congress are not pursuing efforts to lower 
barriers, state court jurists have come to the fore as advocates for the right to 
counsel for poor claimants dealing with fundamental needs, such as shelter and 
family relations.545 Just as the federal courts were imbued with legal and cultural 
capital during the last century, the twenty-first century may mark the reemergence 
of the state courts as a fount of national legal agenda setting.546 Doctrine is one 
area, with same-sex marriage as one of several issues bringing visibility to the state 
courts.547 Another is the effort, nicknamed “Civil Gideon,” to invoke Earl Warren’s 
                                                                                                                 
to increase courtroom usage, b) whether to share courtrooms, and if so, with what sets of 
adjudicators, and c) whether courtrooms could be used by relevant local federal agency 
adjudicators or whether state court users would be appropriate. Another model of reform that 
should serve as a guide comes from the history of bankruptcy courts. Before the 1980s, the 
bankruptcy system did not have the stature that it has gained by virtue of congressional 
authorization for bankruptcy judges, who moved before the public in courtrooms around the 
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the problems that have beset those proceedings, benefitting the administration of justice and 
alleviating some of the burdens that these cases now impose on the appellate courts. Id. at 
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landmark decision interpreting the Sixth Amendment to require lawyers for 
indigent defendants facing felony convictions.548  
With the support of leaders of state judiciaries on both coasts, state court justices 
have supported efforts to expand rights of counsel for civil litigants. Through the 
efforts of California’s then-Chief Justice Ronald M. George and California’s 
Judicial Council, California enacted laws—the Sargent Shriver Civil Counsel 
Act—for pilot projects based in selected courts to provide appointed counsel for 
“low-income parties in civil matters involving critical issues affecting basic human 
needs.”549  
Jonathan Lippman, the Chief Judge of the State of New York, has likewise 
expressed his support for developing rights to counsel in civil cases and, in 
November 2010, set aside budgets for it. Under his leadership, the New York state 
legislature adopted a joint resolution that the “fair administration of justice requires 
that every person who must use the courts have access to adequate legal 
representation.”550 Moreover, he has addressed the “disturbing disconnect between 
the promise of Gideon and the reality of our criminal justice system,” and charged 
the Indigent Legal Services Office, whose Board he chaired, with undertaking to 
fulfill the “moral obligation [that] every participant in the criminal justice system” 
deserves adequate defense services.551 Lippman explained that the “very reason 
[that courts] exist” is to provide equal justice to all, and that mandate entails 
providing representation to the “poor and the indigent.”552 And just as the 
professional bar once supported the federal court efforts to gain authority and 
resources, today’s American Bar Association has been a strong advocate of these 
state-based efforts.553 In contrast, the 2011 Supreme Court’s decision in Turner v. 
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Rogers refused to require counsel for a civil contemnor facing charges leveled by a 
child’s parent of failure to provide child support.554 Yet the challenge of funding 
both courts and their users has become a topic around the world.555 
This Lecture has provided a history of changing norms, practices, buildings, and 
constitutional interpretations, spawned by social movements mixing with economic 
forces and the professions of lawyers, judges, and architects. The twentieth-century 
narrative was not inevitable but a product of social and political will. The first 
decade of the twenty-first century has been one of closing doors, literally and 
legally. What visions of courts and their buildings will prevail in the decades to 
come remains to be seen.  
I have sketched normative arguments about why courts are a special service 
critical to democratic orders. What has also become plain is that the “courts” 
meriting attention are no longer only those sited in courthouses (grand or modest) 
but also in administrative agencies, and that the courthouses in most dramatic need 
are those in the states. As Earl Warren is emblematic of a commitment to opening 
up courts, it is perhaps now fitting that the one building that web searches identify 
as named after Earl Warren is a state court facility in San Francisco in which the 
Supreme Court of California and one of that state’s appellate divisions sits, along 
with the administrators of that court system. The monumental idea of courts as 
open venues is today a site of conflict—tottering in the federal courts as some state 
jurists seek its restoration. 
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